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ABSTRACT
WORK AND POWER IN POST-FORDIST PRODUCTION:
A CASE STUDY OF FOUR MACHINE SHOPS
by
Stephen A. Sweet 
University of New Hampshire. May, 1994
American industry is shifting to a "post-Fordist" 
approach to production. The post-Fordist approach includes 
expanding use of advanced manufacturing technologies, 
decreasing organizational sizes, decreasing bureaucratization 
of the work place, and the abandonment of Tayloristic 
managerial practices in favor of increasing worker 
participation in decision making processes. This study 
examines the effects of the post-Fordist approach upon power 
relations in four work places in the machining industry.
Interviews with 44 machinists, employers and community 
leaders in the case study site "Machinist Valley" show that 
the shift to post-Fordism is accompanied by declining incomes, 
fewer employment opportunities, lower benefits, and less job 
security in comparison to machining work during the Fordist 
era. While machinists exercise greater skills in the work 
place, they have less power to determine the pace and pay of 
their work. Declining worker power primarily results from
ix
owners' abilities in Machinist Valley to instill and take 
advantage of the feeling of individual and collective job 
insecurity that pervades workers' consciousness.
These findings point to the need for further evaluation 
of the shift to "flexible specialization." Findings of this 
study suggest that the optimistic scenario of craft control 
theory (Piore & Sable 1984), which asserts that increasing 
craft skills enhance worker power in the work place, is 
unlikely to be born out of post-Fordism in the current market 
conditions. The experiences of workers in Machinist Valley 
are more consistent with the projections of fragmentation 
theory (Lash & Urry 1987), which projects decreasing worker 
power due to declines in workers' class capacities.
x
INTRODUCTION
In the early decades of the 20th century, a new approach 
to production dramatically changed the shape of American 
manufacturing work. Huge factories replaced the small craft 
shops of the 19th century. Highly specialized machines geared 
for mass production, such as the assembly line, replaced 
simple craft tools (Hounshell 1984). A bureaucratically 
organized work place replaced the informal "simple" methods of 
organizing and controlling work (Edwards 1979). A new method 
of "scientific management," that separated thought from 
execution, made it possible to replace skilled craftsmen with 
less skilled machine operators (Braverman 1974) . These 
combined changes constitute the key features of Fordism, an 
approach to production which dominated American industry well 
into the 1970s.
In the last 20 years, however, new approaches to 
manufacturing are producing changes as dramatic as those seen 
in the early 20th century. Huge factories are being replaced 
with smaller "flexibly specialized" enterprises designed to 
capitalize on new markets for customized goods (Chandler 1990, 
Piore & Sabel 1984). Rigidly specialized machines are being 
replaced with programmable computer technologies. These new 
"smart machines" have the potential for liberating workers
from the degraded tasks of Fordism or potentially extending 
the degradation process (Zuboff 1988, Howard 1985, Shaiken 
1984). Work organizations are increasingly becoming de­
bureaucratized and companies rely on fewer formal rules and 
rigidly defined offices and job tasks (Tucker 1992). And a 
new management philosophy extols the desirability of returning 
decision making responsibilities to workers, replacing the 
Tayloristic practice of separating thought from execution 
(Thomas & Kochan 1992, Wood 1989, Dore 1986).
Taken as a whole, these changes represent a shift from 
the previously dominant "Fordist" approach to a new "post- 
Fordist" approach to production. This dissertation examines 
control in the work place in the machining industry during the 
Fordist and post-Fordist eras. By examining workers' 
experiences in a case study community long dependent upon the 
machining industry, I explore how the shift to the post- 
Fordist approach affects the power of machinists to assert 
their individual and collective wills in determining the terms 
of production. As Richard Edwards (1979) points out, the work 
place is a domain of "contested terrain," where owners and 
workers engage in conflict over the terms of production. The 
post-Fordist work place is a new arena for conflict between 
owners and workers. It may render old methods of control 
obsolete and potentially enable workers and owners to shift 
the distributions of power established under Fordism.
This case study analyzes worker experiences in "Machinist
2
Valley" to examine how workers' and owners' power in the work 
place changed under post-Fordist production. Machinist Valley 
is an industrial district in the Northeastern United States 
which was previously dominated by six very large machining 
enterprises. During the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, 
machinists have seen their opportunities decline compared to 
when the previously dominant Fordist enterprises were 
operating during the 1940s-1970s. By the mid 1980s, all of 
these large enterprises had closed or downsized during the 
period of "deindustrialization" (Bluestone & Harrison 1982). 
However, during the 1970s and 1980s there was significant 
growth in the number of small post-Fordist enterprises 
occurred in Machinist Valley, and these small shops offered 
new job opportunities in the same industry. Similar trends 
toward smaller organization size are occurring at the national 
level.
Machinists are the backbone of any industrial society, as 
they operate the machines that bend, cut and shape metal into 
precise shapes. They not only make machines, but they also 
make the machines that make machines. Almost all products 
produced in an industrialized society are in some way the 
product of machinists' work. Despite claims of an emerging 
"post-industrial society" (Bell 1973), and the 
"deindustrialization of America" (Bluestone & Harrison 1982) 
industrial production remains an important aspect of the 
American economy (Kutscher & Personick 1986), and machinists
3
will probably continue to be important to sustaining American 
industry.
Machinists are also particularly important to the study 
of post-Fordism because they have been affected by the 
organization and technological changes associated with this 
new approach to production. Machinists use the machinery 
associated with advanced manufacturing technologies, such as 
computer numerically controlled machine tools. And consistent 
with the shift to post-Fordism, the machining industry is 
restructuring to smaller enterprise sizes representative of 
the post-bureaucratic organization of work.
In Chapter 1, I examine changing markets which signal a 
shift from the Fordist era to the post-Fordist era. I detail 
how the Fordist approach to production affected power and 
control in the work place. I then examine the features of the 
post-Fordist approach and detail the projections of craft 
control theory and fragmentation theory and how new approaches 
to production affect power in the work place. Chapter 2 
details the methodology I used to examine how control and 
power in the work place have changed as the post-Fordist 
approach to production was introduced in the case study site 
of Machinist Valley.
In Chapter 3, I examine how pay and benefits machinists 
receive for their labor have changed during the transition to 
smaller post-Fordist enterprises. Chapter 4 examines the 
methods that owners use to control production and workers in
4
Machinist Valley. Chapter 5 analyzes control from below, the 
methods workers use to exert their individual and collective 
wills on the production process in Machinist Valley. These 
findings suggest that post-Fordist production decreases 
workers' power in the work place by making obsolescent the 
forms of workers' control developed under Fordism. Chapter 6 
examines the parallels between Fordism and post-Fordism 
concerning the development of owners' and workers' control in 




FROM FORDISM TO POST-FORDISM
This chapter examines the Fordist era and post-Fordist 
era and how Fordist and post-Fordist approaches to production 
influence control in the work place. I first discuss changes 
in labor markets and product markets which have caused 
companies in the United States to shift away from "American 
System" of mass production in order to exploit emerging 
markets. The changes in labor markets and product markets, 
and the decline of United States’ hegemony of the global 
economy, signal a shift from the Fordist era to the post- 
Fordist era.
I then discuss how the Fordist era influenced production 
practices and the ways in which workers and owners attempt to 
advance their competing interests within the "contested 
terrain" of the work place. I show that owners' practices 
under Fordism were instrumental in reducing the effectiveness 
of methods of workers' control exercised in the 19th century 
craft production. But by developing new tactics of control 
specific to Fordist production, workers were able to retain 
power and advance their economic position.
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The final section of this chapter examines how the 
Fordist era is currently being superseded by the post-Fordist 
era, and details the characteristics of the post-Fordist 
approach to production. The post-Fordist approach includes 
downsizing of organization, introduction of flexible 
technologies, and new managerial practices which favor 
increasing worker participation in decision-making. While 
there is some debate among scholars concerning Fordism and its 
effects upon workers, there is even less agreement on post- 
Fordism concerning its effects upon workers' power in the work 
place.
Two opposing theories will be examined to illuminate the 
points of contention concerning how post-Fordism influences 
power in the work place. Craft control theory (Piore & Sabel 
1984) offers a positive assessment concerning work experience 
under post-Fordism. This theory suggests that worker power 
could increase by returning craft control to individual 
workers in a manner similar to that of craft production in the 
19th century. On the other hand, fragmentation theory (Lash 
& Urry 1987) emphasizes diminished worker power resulting from 
the declining class capacities of workers to exert their 
collective wills in negotiating the terms under which 
production takes place.
7
Changing Labor Markets and Product Markets
This study is an analysis of how power in the work place 
is changing as American industry restructures to capitalize on 
new markets in a global economy. This study is not a study of 
global capitalism, but rather is concerned with the practices 
of employers and workers within companies as their firms find 
niches in these new markets. My primary concern is with 
relations within the work place, not the external factors 
which have produced these changes. Nonetheless,
understandings of experiences in the firms studied in this 
dissertation must be grounded in an understanding of the 
changing labor markets and product markets which have brought 
about their emergence.
This section briefly outlines the central changes in 
labor markets and product markets which have influenced the 
emergence and structure of the new enterprises in this study. 
Since the early 1970s, labor markets and product markets have 
changed as industry in the United States has shifted to the 
global production of goods (Barnett & Muller 1974). These 
changes are having a profound affect on how work places are 
organized, the use of technology in production, and the 
experience of work.
Changing Labor Markets
Prior to the 1970s, manufacturing work was characterized
8
by a two tier opportunity structure, described both as a "dual 
economy" (Averitt 1968) and a "dual labor market" (Edwards, 
Reich & Gordon 1973). Dual economy theory argues that 
American companies can be divided into two groups, "core" and 
"peripheral" enterprises. Core enterprises constitute a 
sector of prosperous corporations that are large in size, 
create stable jobs, and have sufficient economic power to 
restrict threat from outside competition within their 
industry. Peripheral enterprises are smaller in size, less 
prosperous, and less stable (Averitt 1968).
Similarly, dual labor market theory distinguishes 
opportunities between a "primary" and a "secondary" labor 
market. Primary labor markets are characterized by jobs which 
offer high wages, better benefits, career structures, chances 
to acquire skills, and secure employment. Secondary labor 
markets offer lower wages, fewer possibilities for 
advancement, low potential for skill acquisition, and insecure 
employment (Edwards, Reich & Gordon 1973) . Both
conceptualizations, while differing slightly in focus, point
to a sharp division between the "good jobs" and "lousy jobs"
that emerged during the 20th century. They also point to the
structural barriers to mobility and low life chances for those
workers occupying positions in the peripheral firms or in 
secondary labor market. Prior to 1970, primary labor market 
jobs were predominantly found in core enterprises and 
secondary labor market jobs were predominantly found in the
9
peripheral enterprises.
While the dual labor market may still hold true for 
service sector employment, I believe it is of lesser relevance 
in examining the life chances of American manufacturing 
workers in the global economy of the 1990s. As industry 
increasingly takes advantage of the second world and third 
world labor, because of the cost advantages this labor offers, 
low-skill manufacturing jobs are of increasing importance in 
these countries (Sassen 1988, Portes & Walton 1981). As low- 
skilled jobs are exported to peripheral areas of the global 
economy, they are of decreasing importance in core countries 
such as the United States (Wallerstein 1991). An indication 
of the result of this process are the declining numbers of 
lower wage manufacturing jobs. According to the Committee on 
the Budget of the United States Congress (1988), low wage 
manufacturing opportunities (paying less than $11,611) 
declined by 54,000 jobs from 1979-1987. Likewise, middle wage 
manufacturing opportunities (paying $11,612-$46,444) declined 
by 2,230,000 jobs from 1979-1987.
During this same time period, the core and periphery 
sectors of dual economy theory have also undergone important 
changes. Corporate restructuring is resulting in the 
downsizing of many of the previously dominant core firms, and 
there is an increasing reliance upon smaller peripheral firms 
for the "outsourcing'1 of production (Brown, Hamilton & Medoff 
1990, Bluestone & Harrison 1982). Therefore, while the core
1 0
and periphery distinction of dual economy theory was generally 
consistent with the primary and secondary labor markets of 
dual labor market theory prior to 1970s, by the 1990s these 
relationships are proving much more complex. Given these 
concurrent changes, the contemporary labor market in 
manufacturing enterprises may potentially integrate primary 
labor market work within peripheral enterprises. As companies 
downsize, manufacturing work is argued by many to be evolving 
to a point where most manufacturing enterprises located in 
America will rely primarily on high skilled workers for stable 
production (Marshall & Tucker 1992, Thurow 1992, William & 
Packer 1987).
Changing Product Markets
Product markets also influence the experience of work, as 
the products influence the ways in which work is to be 
performed. Prior to the 1970s, 20th century American industry 
was characterized by the "American System," which relied upon 
the mass production of standardized goods (Chandler 1977) . 
Internal demands in industrializing America during the first 
decades of the 20th century through World War II sustained the 
markets for mass produced goods, requiring little variation in 
product lines (Chandler 1990). For example, automobile models 
were limited and few options on cars were available. The 1945 
Bretton Woods conference extended the American System, and 
gave the United States considerable advantages in marketing
1 1
mass produced American goods to war devastated Europe (Thurow 
1992).
Piore and Sabel (1984) and Lash and Urry (1987) point to 
changing product markets as being one of the distinguishing 
features of the new era in industrial production. According 
to both studies, the increasing competition in the 1970s has 
reduced the United States' hegemony over markets for mass 
produced products. This has compelled United States' industry 
to shift toward production of more specialized commodities and 
away from the Fordist approach to mass production. Aside from 
growing international competition, Piore and Sabel (1984) 
point to two related forces compelling industry tend toward 
"flexible specialization." They argue that markets for mass 
produced commodities have reached a point of saturation and 
are therefore of declining importance. They also suggest that 
industries are starting to abandon mass production in favor of 
a new approach to flexible specialization, which increases the 
likelihood of innovating and capturing new markets.
Lash and Urry (1987) emphasize cultural changes which 
affect the markets for goods. According to these authors, 
media created desires have created a new "post-modernist 
sensibility" for unique products. Whereas the customized 
product was once used to distinguish bourgeois tastes (see 
Bourdieu 1984), post-modernity levels class distinctions by 
promoting individuality in consumption practices among the 
masses. Therefore, wide ranging markets are opening for
1 2
unique, specialized, and "funky" products. A comparison of 
the automobile industry of the 1950s and 1990s, for example, 
provides compelling evidence in support of their thesis, as 
the multitudes of automobile makes, models and options have 
grown exponentially. Companies that can provide these 
variations in products have a decided advantage in 
capitalizing on these cultural changes.
Standardized goods are suited to rigid technologies, such 
as the assembly line, and rigidly bureaucratic organizations. 
While these approaches to production are well suited the 
American System of mass production, they are a decided 
disadvantage for enterprises attempting to capture the new 
markets for specialized goods. These changes in markets are 
having a major impact on the ways in which goods are produced 
and the experience of work.
These changes in labor markets and product markets signal 
a shift from the Fordist era and the post-Fordist era in the 
United States. The Fordist era (1900-1973) constitutes the 
time period in which the United States held hegemony in the 
global economy with the American System of mass production. 
The post-Fordist era (1973-present) signals a new era in which 
American industry has lost its control of the global economy 
and is shifting away from the American System of mass 
production in order to exploit new labor markets and 
capitalize on new product markets. I discuss below how the 
Fordist era was also characterized by specific practices of
13




In an analysis of class relations in American society, 
Antonio Gramsci (1971) coined the word "Fordism” to describe 
Henry Ford's methods of successfully implementing assembly 
line technology in the early 20th century. According to 
Gramsci, Fordism had the effect of reducing the potentials for 
class conflict in America by linking the interests of big 
business with nationalistic ideology of "Americanism" through 
a skilled use of coercion, ideology and economic reward:
....it was relatively easy to rationalize production 
and labour by a skillful combination of force 
(destruction of working-class trade unionism on a 
territorial basis) and persuasion (high wages, various 
social benefits, extremely subtle ideological and 
political propaganda) and thus succeed in making the 
whole life of the nation revolve around production 
(Gramsci 1971:285).
Subseguent discussions of Fordism use the term to describe the 
significant events which enabled the United States to dominate 
the global economy in 20th century. Two explanations are 
given to explain this dominance: economic and industrial.
Economic theories of Fordism argue that because the 
United States was able to secure favorable trading relations
14
in the 194 5 Bretton Woods Conference, it was able to prosper 
by gaining hegemonic control of the global market for goods 
(Sayer 1989). Economic theories also argue that Fordism 
operates by a "propulsive" force, whereby high wages promote 
consumerism, which in turn drives production in related 
sectors of in the economy (Sayer 1989) . High wages thereby 
sustained the United States economy, as well as prevented 
class conflict by enabling American workers to experience 
personal prosperity.
Production in the United States during the latter half of 
the 20th century functioned with a mutual understanding 
between workers and owners that disruption of production would 
be minimal so long as workers' wages continued to increase 
(Reich 1991). Until 1973, wages increased and real family 
incomes consistently grew, thereby sustaining the Fordist 
approach (Levy 1986). A crisis in the Fordist approach 
occurred, however, in conjunction with the emergence of newly 
industrialized countries [NICs] and the OPEC oil embargo, 
which challenged the United States domination of the world 
economy. After 1973, incomes stagnated and declined (Levy 
1986) and the high wages which supported hegemonic control 
could no longer be sustained in the face of increasing 
international competition (Thurow 1992). Because the United 
State's domination of the global economy is being replaced in 
a new era of "head to head competition" (Thurow 1992), 
economic theories assert that capitalism is entering into a
15
"post-Fordist" stage (Sayer 1989).
On the other hand, Fordism is also used to describe 
specific industrial practices which occur within the factory 
(Sayer 1989). In this section I concentrate my analysis on 
these practices and how they affect power relations within the 
enterprise. These include the use of assembly line mass 
production, large factories, start to finish production 
practices, and Taylorized job tasks. As these features of 
industrial production appear to be declining, again Fordism is 
argued to be shifting to a post-Fordist approach (Sayer 1989) .
In the present analysis, I use the term Fordism to 
describe the approach to production that dominated 
manufacturing work in the United States during the first 
seventy years of the 20th century, which I have termed the 
Fordist era. In its most advanced form, the Fordist approach 
developed into production methods that used highly 
bureaucratized organizations to control large numbers of 
workers who labored at divided and repetitious tasks on 
machinery designed for mass production. Under this approach, 
laborers worked on highly specialized machines designed to 
mass produce component parts to be assembled on a final 
assembly line procedure. Each laborer performed tasks more 
simple than those types of tasks executed by skilled laborers 
under the craft approach to production. Work was guided by a 
system of scientific management which stipulated a separation 
of thought from execution, delegating design to management and
16
manual tasks to workers (Braverman 1974). In order to manage 
the large organization, formalized bureaucratic rules were 
implemented which stipulated job classifications, tasks, and 
wages (Edwards 1979).
My analysis is limited to post-Fordism as it operates 
within the factory, rather than the global context within 
which post-Fordism emerged. Global production and global 
markets are an important aspect of the post-Fordist era and 
global production significantly lowers workers' power because 
owners are not constrained by national borders in their 
efforts to employ workers at low wages (Barlett & Steele 1992, 
Portes & Walton 1981, Wallerstein 1979). At the same time, 
changing approaches to production are occurring within the 
factory walls and these changes are also influencing power 
relations between owners and workers. By concentrating this 
study within the place of employment and in the local 
community, I am highlighting how a changing approach to 
production influences power relations between workers and 
owners at a specific level of analysis that is analytically 
differentiated from other levels of analysis (Luhmann 1982).
Before addressing how Fordism changed power relations 
within the factory, it is also important to address the issue 
of the degree to which the concept of "Fordism" is appropriate 
to describe the experiences of all workers during the 20th 
century. In this study, I focus the analysis on the 
experiences of machinists and I use the term "worker" and
1 7
"machinist" interchangeably. However, machinists should be 
conceptually distinguished from workers laboring in other 
industries, especially those types of workers who labor in the 
secondary labor market (Edwards, Reich & Gordon 1975).
Machinists have occupied positions in the primary labor 
market under Fordism because they were required to learn 
generalized skills needed for stable production and sales. 
Machining work, despite the attempts at deskilling production 
(which I discuss below), has always required varying degrees 
of skill well above that needed for fully "deskilled" work. 
This differentiates their experiences from those of lesser- 
skilled manufacturing workers employed in the secondary labor 
market, where skill development and stable work behaviors are 
neither required nor rewarded (Edwards, Reich & Gordon 
1975:xv).
To concentrate this study on the experiences of 
machinists was not an arbitrary decision. Manufacturing work 
in the secondary labor market is suited for low-skilled and 
low-educated workers, and because of this, secondary labor 
market work is especially suited to transplantation to less 
developed countries, where unskilled labor is plentiful and 
labor costs lower (Reich 1991). The primary sector, however, 
relies upon workers who can be expected to engage in 
consistent work behaviors and perform tasks with greater 
skill. These are the types of manufacturing jobs that are 
likely to remain in the United States in the 21st century
1 8
(Reich 1991, Johnson and Packer 1987). By studying the 
experiences of machinists under Fordism and post-Fordism, I am 
able to analyze a group of workers who are likely to remain an 
important component of the blue-collar labor force in the 21st 
century. The findings concerning changing power relations 
will be of importance in making policy decisions regarding the 
emerging needs of manufacturing workers in the United States 
under post-Fordism.
The concepts of "Fordism" and "post-Fordism" are used as 
ideal types (Gerth & Mills 1946) to describe distinctive 
production practices. Individual enterprises will certainly 
vary in the degree to which they conform to either the Fordist 
or post-Fordist approach to production. Nonetheless, the over 
arching concepts of Fordism and post-Fordism provide a useful 
framework to describe the general features which distinguish 
two eras of industrial production in the United States. 
During the Fordist era, there were enterprises which used 
other approaches to production. However, I argue that the 
Fordism approach was the distinguishing feature of industrial 
production which separates the experiences of workers in the 
20th century from the experiences of craft workers in the 19th 
century.
I detail below the conflicts between workers and owners 
under Fordism, which ultimately resulted in the combination of 
degraded work with high wages. I treat organization and 
technology as separate components in analyzing Fordism, but
19
they should at all tines be understood as coupled together and 
inplenented by owners, in part, to wrest control fron workers. 
Workers in turn used organization and technology, coupled 
together, in ways unanticipated by nanagenent and owners to 
retain power in the work place.
Organization of Work Under the Fordist Approach
This study follows the long tradition of viewing the work 
place as an arena of "contested terrain" where the conflicting 
interests between owners and workers are played out (Edwards 
1979, Dahrendorf 1959, Marx 1970/1867). Owners desire maximum 
profit and therefore introduce measures to minimize labor 
costs and increase production. Workers, on the other hand, 
strive to obtain maximum wages and control over the intrinsic 
conditions of work (e.g., tasks, pace, hours) (Montgomery 
1979, Thompson 1967). The conflicts are played out in the 
work place, as each group strives to maximize its own 
interests. I show below that workers and owners used the 
organization of work, specific to the Fordist approach, to 
advance their individual and collective interests. These 
efforts entail the tactical use of bureaucracy, scientific 
management, and large organization size to advance each 
group's power in the work place.
Bureaucracy
Edwards (1979) argues that the bureaucratic approach to
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organizing production sharply differentiates 20th century 
production from the craft approaches of the 19th century. 
Craft production in the 19th century was organized with 
"simple control" which operates according to informally 
negotiated agreements between owners and individual workers 
concerning the pace and pay of work. Often owners worked side 
by side with workers, cultivating the loyalty of workers to 
the entrepreneur and the enterprise, and thereby minimized the 
conceptual division between the owner and worker.
Edwards (1979) argues that under simple control, owners' 
authority rested chiefly on a combination of coercion and 
charismatic (entrepreneurial) authority. Coercion compelled 
workers to labor because they were either threatened with 
physical harm or expulsion from the company. Charismatic 
authority compelled workers to labor because of their 
commitment to the entrepreneurial spirit of the employer. 
While Edwards analyses simple control in a "top-down" analysis 
of power, Haydu (1988) shows that "bottom-up" power also is 
extended to workers under simple control because it enabled 
workers to develop tactics to protest work conditions 
particular to the craft approach to production. In the case 
of the machining industry, a strong craft ethic cultivated 
strong loyalty to co-workers, enabling workers to engage in 
spontaneous walkouts and strikes when owners actions were 
regarded as unjust (Haydu 1988).
Edwards (1979) argues that simple forms of control
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extended into early experiments in large factory mass 
production, but were abandoned primarily because of their 
relative ineffectiveness at profitably controlling workers in 
complex large scale endeavors. Initially, large factories 
were hierarchically organized to operate under a system of 
internal contracting, where foremen operated as independent 
entrepreneurs who contracted for the use of the factory 
owner's property. Because foremen had no stake in maintaining 
equipment, this wreaked a great toll on equipment in these 
early endeavors at mass production. And because these 
organizations rested on simple forms of control (with coercive 
foremen replacing coercive owners), workers could use the same 
simple forms of control developed under craft methods of 
production (Edwards 1979:34).
The heart of Edward's argument is that bureaucratic 
organization, introduced in the early 20th century, provided 
owners with a more viable means of controlling workers, as 
well as foremen, maintain equipment better and produce stable 
patterns of production. The legal-rational basis of authority 
that underpins bureaucracy overcame the problems involved in 
using simple control in these large organizations, such as the 
need to rely on excessively coercive shop foremen. The formal 
rules of bureaucratic organization produced a more subtle 
means of gaining worker acceptance of work conditions because 
it provided a rational basis that obscured coercive elements 
of work (Edwards 1979:151). Promotions and small incremental
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raises, for example, provided workers with a false sense of 
personal advancement that is impossible under simple control 
with its sharp division between owners (the controllers) and 
workers (the controlled). Bureaucracy makes everyone in the 
organization appear to be both controller and controlled, as 
all members of the organization submit themselves to the same 
system of impersonal rules. As Richard Edwards explains:
Above all else, bureaucratic control institutionalized 
the exercise of capitalist power, making power appear 
to emanate from the formal organization 
itself...."Rule of law" - the firm's law - replaced 
rule by supervisor command (Edwards 1979:145).
Edwards ignores, however, the ways in which bureaucracy 
enabled workers to advance their power under Fordist 
production. Because Edwards places too much emphasis on the 
advantages bureaucracy offers managers and owners, he ignores 
the ways in which workers used bureaucracy to advance their 
own economic interests. For example, rigid job definitions 
and classifications were not desired by owners. Unionized 
workers demanded these job definitions to enable them to 
negotiate job security, as well as restrict the number of job 
tasks workers would be demanded to perform (Montgomery 1979).
Workers also used managerial imposed rules as a means of 
disrupting and limiting production, again undermining the 
profitability of the organization (Jacoby 1985) . For example, 
production often can be made more efficient by ignoring 
certain rules concerning safety or outdated methods. In
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normal production, unnecessary rules are ignored as a matter 
of practice (Roy 1955). If, however, bureaucratically 
controlled workers are displeased with working conditions, 
"work to rule strikes" allow them to disrupt production with 
little fear of dismissal (Jacoby 1985).
Furthermore, as the basis of bureaucratic control rests 
on legal-rational authority, it must allow for legalistic 
methods of dealing with complaints. This opened the potential 
for workers to tie up manager, shop steward, and worker time 
in grievance procedures. Finally, workers have also used the 
factory organization itself against management. For example, 
tactics such as "rolling strikes," brief stoppages scattered 
from line to line according to an agreed timetable, were 
possible only in the time oriented factory system designed for 
mass production (Stark 1980). The manipulation of bureaucracy 
became one of labor's most powerful means of reasserting 
control in production. Beyond simply resisting bureaucracy, 
workers were able to harness potential sources of power by 
using bureaucracy for their own interests.
Edwards (1979) argues that hierarchy and bureaucracy 
exist in the work place because it is profitable. Outside of 
the problems associated with workers' control, bureaucratic 
organization itself may undermine the profitability of 
enterprises because there are a number of dysfunctions 
inherent in bureaucratic organization. For example, a common 
bureaucratic response to crisis is to add on offices and
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departments. However, offices are seldom removed from 
organizational structure once introduced (Blau & Meyer 1987, 
March & Olsen 1976). While bureaucratic organization may be 
initially profitable, those profits may eventually be 
diminished as the organization continues to expand with non­
productive workers and as offices and rules remain in the 
organizational structure long after their functions have 
ceased to be of importance.
Scientific Management
Braverman (1974), like Edwards, argued that production 
methods in the 20th century were introduced to depower workers 
and lower their capabilities to resist the terms of production 
set by owners. Braverman, however, stressed the effects of 
"scientific management," which he argued depowered workers 
through a process of deskilling job tasks. According to 
Braverman, the acceptance of principles forwarded in Frederick
Taylor's IUfi Principles of Scientific Management (1964)
provided the distinguishing feature of 20th century production 
which distinguishes it from craft production of the 19th 
century.
Under scientific management, each step in the production 
process was reduced to its smallest component tasks. Time 
study men, armed with stopwatches, sought to determine the 
optimum pace of performance through careful observation. The 
work place was then to be redesigned so as to best facilitate
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the greatest efficiency of production. This "scientific" 
method made work tasks highly divided between workers, each of 
whom labored at simple component tasks (Braverman 1974).
Fundamental to Tayloristic ideology is the need to 
separate thought from execution, or mental from manual labor. 
This need was guided by a taken-for-granted understanding of 
workers' "natural" tendencies to "soldier," to restrict the 
pace of production (Gini & Sullivan 1989). To counteract 
worker soldiering, Taylor recommended minute division of labor 
and careful time study methods to determine the optimum pace 
of production. Once work became organized scientifically, 
Taylor believed management would have complete knowledge and 
control over production methods and be capable of determining 
the pace of production. Jobs would be "deskilled" according 
to Braverman (1974), and the new strata of operators would be 
easily replaced like cogs in a machine when they proved 
troublesome to employers.
Braverman's thesis, while compelling, has been subject to 
criticism. Stark (1980) points out that it is fallacious to 
think that owners were acting in a class conscious way to 
deskill the working class. Nelson (1991) also shows that 
scientific management was seldom implemented to the degree 
Braverman asserted it was. Nonetheless, the ideology 
underpinning Taylorism had a great impact on work organization 
and manager-worker relationships under Fordism because of the 
widespread acceptance of the philosophy that advocated the
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removal of control from the shop floor.
But the "top-down" power that scientific management 
offered owners was also confronted with "bottom-up" power from 
the shop floor, a dimension of power relations that Braverman 
ignored. In Workers' Control in America (1979) Montgomery 
shows that workers, contrary to Braverman's thesis, were not 
passive recipients of the new managerial agenda. Rather they 
sometimes were able to resist the implementation of scientific 
management, as well as use the scientifically managed work 
place to advance their power in restricting the pace of 
production.
Montgomery (1979) shows that "scientifically" managing 
work was fraught with problems for management, largely because 
it relies upon the participation of workers to obtain baseline 
scientific data. Determining the optimum pace of production 
rested on the cooperation of workers in the time study phase 
of analysis. In fact, workers on the shop floor developed a 
variety of methods to bar this effort, and even used Taylor's 
Principles of Scientific Management as their own guide for 
resistance. Workers' tactics of resistance included stopping 
work when directly observed, running machines "dry" (thereby 
appearing to work when not working at all), and hiding tools 
(such as jigs) which simplify work tasks. Thus, in actual 
practice the baseline time study data often proved neither 
scientific nor optimum.
Burowoy's (1979) study of the Allied Machine Shop shows
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a second way in which scientific management extends workers' 
power. Once a pace was determined and a quota set, workers 
had to be motivated to produce according to this prescribed 
pace. A variety of incentive pay systems were developed to 
motivate workers according to the prescribed pace, ranging 
from strict quota systems to simple piece work. By 1930, 56% 
of the employees in very large manufacturing plants (3,500+ 
employees) were being paid through a combination of time, 
piecework, and bonus wages (Nelson 1991). Incentive pay 
systems in the machining industry were typically structured to 
give workers a quota to produce two-thirds of the optimum 
amount determined through time study methods. Workers were 
then able to earn "incentive" by producing beyond the quota to 
the scientifically determined optimum. Depending upon the 
job, workers could "make out" and potentially earn one-third 
above their base rate of pay by producing above quota to the 
optimum level of production (Burowoy 1979).
Burowoy (1979) showed that wages under incentive systems 
were not scientifically determined, they were socially 
negotiated with workers who still maintained some control over 
whether they would or would not produce according to 
managements' dictates. In his study of the large Allied 
Corporation's machine shop, Burowoy showed the incentive 
system to be an effective motivator for machinists only so 
long as machinists perceived they were winning at the "game" 
of "making out." However, if workers perceived that the
2 8
"rules of the game" were structured against them, either in 
the pace being too rapid or pay too low, they would withdraw 
from "the game" and produce at a self-determined pace. 
Therefore, the pacing of work still did not fully rest under 
the prerogative of management, even when it was 
"scientifically" determined and compensated.
Beyond the ways in which workers were able to subvert the 
agenda of scientific management, the scientifically managed 
work place also offers distinct disadvantages in maintaining 
a profitable enterprise. Although scientific management was 
implemented to increase the efficiency of production through 
bureaucratic organization, it greatly increased the number of 
non-productive workers (Jacoby 1985). Not only did scientific 
management require the employment of time study men and data 
analysts, it also forced the creation of a number of other new 
positions in the factory. For example, because workers were 
compensated for the volume they produced, quality control 
employees were needed to check on the quality of the pieces. 
As pay systems increased in complexity, payroll departments 
had to be expanded. And because management was deemed to be 
"scientific," control rested on bureaucratic legal-rational 
authority, rather than simple forms of control. This required 
forming personnel departments to dealing with worker 
complaints. Thus while scientific management was implemented 
to increase owners' and managers' power in the work place, it 
also entailed the employment of vastly increased numbers of
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employees working in non-productive capacities, thereby 
incurring new costs not required in craft production of the 
19th century (Jacoby 1985).
Large Organisation Sise
Fordist production was introduced to capitalize on new 
economies of scale and was oriented to the mass production of 
finished products (Chandler 1990). Under Fordism, work was 
organized for start-to-finish production, which required large 
organization sizes. While large organization size facilitated 
the Taylorization of work and the dilution of work tasks, it 
also facilitated the formation of workers' class 
consciousness, extending worker loyalties beyond their 
individual occupational categories (Vanneman & Cannon 1987). 
Craftsmen increasingly gained an understanding that their life 
chances were intertwined with those of laborers. Haydu 
(1988), Montgomery (1979), and Gutman (1977) show that 
craftsmen in 19th century craft production were not inclined 
to support or care about the situation of laborers. But by 
the mid-20th century, craftsmen and laborers were striking 
each others, as well as for workers in diversely related 
occupations.
Montgomery (1979) argues that in the 19th century, 
control was exercised by the functional autonomy of the 
craftsman, relying primarily on individualistic methods of 
control in bargaining over pay and work conditions. In the
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early 20th century, workers exerted control through craft 
union responses, restricting access to skilled jobs and 
mobilizing collective responses to insure the rights of craft 
union members. By the 1940s, the industrial union expanded 
workers' control in the mutual support of diverse trades and 
unskilled workers. These shifting alliances from craft to 
class were in part produced by the large organization sizes, 
which disintegrated the sharp social divisions craft workers 
maintained with laborers (Haydu 1988). In the mid 1950s, 35% 
of the non-agricultural labor force were union members (Kochan 
et al 1986).
Large organization size enabled workers to increase their 
power through new collective forms of workers' control. In 
1953 alone, over 30 million employee days were spent idle 
because of work stoppages (lockouts or strikes) in plants that 
employed one thousand or more workers (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 1990). Thus under Fordism, the change in workers' 
control shifted from individualistic or small group methods to 
occupational group and finally to class methods of disrupting 
production. In large organizations, strikes had a very 
powerful effect, as the financial costs of strikes were 
compounded by centralized production.
In summation, the Fordist approach to organizing 
production replaced the simple forms of control owners 
exercised under craft methods of production in favor of 
bureaucratic forms of control. Guided by Frederick Taylor's
31
principles of scientific management, managers designed work 
places to manufacture products with highly divided workers 
laboring at simple tasks. This highly divided work was 
introduced by owners to increase managerial power (operating 
in owners' interests) to determine the terms under which 
production was to take place. With the shift from craft work 
to mass production work, the forms of control workers 
exercised changed as well. While Taylorized bureaucratic 
organizations were introduced to depower individual workers, 
these organizations had the unforeseen consequences of 
increasing collective worker power by facilitating organized 
workers' abilities to disrupt production.
Technological Development Under Fordism
Technology during the 20th century was designed for the 
purposes of mass production (Sabel & Zeitlin 1985). Braverman 
(1974) argues that it was also designed to extend the 
deskilling process, and pays specific attention to the 
assembly line as a means of depowering workers.
The first assembly line was actually a "disassembly" line 
used in the 19 th century meat packing industry. This 
technology served as the model for Henry Ford's Model T 
assembly line (Hounshell 1984). The assembly line conveyor 
belt was designed not only to transport materials through the 
production process, but also to impose a pace of work outside 
of the control of individual workers. The best designed
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assembly line will operate at the maximum possible pace, and 
coupled with Taylorism, it will require individual workers to 
perform low-skill tasks. Assembly line technology gives 
managers and owners direct cost savings through technological 
efficiency and hypothetically greater control over their work 
force, as workers can be easily trained and therefore easily 
replaced.
Montgomery (1979) points to less recognized ways in which 
the assembly line allows workers to extend their power in the 
work place. Although assembly line work does not advance 
individual worker skills, it vastly increases the degree of 
disruption individual and collective workers can unleash in 
the work place. Passing incorrectly assembled parts and 
"monkey-wrenching" are eased with large scale assembly line 
work and can greatly disrupt the entire operation. As 
illustration, Montgomery points to an assembly line worker 
whose task it was to drill three holes in a part as it passed 
his station. This creative worker found it easier to drill 
one hole incorrectly and chalk mark the part for further work 
off the assembly line (by another worker) than to drill three 
holes correctly (Montgomery 1979).
Hounshell (1984) also argues that workers' ability to 
disrupt production made the initial implementation of the 
assembly line problematic. One of the most remarkable aspects 
of Henry Ford's assembly line is not the technology itself (as 
this had existed prior to his Model T factory) but rather the
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successful implementation of the assembly line in the 
production of a commodity as complex as the automobile. In 
part, the success of the Model T assembly line rested on the 
previously unheard of $5.00/day salary workers received 
(Hounshell 1984). Because each step in the process of 
assembly line work is closely coupled with the preceding 
steps, workers must perform their respective tasks diligently. 
A high rate of pay was one means of producing compliant worker 
behavior, even when they were confronted with an intrinsically 
alienating task such as assembly line work.1 Therefore, like 
the organizational development of Fordism, technology also 
changed (and in some cases extended) workers' power by 
increasing their collective abilities to disrupt production 
when dissatisfied with terms upon which production was to take 
place.
Noble (1984) extends Braverman's thesis, arguing that 
technology was designed and implemented to extend owners' and 
managers' control of workers in 20th century production, and 
to give owners increased power in determining the terms upon 
which production would take place. As machines were developed
1 Similarly, Stephen Marglin (1982) shows that the 
industrial revolution relied less on technology than on owners' 
abilities to organize workers to labor on technology. Awkright's 
"water frame," the technology which is often heralded as the 
invention which started the industrial revolution, was in fact 
made 60 years after a very similar technology invented by John 
Wyatt. The reason for Wyatt's failure and Awkright's success 
rested in their abilities in disciplining workers to labor 
consistently and diligently on the new technology.
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to incorporate computer technology, technologies which 
facilitated the Tayloristic agenda of removing control from 
the shop floor were favored over those t< 'ogies which 
relied upon workers’ craft skills.
Noble (1984) shows that in the machining industry, 
managers and engineers worked together to design and implement 
those types of technologies that took control off the shop 
floor and away from workers. For example, Noble shows that 
numerically controlled (NC) and computer numerically 
controlled (CNC) machines were favored over record-playback 
machines, which literally recorded and replayed the actions of 
skilled machinists. Although record-playback machines in the 
1950s and 1960s were less complicated, more dependable, and 
probably more profitable in normal practice, they had the 
distinct disadvantage of leaving power in the hands of the 
machinists on the shop floor. Record-playback technology was 
therefore abandoned in favor of more complicated and less 
dependable technologies (Noble 1984:84).
While NC machines were developed in the 1950s and CNC 
machines in the 1960s, these technologies were not in 
widespread use in the machining industry until the mid 1970s 
(Cornfield 1992). Thus most machinists until the 1970s 
continued to work primarily on manual machines. During the 
1970s, however, machining work began to include computer 
controlled machines on a widespread basis.
Noble (1984) argues that the designs of machine tools
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were guided by the hope of managers and engineers to produce 
an automatic (workerless) factory. As evidence, Noble points 
to the trade journal American Machinist which published a 
number of articles in the 1960s dedicated to the prospect of 
technological advance leading to the automatic (workerless) 
factory. At the same time, trade journals and manuals for CNC 
machines were claiming that the need for craftsmen was 
diminishing, as numerically controlled machines were so "fool 
proof" that monkeys could operate the machines just as well as 
people.
Noble argues that, like the assembly line, NC and CNC 
offered management a hope that they could technologically 
control the pace of production. In the early phases of 
machining production, the feeds and speeds on manual machines 
were determined by machinists turning dials and pulling 
levers, leaving machinists in control of the pace of 
production. Once NC and CNC machines were set up for 
operation, machining was largely reduced to placing parts on 
machines and hitting a start button. So long as managers 
could control writing the NC and CNC programs, they could 
determine how fast the machine would bore and grind the 
materials. Theoretically, machinists would be reduced to 
unskilled operators, performing simple operations of putting 
on castings and taking off finished parts (Shaiken 1984).
While CNC machines were designed to remove control from 
the shop floor, Shaiken (1984) shows that machining work
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invariably involves some degree of task uncertainty which 
prevented the full transplantation of control into the hands 
of managers and owners. Materials vary in hardness and 
therefore operators may be required to slow feeds and speeds 
to get the desired finish or to keep the machine from being 
damaged. Also, computer programs often have initial bugs or 
develop bugs that can cause a great deal of damage to 
expensive machinery if left undetected. Machinists must be 
able to detect these bugs and be able to stop production in 
the early moments of disruption, or valuable machinery can be 
put out of commission. Therefore, NC and CNC machines are 
designed with emergency stop buttons, as well as direct 
controls (often in a locked panel) which can reduce the speeds 
of the machine. Machinists have sometimes used these controls 
as "job security switches" because they allow them to slow the 
pace of production (Shaiken 1984).
In his case study A Machinist's Semi Automated Life 
(1984) Tulin shows that CNC machine tools were not fool proof, 
and that CNC machining requires considerable skill. Even when 
CNC machine tools are set-up for production, they are prone to 
have bugs that require the immediate attention of workers, and 
workers must be able to alter programs when faced with 
variations in materials. Tulin forcefully shows that CNC 
machines were introduced to manufacturers as technologies that 
they could be operated by low-skilled workers, but in fact CNC 
machining requires considerable skills on the part of workers.
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Jobs in the machining industry never became "deskilled," 
despite owners' desire to do so. For this reason, machinists 
were still able to exercise the power in the work place 
because of owners' needs for skilled workers.
As mentioned earlier, advanced technologies such as NC 
and CNC machines were necessarily complicated and expensive 
because these technologies were designed to be controlled off 
of the shop floor (Noble 1984). Like the assembly line, NC 
and CNC machinery are very prone to worker sabotage. 
Shaiken's (1984) study of machinists found a strong 
relationship between machinist's level of unhappiness and the 
number of problems experienced on CNC machines. Even if CNC 
machines deskilled workers and could technologically dictate 
the pace of production, workers still maintained some power in 
negotiating the terms of production.2
In summation, technology, like organization, was 
introduced by owners and managers under Fordism to deskill 
work tasks and depower workers. These technologies were not 
introduced as a class conscious effort of capitalists to 
dominate the working class, but rather were introduced to 
increase the profitability of individual enterprises by 
decreasing worker power in negotiating the terms under which 
production would take place. The effects of technology,
2 For example, CNC machines theoretically ended the need for 
incentive pay systems, as there are very few worker operations 
involved. However, under Fordist production, unions often 
negotiated that CNC operators were to be paid incentive rates.
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however, did not depower workers, and in some ways increased 
their power. Advanced and sophisticated technologies are 
expensive, and damage to these machines can halt production 
for long periods of time. Thus worker sabotage or neglect of 
these machines can have a profound impact upon the 
profitability of the enterprise. In order to protect machines 
from sabotage or neglect, workers were able to force owners to 
provide relatively high wages.
In the 19th century, workers' control relied primarily on 
the individual's possession of craft skills as he or she 
worked in small organizations with simple technologies. 
Fordist enterprises emerged during the 20th century to exploit 
economies of scale by mass producing commodities in start to 
finish production. While technology and bureaucratic 
organization were used to mass produce commodities at a good 
profit, they were also designed by owners and managers to 
undermine the methods of control exercised by craft workers of 
the 19th century. Workers responded by developing new methods 
of control specific to Fordism in order to assert power in 
determining the terms upon which production would take place. 
The question for contemporary workers is how the recent 
changes in the use of organization and technology affect their 





There is general agreement among social scientists that 
Fordist approach to production has declined during the decades 
of the 1970s and 1980s (Hirst & Zeitlin 1991) . Two terms are 
commonly used to describe the new approach to production 
replacing Fordism: "post-Fordism" and "flexible
specialization." In general, the term "flexible
specialization" is used when analysts want to connote a 
positive context, emphasizing the innovating potentials and 
adaptability of new enterprises to capitalize on expanding 
markets for customized goods. The concept "post-Fordism" is 
generally used when analysts intend to critique the changes in 
production, because their analysis shows that these changes 
alter class relations in ways that hurt workers (Hirst & 
Zeitlin 1991).
I choose to use the term "post-Fordist" to describe the 
current features of production because I believe this term 
more accurately captures the significance of the decline of 
Fordism, as well as the complexity and variety of the current 
structure of manufacturing work. While flexible
specialization is one important component of post-Fordism, the 
flexibly specialized firm is only one particular type of 
enterprise operating in contemporary production. Post-Fordist 
work also involves new approaches to mass production, such as
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the practice of outsourcing to independent companies for mass 
produced component parts (Sayer 1989, Williams et al 1987).
In the previous sections, I outlined the distinctive 
features of Fordism. Post-Fordism, I define in terms of the 
ways in which it breaks from this previously dominant approach 
to production. These features include the decline of large 
factories designed for start-to-finish production, growing 
importance of small post-bureaucratic organizations, growing 
importance of small batch production, replacement of rigid 
technologies with flexible technologies, the emergence of a 
new managerial consciousness, and declining unionization.
One the most important events signalling the emergence 
of post-Fordism was the wave of factory closures which 
occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, and the subsequent 
restructuring of enterprises to smaller organization sizes. 
The closure of large factories led some analysts to theorize 
a "deindustrialization of America" (Bluestone & Harrison 
1982). Although the service sector is of increasing relative 
importance, manufacturing enterprises remain a vital component 
of the American economy (Kutscher & Personick 1986). Counter 
to the deindustrialization theories, in 1990, over 19 million 
Americans were employed in the manufacturing sector, in 
comparison to 20 million in 1970 (Kutscher and Personick 1986, 
County Business Patterns 1992). Previous research has shown 
that the loss of the 1 million manufacturing jobs has had a 
decidedly negative impact upon workers and communities
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(Holland 1989, Bensman & Lynch 1987, Bluestone & Harrison 
1982, Lynd 1982). However, I argue that to view the United 
States as being "deindustrializing" (Bluestone & Harrison 
1982) or becoming "post-industrial" (Bell 1973) is to ignore 
continued employment of the 19 million workers in the 
manufacturing sector.
Since 1970, increasing percentages of manufacturing 
workers are employed in the smaller manufacturing enterprises 
and these small enterprises are replacing the large Fordist 
factories which closed during the "deindustrialization" wave 
(Brown et al. 1990). The small company, unencumbered by 
bureaucratic organization, is one of the features of post- 
Fordist production. With the global production of goods, and 
practices such as outsourcing for component parts, fewer 
companies engage in start to finish production of commodities 
(Henderson 1989) , another feature of post-Fordism. There are 
indications that American companies are shifting away from 
mass production, which exploited economies of scale, to a 
flexibly specialized orientation to production designed to 
exploit economies of scope (Chandler 1990). Growing attention 
is also being paid to emerging post-bureaucratic organizations 
(Tucker 1992), which may be able to adapt more quickly to 
changing markets than slowly adapting bureaucratic 
organizations.
There is widespread acknowledgment of the importance of 
computers and robotics in the work place, but the ways in
42
which these new technologies are being implemented vary. On 
the one hand, Howard (1985) argues that computers are being 
used to structure the "brave new work place," and to extend 
owners' control to degrade work tasks. Zuboff (1988), on the 
other hand, argues that computers are often being used to 
degrade tasks, but that is a result of a cultural lag. 
Because managers desire to maintain their position under 
hierarchical control and because workers resist engaging in 
"hands-off" production, the positive potentials of computer 
technology are being resisted or perverted. At the same time, 
Zuboff also shows that in many ways computers are upgrading 
the intrinsic experience of work, once workers and managers 
acclimate themselves to the new imperatives of computerized 
work. Zuboff's analysis suggests that while some of the 
present day technologies were developed under Fordism to 
deskill tasks and depower workers, the computer technologies 
which emerged in the post-Fordist era may be being used in new 
ways which gives control back to workers.
Relationships between managers and workers are also 
changing in ways counter to the Tayloristic practices which 
advocated the rigid separation of thought from execution. A 
new "consciousness of manufacturing" is emerging as managers 
abandon Taylorism (Thomas & Kochan 1992).3 "Total Quality
3 As an example of changing managerial philosophies, the MIT 
professor W. Edwards Deming recommended worker participation in 
decision making practices in the 1950s. This advice fell on deaf 
ears in America but was used extensively in Japan. Currently 
Deming's approach is now widely regarded in American managerial
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Management," "Quality Circles," and "Just In Time Production" 
are just a few of the new approaches to production that are 
increasingly being used to in the work place (Lazonick 1992, 
Schonberger 1982). As new managerial practices advocate 
worker participation in decision making aspects of production, 
this indicates a shift away from Taylorism as practiced under 
Fordism.
Chandler (1990) argues that mass production was 
introduced in the early 20th century to capitalize on new 
markets of scale. Chandler further argues that these markets 
are now diminishing in importance, while new markets for 
specialized goods are expanding. Because production is 
shifting to small batch production, suited to economies of 
scope, technological development and use is increasingly 
guided by needs for flexibility production rather than rigid 
production. Rigid technologies are well suited to markets for 
mass production, but are not well suited to accommodate 
changing customer demands and small batch production. 
Flexible machines, while suited for customized production, 
also increase the need to employ workers capable of quickly 
adapting machines to new specifications and new product lines.
Another important change signalling the emergence of a 
post-Fordist era is the increasing geographic distribution of 
the production process. "American" companies are less likely
circles as one of the important factors in the rise of Japanese 
industry (Schonberger 1982).
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to be relying exclusively upon American labor as they were in 
the Fordist era, and are now more likely to be enmeshed in a 
global web of production (Reich 1991). Whereas prior to the 
1970s, the relationship between big business and government 
was mutually compatible, in the post-Fordist economy this is 
not necessarily the case (Nash 1987, Habermas 1973). 
Following Gramsci, Nash (1987) argues that hegemonic control 
in the work place may be more fragile in the post-Fordist era, 
because "Americanism" is less closely tied to "Fordism."
TABLE 1.1: SUMMARY OF THE DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN FORDIST AND POST-FORDIST ERAS
FPRPIST ERA
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The behaviors of workers also suggest an abandonment of 
the types of workers' control developed under Fordism. One 
important change is signalled by dramatic declines in union 
memberships. In 1960, 35% of all non-agricultural workers 
belonged to a union, but by 1990 that percentage was halved 
to 17% (Reich 1991). The declining percentage of workers 
belonging to unions is, in part, a result of the increasing 
numbers of workers employed in white collar work. White 
collar workers have traditionally been less inclined to join 
unions (Heckscher 1988). However, the actual number of 
workers joining unions has also significantly declined 
during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s. Union membership 
peaked in 1974, when 22 million workers belonged to unions, 
but by 1986 only 17 million workers belonged to unions 
(Clark 1989). Organized labor, one of the strongest means 
of workers' control under Fordism, is in a state of crisis 
and is having less influence upon the production process in 
the post-Fordist work place (Heckscher 1988, Kochan et al. 
1986).
In summation, Table 1.1 shows that the post-Fordist era 
is signalled by changes in markets and the United States 
position in the global economy, as well as the combined 
changes in organization, technology, and owner-manager-worker 
relationships. Post-Fordism is defined in opposition to the 
concept of Fordism, and as an emerging approach to production, 
its form is currently evolving.
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While there is general consensus that changes described 
above have occurred, there is much less agreement on the 
meanings these changes have for the experience of work and the 
exercise of power in the post-Fordist work place (Hirst & 
Zeitlin 1991). I discuss below two theoretical orientations 
to post-Fordism, craft control theory and fragmentation 
theory, and their arguments concerning control and power in 
the work place. On the one hand, the craft control theory 
forwarded by Piore and Sabel (1984) stresses the increasing 
autonomy and skills individual workers exercise in the post- 
Fordist work place. They argue that the increase in skill 
demands increase worker control in the work place, returning 
workers to a position of power similar to that held by 19th 
century craftsmen. On the other hand, Lash and Urry's (1987) 
fragmentation theory stresses the declining class capacities 
of workers in the smaller geographically dispersed post- 
Fordist organizations. Therefore while these two general sets 
of theories agree that work is being restructured, the 
implications concerning power in the work place diverge 
markedly. By studying the experiences of machinists in the 
case study site, I will provide information concerning which 
theoretical projection more closely matches the experiences of 
workers laboring under the new post-Fordist approach to 
production.
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Craft Control Theory and Post-Fordism
Possibly the most optimistic interpretation of the 
emerging post-Fordist era is represented in The Second 
Industrial Divide (Piore & Sabel 1984). Piore and Sabel argue 
that markets for mass produced goods are breaking down and 
markets are opening for more specialized goods. Therefore 
there is a growing demand for workers who are able to exercise 
craft skills in the production of wider ranges of commodities 
outside of the system previously designed for mass production. 
To exploit these new markets, Piore and Sabel advocate 
organizing work and using advanced technologies in a strategy 
of flexible specialization:
[Flexible specialization is] a strategy of permanent 
innovation: accommodation to ceaseless change, rather 
than an effort to control it. This strategy is based 
on flexible - multi-use - equipment; skilled workers; 
and the creation, through politics, of an industrial 
community that restricts the forms of competition to 
those favoring innovation. For these reasons, the 
spread of flexible specialization amounts to a revival 
of craft forms of production that were emarginated at 
the first industrial divide (Piore & Sabel 1984:17).
Whereas Fordist mass production took place in centralized 
factories operating under a Taylorized system, flexibly 
specialized small batch production occurs in smaller 
organizations located in emerging industrial districts. Piore 
and Sabel argue these industrial districts will be guided by 
a community ethos which supports industrial innovation and the 
economic livelihood of workers:
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Short-term employment security is provided not by 
seniority rules, as in mass production, but rather by 
a hiring hall system....It serves the employer by 
ensuring that the requisite skills are always on call. 
It serves the worker by ensuring that available work 
is rationed equally among the members of the community 
- under conditions that make allocation of work by 
seniority meaningless. This principle of equal 
allocation of work is modified only by communally 
sanctioned judgments of equity: in periods of
adversity, workers with large families, extraordinary 
medical expenses, or other exceptional needs may be 
given priority in job assignments (Piore & Sabel 
1984:116).
The above quote is specifically describing construction 
work. However, Piore and Sabel later liken work in the 
construction trades to the types of work involved in the 
skilled machining trades (1984:120). The community ethos is 
further enhanced by cooperative owner-worker relationships 
that replace the antagonistic relationships previously 
experienced under Fordist mass production:
....flexible specialization opens up long-term 
prospects for improvement in the condition of working 
life - regardless of this system's effect on the 
balance of power between currently existing 
organizations of capital and labor.. .Mass production's 
extreme division of labor routinizes and thereby 
trivializes work to a degree that often degrades the 
people who perform it. By contrast, flexible 
specialization is predicated on collaboration. And 
the frequent changes in the production process put a 
premium on craft skills. Thus the production worker's 
intellectual participation in the work process is 
enhanced - and his or her role revitalized (Piore & 
Sabel 1984:278).
Because workers exercise increasing amounts of skilled work,
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workers are hypothesized to have significant power in 
determining the terms upon which production will take place. 
So much power, that at times it appears Piore and Sabel 
suggest that workers' power in the post-Fordist work place is 
placed nearly on a level footing with that of the employer:
Those who violate the norms of the craft community may 
be informally but effectively disciplined: the
employer who sends back too many workers referred by 
the hiring hall will begin to receive only the poorest 
craftsmen; the worker who refuses too many assignments 
will end up at the bottom of the list for jobs. If 
provoked, the craftsmen will simply pick up and walk 
off the job as a group; their capacity to do so always 
stands behind their voiced complaints (Piore & Sabel 
1984:117).
It is important to note that Piore and Sabel (1984) are 
pointing out the positive potentials of post-Fordism, not that 
this is what is actually happening. They also recognize that 
in order to produce such cooperative worker-owner relations 
involves government support of industry that promotes flexible 
specialization and innovation (1984:265). By studying the 
experiences of machinists in the socio-political context of 
their community, I will be able to examine how closely post- 
Fordist work exemplifies the positive potentials advanced by 
this craft control theory.
Despite the popularity and influence of Piore's and 
Sabel's theory of the second industrial divide, it has also 
been subject to criticism. A number of potentially negative 
aspects of flexible production are left unexaroined by Piore
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and Sabel, leading some to label their analysis as a 
"romanticization" of the restructuring of production (Sayer 
1989, Williams et al. 1987). Flexibility is one of the great 
catchwords managers use under post-Fordism, but as Boyer 
(1988:299) points out, flexibility "is sometimes a euphemism 
for downgrading most of the rights of wage earners." And 
Pollert (1988) criticizes the "flexibility" discourse for its 
hegemonic implications:
In each approach, all labour flexibility is celebrated 
as work enhancing, while decentralizing and
fragmentation are embraced. As such, the informal and 
secondary economies are legitimized, and the 
significance of the disjuncture between organized, 
collective and directly employed labor, and isolated, 
atomized production is masked" (Pollert 1988:71).
Others argue that well documented changes in the 
experience of work do not support flexible specialization as 
increasing worker economic prosperity. For example, the 
increasing prevalence of part-time work, freelancing, 
subcontracting, all potentially reduce worker earnings, 
especially when employee benefits are considered (Pollert 
1988, Offe & Heinze 1992). Recent examinations of the 
informal economy show that non-paid work activity is 
increasing as a result of restructuring production. As 
examples of non-paid work activities, workers are now often 
responsible for advancing their education (and skills) on 
their own time, earnings are used for personal investment in 
tools to be used on the job, and participation in self-help
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groups is increasing as company-sponsored benefits for 
professional services decline (Offe & Heinze 1992, Mingione 
1991). This suggests that post-Fordist production is 
increasing the demands upon workers, without the compensation 
they would have received for these activities under the 
Fordist approach.
This study opens craft control theory to critical 
examination. The emerging forms of production are studied to 
determine the degree to which they are flexibly specialized 
and using craft methods of production. Piore and Sabel 
repeatedly stress that flexible specialization is only a 
possibility, not a necessity. For example, small firms may be 
engaging in very limited forms of rigidly specialized mass 
production. This requires an examination of the types of 
firms that are replacing the large factories that closed 
during the 1970-1980 period of deindustrialization. I also 
examine whether flexibly specialized firms are operating on 
the basis of the community ethos postulated in The Second 
Industrial Divide, which asserts a relatively equitable 
balance in power between workers and owners under post- 
Fordism.
Fragmentation Theory and Post-Fordism
Fragmentation theory is forwarded primarily by marxian 
analysts who assert that post-Fordism undermines worker power, 
primarily due to the global production of commodities. As
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production is carried out in smaller manufacturing companies 
spread throughout the United States and the world, worker 
power is decreased and working class life chances are thereby 
diminished (Scott & Storper 1986). Lash and Urry's The End of 
Organized Capitalism (1987) examines the negative implications 
of post-Fordism and global production. I explore the 
implications of their argument below, concentrating on the 
issue of worker power in the work place under post-Fordism and 
how fragmentation theory differs from the optimistic account 
presented in The Second Industrial Divide.
In The End of Organized Capitalism. Lash and Urry argue 
that the post-Fordist approach is evidence of a new stage in 
the development of capitalism, a stage of "disorganized 
capitalism" which frees industry from many spatial constraints 
of organized capitalism:
....new spatial configurations are exceptionally 
significant and result in the constant revolutionizing 
of the spatial constraints of production...[and 
involves]...the tendency for capital to see-saw from 
place to place seeking locational advantage, 
resembling a plague of locusts, settling on one place, 
devouring it, moving on to a new place, while the old 
restores itself for another attack..[and]...The 
tendency for capital to be come spatially indifferent, 
through reducing its dependence upon particular raw 
materials, markets, sources of energy, supplies of 
skilled labor, and so forth (Lash & Urry 1987:86).
Lash and Urry agree that in some industries skills will become 
moderately more important as workers increasingly need to 
exercise craft skills to produce the variety of commodities
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sought by members of society socialized in the fickle 
consumption conscious post-modern culture. However, while
individual members of the working class may have more control 
in the work place, the primary effect of disorganized 
capitalism is to reduce the potential of the working class 
members to exert their collective wills in the work place and 
the political arena.
One overriding consequence of these spacial changes 
has been (and this is perhaps the key explanatory 
factor, though not ultimately the crucial determinant, 
of disorganized capitalism) the decline of working 
class capacities. "Class capacities" are a matter not 
just of the numerical size of a social class but the 
organizational and cultural resources at its disposal. 
Not only has the size of the working class and 
especially its "core" declined in disorganized 
capitalism, but spatial scattering has meant the 
disruption of communicational and organizational 
networks, resulting in an important diminution of 
class resources. If class capacities of the 
proletariate have been diminished in disorganized 
capitalism, the size and resources of the 
professional-managerial strata, or "service class," 
have enormously increased (Lash & Urry 1987:11).
Finally, outside of relations in the work place, Lash and 
Urry point to the broad post-modern cultural transformations 
that serve to fragment working class power. Post-modernism 
has the effect of undermining $ class orientation to social 
relations by promoting diverse alliances with wide varieties 
of interest groups that cut across class lines. Environmental 
organizations, women's rights organizations, etc. may benefit 
special interest groups, but at the same time they dilute the
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power of working class groups and draw attention away from the 
salience of class as a primary determinant of social 
relations. Beyond this, life in post-modern culture involves 
the experience of absorbing wide varieties of alternate 
understandings of social events from "infotainment" shows, 
newspapers, radio, etc. This has an effect of saturating 
individuals with such a wide variety of perspectives that no 
one perspective can reasonably be treated as "truth." With no 
absolute truths, a cynical social climate may prevent 
collective action to change existing conditions (see also 
Gergen 1988).
For Lash and Urry, the chief effect of disorganized 
capitalism (of which post-Fordist production is a vital 
component) is a decline in the workers' class capacity to 
advance their collective interests. As class action 
constituted the primary means of exerting control under 
Fordism (Montgomery 1979), the shift to post-Fordism works 
against the interests of members of the working class, even if 
they are exercising more craft skills than under post-Fordism. 
Where Piore and Sable see the emergence of communitarian 
industrial districts, Lash and Urry see a one sided 
relationship that allows capital to move from community to 
community with fewer and fewer legal and social constraints.
Critiques of fragmentation theory are primarily leveled 
at the dogmatic approach many marxian theorists use in their 
analyses of post-Fordism, which prevents more value-neutral
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observations of existing conditions, and their failure to 
incorporate an understanding of the increasing importance of 
worker craft skills. Hirst and Zeitlin (1991) argue that 
Marxist theories of post-Fordism often rely on 
unsystematically gathered bits and pieces of worker 
experiences to support the theory of an increasing 
proletarianization of work consistent with traditional Marx's 
theory of historical capitalism, while ignoring liberating 
aspects of post-Fordism such as craft skill utilization. The 
British journal Marxism Today, for example, is particularly 
criticized in its over-reliance on traditional Marxist 
orientation in explaining the changing approach to production:
Marxism Today is happy to bowdlerize the concept of 
flexible specialization as an ideal type of 
manufacturing whilst studiously ignoring what its 
exponents have to say about the routes to the 
construction an appropriate social context for this 
type of production. [This] analysis of "New Times" is 
little more than pop sociology.... (Hirst & Zeitlin 
1991:11).
I presented the above discussion of The End of Organized 
Capitalism primarily because Lash and Urry present a carefully 
designed cross cultural analysis of post-Fordism. This study 
is one of least dogmatic and most important of the marxian 
theories of post-Fordism. Because of its macro level 
analysis, however, the study offers little analysis of worker 
experience in the post-Fordist work place. While recognizing 
the growing importance of movement of capital, the lack of 
analysis at the firm or community level leaves unanalyzed the
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role of community dynamics and increasing craft skills which 
are potential buffers to the savage movement of enterprises in 
the post-Fordist era. By examining work experiences of 
machinists in a post-Fordist industrial district, this study 
opens this ignored aspect of fragmentation theory to analysis.
Summary
The Fordist era emerged during a period of United States' 
history when the United States maintained hegemonic control of 
the global economy with mass produced goods. The post-Fordist 
era is emerging as international competition is increasing and 
as industry in the United States is restructuring to exploit 
global labor markets and capitalize on expanding markets for 
specialized goods.
The conflict relationship between workers and owners 
under Fordism produced a degradation of the work experience. 
Because of workers' abilities to adapt and control the 
organization and technology introduced under Fordism, they 
were able to extend their power and advance their economic 
livelihood.
Post-Fordism emerged in the 1970s and opens new questions 
concerning power in the work place. While there is general 
agreement that industrial production in America is shifting 
away from centralized mass production towards what I term the 
post-Fordist approach to production, there is less 
understanding of the implications this has for worker power in
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Ithe work place.
Craft control theory projects that the growing need for 
skilled workers will increase workers' power in the work 
place. On the other hand, fragmentation theory foresees the 
opposite conclusion. As work is scattered in small 
enterprises, workers' power will decline as a result of the 
declining effectiveness of methods of control advanced under 
the Fordist approach. By studying the experiences of 
machinists in a case study, this dissertation will contribute 
research concerning how workers' and owners' power are 




To examine the shift to the post-Fordist approach to 
production influences control and power in the work place, I 
address two general issues. First, how are the changes 
associated with post-Fordism affecting the opportunity and 
economic rewards for machining work? Second, how does post- 
Fordism affect the intrinsic nature of work and the ways in 
which owners and workers assert their individual and 
collective wills in negotiating the terms of production? This 
chapter details the methods that are used to answer these 
questions.
Machinists are the backbone of any industrial society. 
They operate the machines that bend, cut and shape metal into 
precise shapes. They not only make machines, but they also 
make the machines that make machines. Almost all products 
produced in an industrialized society are in some way the 
product of machinists' work. Machinists are especially 
important to the study of post-Fordist production because they 
labor on the advanced manufacturing technologies, and because 
their industry has been restructured to the smaller 
manufacturing enterprises common under post-Fordism.
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Two sources of information provide data on how the use of 
organization and technology affect the work experiences of 
machinists: (1) Countv Business Patterns statistics and (2)
interviews with workers, employers and community leaders in a 
case study community. I use the Census Bureau's Countv 
Business Patterns (CBP) for the period of 1960 and 1990 to 
assess national changes in the employment opportunities for 
machinists and its effect on machinists' earnings. As I 
discuss below, Countv Business Patterns provide one of the 
best sources of secondary data on national changes in work 
organization, pay and employment opportunities for workers 
such as machinists. However, these data do not include other 
important information such as health insurance, vacation pay 
and overtime pay. To explore these issues and changes in the 
intrinsic nature of work and workers' control in the work 
place, I conducted 44 interviews with workers, employers, and 
community leaders in a case study community. The primary 
purpose of these interviews was to assess how work and control 
over work changed during the shift to the post-Fordist 
approach to production.
In this chapter I first discuss my use of Countv Business 
Patterns data. I then discuss the interview methods I used to 
examine work experience under post-Fordism and how it has 
affected the control over work in several enterprises in a 
case study community. This includes detailed discussions of 
the interview guide, interview procedures, sampling
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strategies, sample sizes and the criteria used to select the 
case study site.
Measures of Employment Opportunities
I examine data from County Business Patterns between 
1960-1990 to assess how the recent changes in organization and 
technology associated with post-Fordism affect employment 
opportunities and earnings for machinists at the national 
level. Reliable CBP data have been compiled since 1947, 
documenting trends in employment and payrolls for the major 
industrial classifications established by the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) Manual. Since 1974, CBP data 
have also documented payroll and employment by enterprise 
size. Because post-Fordist organizations tend to be smaller 
than Fordist organizations, these CBP data allow me to compare 
opportunities for employment between these two approaches to 
production. By dividing yearly payrolls by the number of 
employees in each enterprise size classification, I was able 
to determine the average employee pay by enterprise size.
This allowed me to compare the earnings of workers in the 
smaller enterprises (typical of post-Fordism) with the larger 
enterprises (typical of Fordism). These comparisons are 
performed in two ways. First, I examine pay and employment 
opportunities with a cross-sectional analysis, comparing 
Fordist type enterprises with post-Fordist type enterprises in
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given years. I then use a time series analysis to compare 
trends in earnings and employment opportunities from 1974- 
1990, the transition period from Fordism to post-Fordism.
I define machining work in accordance with the standard 
industrial group 35, which the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) Manual (1987) defines as:
...establishments engaged in manufacturing industrial 
and commercial machinery and equipment and computers. 
Included are the manufacture of engines and turbines; 
farm and garden machinery; construction, mining, and 
oil field machinery; elevators and conveying 
equipment; hoists, cranes, monorails, and industrial 
trucks and tractors; metalworking machinery; special 
industry machinery; general industrial machinery; 
computer and peripheral equipment and office 
machinery; and refrigeration and service industry 
machinery... (1987:199).
This classification encompasses a number of diverse types of 
machining production. Pilot study interviews with workers 
revealed that machinists commonly move from one industry to 
another within group 35, depending upon opportunities in their 
labor market areas. For example, machinists often worked in 
both the machine tool industry of metal-cutting (SIC code
3541) and metal-forming machine tool manufactures (SIC code
3542), moving from one company to another. Within each 
company, however, workers reported performing similar types of 
tasks despite producing different types of commodities. 
Because my aim is to analyze employment opportunities and 
earnings for workers with machining skills, I capture most of 
those opportunities for machining work by defining machining
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broadly with SIC code 35.
Limitations in the Use of Countv Business Patterns
Technically, SIC major group 35 is a measure of all 
people employed in the machining industry, not only 
machinists. Data therefore include all people employed in the 
enterprises which make the previously listed commodities, 
including non-production employees such as foremen, 
secretaries, sales people and managers. CBP data therefore do 
not indicate the absolute number of machinists (the workers 
operating the machines) employed. While this is an 
unavoidable limitation, interviews in the case study community 
site provide a further data which enable additional 
empirically grounded assessments of how employment 
opportunities and earnings have changed during the 
restructuring to the post-Fordist approach.
The Case Study Site
Both craft control and fragmentation theories view 
community dynamics as being essential to understanding the 
dynamics of post-Fordism. On one hand, craft control theories 
see the potential for emerging post-Fordist communities to 
operate according to a community ethos that benefits both 
workers and employers. In contrast, fragmentation theories 
see a one-sided relationship between owners and communities,
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with workers losing power both inside and outside of the work 
place. By interviewing workers, owners, and community leaders 
in a case study site, I have been able to examine the social 
context of community life which has important implications for 
power in the work place (Hall et a l .  1987, Gaventa 1980, 
Hareven & Langenbach 1978, Pope 1942).
In selecting the case study site, I endeavored to find a 
community that mirrored changes which occurred at the national 
level during the 20th century, including the rise of Fordism, 
the wave of factory closures in the 1970s-1980s, and the 
subsequent restructuring of production to accommodate the 
post-Fordist approach. "Machinist Valley" (a pseudonym) 
proved an excellent site for case study because of its long 
dependence upon the machining industry. The six large 
machining enterprises which previously operated in Machinist 
Valley were organized under the Fordist approach to 
production. The closure of these companies in the early 
1980s, and the subsequent emergence of a number of small post- 
Fordist enterprises, offered an opportunity to compare the 
experiences of Fordist workers with the experiences of post- 
Fordist workers.
I provide much of the following description of Machinist 
Valley without specific citations of sources. While 
unfortunate, this is necessary to protect the identity of 
workers, owners and enterprises in this study. All of the 
information presented below, however, is drawn from sources
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such as local newspaper reports, reliable publications 
concerning the history of Machinist Valley, and company 
records.
Machinist Valley is located in a rural, geographically 
isolated area in the Northeastern United States, and 
constitutes a relatively isolated industrial district in which 
workers can market their skills. In 1992 Machinist Valley the 
population was 91,000 people, in a geographic area of 1500 
square miles (U.S. Census 1990). Water falls produced by 
steep drops in altitude in the Valley offered great potential 
for water powered factories, and like other places in New 
England in the 19th century, a number of textile mills, lumber 
mills, and shoe factories were built on the banks of its 
rivers. These early factories shifted the economy of the 
Valley from an agricultural base to its dependence upon 
industrial employment. The geographic migration of the 
textile industry to the South during the early 20th century 
left the Valley chiefly dependent upon the machining industry, 
and until the 1970s no subsequent type of employment has been 
as important to the communities in Machinist Valley as the 
machining industry.
Most of the major Fordist machining companies in the 
Valley began operation between 1870-1890. In the late 19th 
century, each of the six major machine shops employed from 20- 
50 employees. There is little information on these early 
small enterprises in Machinist Valley, however sales records
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and payroll records offer some Insight. One company that was 
to become one of the Valley's largest makers of machine tools 
produced only 35 turret lathes in 1891 and 125 in 1895. Thus, 
this small batch production probably occurred according to 
craft methods common in the 19th century.
By 1920, however, work in the machining industry became 
a major avenue for employment in the Valley. Company records 
reveal one firm employed over 600 workers on the shop floor, 
another machine shop employed nearly 700 workers, and at the 
north end of the Valley another machining company employed 150 
workers. Productivity grew during this period as well, and 
because of the high quality machinery produced in Machinist 
Valley it gained an international reputation as the home of 
some of the most highly skilled machinists in the world.
These initially small machine shops continued to increase 
in size when the textile industry moved South. By the mid 
20th century the Valley depended largely upon six large 
machine shops which, together, employed over 4500 people. 
Workers in these large machine shops produced mining 
equipment, compressors, hoists, and industrial machining 
equipment such as gear shapers, turret lathes, and grinders.
Although interrupted by the Great Depression, the 
expanding industrial climate in the United States from 1920- 
1930 and the needs generated by World War II promoted a rapid 
growth in employment opportunities for machinists in the 
Valley and the nation as a whole (Holland 1989). During the
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period of 1940-1970, all of the large shops adopted and 
refined the Fordist methods of production, including incentive 
pay systems, subdivision of tasks, time study methods, and the 
specialization in the mass production of specific product 
lines such as mining equipment, machine tools, and industrial 
compressors.
During the 1940s, workers in the large machine shops 
unionized under the United Steel Workers of America and the 
United Machine Workers of America. Although there were a 
number of brief strikes from 1940-1980 in the Valley, all were 
settled relatively quickly and peacefully. On the whole, 
little labor conflict was evident in the Valley from 1940- 
1980. In part, overt conflict was not common because high 
wages were offered in these factories, secured through 
membership in the national unions. The costs of living in 
Machinist Valley were lower than that found in the machining 
nuclei of larger cities in the Midwest and machinists in the 
Valley benefitted greatly from the collective negotiations of 
the national unions. Wages in the machine shops were also 
well above those offered in the shoe shops and paper mills, so 
at the local level machinists were among the elite of the 
working class and viewed their economic situation very 
favorably.
Employment in the machining industry reached its highest 
plateau in Machinist Valley in the 1950s, and employment the 
machining industry remained stable well into the 1970s.
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Following World War II, industry needed to be retooled, and 
building the interstate highway system demanded road 
equipment, coal mines needed mining equipment, and government 
military needs in the Cold War climate offered many contracts 
to machining industry (Holland 1989). As the machine shops in 
the Valley produced many of the commodities necessary to these 
endeavors, employment opportunities in the Valley were 
abundant. By 1970, the machining industry employed 47% of all 
of the manufacturing workers in Machinist Valley (Countv 
Business Patterns 1970).
The 1970s continued to be a time of prosperity for 
workers in the Valley, as the local newspaper's "1979 Salute 
to Progress" attested. However, shortly after the publication 
of this "Salute to Progress," all of the major machining 
companies began a protracted period of lay-offs. The 
cumulative effects of the layoffs in all of the major plants 
in the area had a profound effect on employment opportunities, 
especially for workers in the machining trades. The local 
paper reported that in October 1981, before local 
manufacturers began announcing major layoffs, 19 out of 20 
workers in one town in Machinist Valley were employed. One 
year later 1 in 7 were unemployed. Table 2.1. shows the 
effects this period of closure had upon the structure of 
employment opportunities in Machinist Valley.
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TABLE 2.1
Employment Opportunities for Machinists in Machinist Valley: 
Changing Size of Machine Shops* 1960-1990.
ESTABLISHMENT SIZE NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS
Number of Employees 1960 1970 1980 1990
1 - 1 9 10 13 28 39
20 - 49 3 4 6 5
50 - 99 2 2 2 6
100 - 249 0 3 3 2
250 - 499 0 1 0 2
500+ 6 5 5 0
Total # Firms 21 28 44 54
Total # Employees n/a n/a 5059 1978
Source - Countv Business Patterns (1960, 1970, 1980, 1990)
* Machinery except electrical, SIC code 35.
Table 2.1 shows that virtually all of the large machine 
shops disappeared in Machinist Valley from 1980-1990. It is 
impossible to determine the actual percentages of workers 
employed in each enterprise size because Countv Business 
Patterns do not offer the necessary data at the local level. 
But by extrapolating from the number and sizes of enterprises 
in Machinists Valley by enterprise size, I estimate that 
roughly 90% of all machinists were employed in the large (500+ 
employees) machine shops in 1960. By 1990 all of these shops 
had closed. 1980-1990 was a period of declining employment
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opportunities for machinists in Machinist Valley, dropping 
from 5059 employees to 1978 employees in the span of eight 
years. With the closure of the large shops in the area, union 
membership also decreased greatly and in 1992 there were only 
two unionized machine shops in the Valley.
Consistent with the shift to post-Fordism, Figure 2-1 
shows the stunning growth in the number of small machine shops 
in Machinist Valley. In 1970 there were only 13 small machine 
shops, but by 1990 that figure had tripled to 39 small machine 
shops. While the overall number of jobs had significantly 
declined during the 1970s-1980s, the number of machining 
companies operating in Machinist Valley nearly doubled from 28 
to 53 enterprises.
These small enterprises provide a strong indication that 
Machinist Valley is not simply becoming "deindustrialized," 
but rather is being "reindustrialized" to accommodate the 
post-Fordist approach to production. In 1990, 18% of all
manufacturing workers in Machinist Valley continued to be 
employed in the machining industry (Countv Business Patterns 
1990). Of course the overall decline in opportunity will be 
an important factor in understanding the experiences of 
workers in Machinist Valley. However, I believe it is also 
important to recognize that there is a new opportunity 
structure Machinist Valley which increases the importance of 
the small enterprise in the work experiences of machinists.
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Figure 2. 1
Machining Enterprises in Machinist Valley 1960-1990
Number of Machining Enterprises
1960 1970 1980 1990
Year
1 1-19 Employees E3 20-49 Employees G 50-99 Employees 
^  100-249 Employees Q 250-499 Employees IU 500+  Employees
Source: County Business Patterns
In summation, although Machinist Valley does not rely as 
heavily on machining as it did in the past, machining work 
still employs significant numbers of workers. Machinist 
Valley previously was dominated by six machining enterprises 
which maintained the essential features of Fordism, including 
unionized labor, specialization in the mass production of 
machined goods, and reliance upon time study methods for 
production. Companies operating in Machinist Valley are small 
in size, typical of the emerging enterprises of post-Fordism. 
As such Machinist Valley is an excellent site to study whether 
post-Fordism is accompanied by the positive or negative 
potentials hypothesized by craft control and fragmentation 
theories.
Interview Methods
After I selected a suitable case study site, I 
constructed interview guides and interviewed employers, 
community leaders, and workers to determine how power in the 
work place has changed during the shift to post-Fordism. I 
conducted a total of 44 interviews, 26 interviews with persons 
employed or retired from the machining industry, 7 with 
employers and supervisors outside of the machining industry, 
and 11 with community leaders in Machinist Valley. I 
conducted most of the interviews in August 1992, during a 
month long period of residence in Machinist Valley. A small
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number of interviews were conducted in the Spring of 1993. I 
developed two interview guides, one for employers and one for 
workers, and these guides are reproduced in Appendix A and 
Appendix B. Community leader interviews were individually 
designed to access information unique to each leader's 
official capacity. All interviews were tape recorded and 
lasted from one to two and one-half hours, and were later 
transcribed, coded and analyzed using the text management 
system askSam.1
I conducted the interviews with the 11 community leaders 
in the early stages of the study to examine the suitability of 
Machinist Valley as a case study site, as well as to obtain 
general historical information and current employment 
opportunities for workers in the Valley. These interviews 
were structured to gather as much general information on the 
local community as possible, especially in regard to the 
effects of the closure of the large machining companies on the 
Valley and workers. All interviews with community leaders 
were conducted in one town in the Valley, pseudonymed 
"Liston." I restricted interviews to Liston to facilitate 
systematically interviewing the key officials important in 
community organizations and politics. By restricting these 
interviews to the town of Liston, I was able to use the 
criterion of geography as a method of sampling community
1 One machinist and one machine shop owner refused to be 
taped, however, and analyses of their responses rely upon 
interview notes.
leaders and the types of non-machinist employers in the entire 
Valley. Interviews included the Liston City Manager, Liston 
Tax Assessor, Liston Chamber of Commerce Director, a high 
school teacher, two members of the town historical society, a 
teacher at the Liston Vocational Technical College, the dean 
of the Liston Vocational Technical College, a supervisor at 
the State Job Training Council, a director at the State 
Department of Employment Security.
I interviewed 7 employers outside of the machining 
industry to examine the types of employment opportunities 
available to machinists following the closure of the large 
machining factories in the Valley. In order to examine 
whether many machinists chose to seek employment outside of 
the machining industry after being displaced by the major 
factory closures, I interviewed employers at the largest non­
machinist employers, such as at a local hospital, a wool linen 
factory, a notebook factory, and a paint brush factory.
Employer interviews addressed the following issues: 
company history in Liston, current number of employees, gender 
distribution of employees, educational criteria for 
employment, difficulty in obtaining employees, methods of 
obtaining employees, number of applications on file, starting 
pay, highest potential pay, benefits, and potentials for 
advancement in the company. At each company I also asked to 
be shown the general operations so I could obtain a general 
indication of the types of work being performed. Data
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obtained in these employer interviews allowed me to examine 
the potential difficulties and successes workers experience in 
attempts to adjusting to work inside and outside of the post- 
Fordist machining enterprises, as well as obtain employer 
perspectives on their employees.
Interviews with owners and supervisors in companies 
outside of the machining industry surprisingly revealed that 
very few machinists are obtaining work in these enterprises. 
In the local hospital, the personnel director of the hospital 
informed me that machinists are undesired workers because of 
the perceived sexual threat blue collar males present female 
patients. In companies such as the wool linen factory, the 
notebook factory, and the paint brush factory, low pay makes 
machinists forsake work in these companies. Also machinists 
are not highly undesired workers in these companies because 
they are perceived by employers as likely to move on at the 
first opportunity. Because this study is concerned with 
control and power in the machining industry, analysis of 
employer interviews will be therefore limited to owners and 
supervisors in the machining industry in Machinist Valley.
I sampled 26 people working in the machining industry in 
the Valley using a snowball sampling technique. To obtain 
worker interviews, I obtained a seed list of machinist names 
from the supervisor at the one of the currently operating 
machine shops in Machinist Valley. He acted as my initial 
informant and provided me with a list of names of workers whom
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he believed to have a variety of different work experiences. 
Because this supervisor had worked at the Bearing Company (one 
of the previously dominant Fordist companies in the Valley) as 
well as at a currently operating machine shop, he was able to 
provide contacts with both currently working machinists and 
retired machinists from these two different companies.
After each worker interview, I asked machinists to 
provide me with the names of two or three other workers who 
would be able to offer information concerning the variety 
experiences, both good and bad, that other machinists 
experienced after the closure of the Bearing Company. In the 
case of retired workers from Bearing, these workers were asked 
to give references to other machinists from Bearing who may 
have had different work experiences than their own, both good 
and bad.
By interviewing both Bearing workers, as well as 
currently working machinists, I was able to explore the 
varieties of ways in which work changed during the 
restructuring of employment from Fordism to post-Fordism. 
Bearing workers provided me with detailed information on work 
in the Bearing Company. These data helped to form my 
understanding of Fordism presented in Chapter 1, as well as 
provide a foil from which to compare worker experiences under 
post-Fordism. Because I interviewed both sets of workers 
(retired Fordist machinists and working post-Fordist 
machinists) with similar procedures, these interviews provide
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detailed data of how work and control changed during the shift 
to post-Fordism.
I constructed worker interviews to tap into the sources 
of reward and frustration for machinists and the ways in which 
workers resolve their complaints concerning their place of 
work, employers, and coworkers. I asked workers general 
questions concerning how well they liked their jobs, what they 
liked about their jobs, and what they disliked about their 
jobs. I then probed workers concerning specific areas of 
potential complaint and frustration in detail, especially 
concerning issues relating to skill utilization, boredom, 
unions, supervisors, and coworkers. I also asked a number of 
questions relating to workers’ job histories and future plans 
in order to assess workers' control over their career paths. 
Finally, I asked questions concerning workers' economic 
situation, including pay, benefits, and experiences of 
unemployment to assess how workers' earnings have changed 
during the shift to post-Fordism. Interviews took, on 
average, one to two hours to complete.
The worker interview guide reproduced in Appendix A was 
modified during the course of interviews because I found 
workers to be generally unwilling or reticent to fit their 
descriptions of their experiences and skill levels into my 
pre-conceived categories such as "low," "medium," and "high." 
One machinist, for example, responded: "Well how would you 
describe teaching, you are a teacher right? Does that take
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low, medium, or high skills?" I soon realized that it would 
be better to listen to how machinists understand their work 
experiences rather than force them to fit their understanding 
into my more rigid classification schemes. As a result, I 
modified the interview technique to address the issues 
outlined in the interview guide, while abandoning the endeavor 
to produce abundant statistically analyzable results. I am 
confident that by doing so I was able to obtain data more rich 
in qualitative information and of much greater validity.
The analysis of experiences in the machining industry 
rely on the responses from 26 persons. 18 had been employed 
solely as machinists, 4 had worked in both a worker and a 
supervisory/owner position, 2 had been employed solely as 
owners/supervisors, 1 was previously employed as a time-study 
man, and 1 was a retired union official. Because some persons 
had been employed both as workers and as supervisors in their 
career history, they were interviewed using both the employer 
and worker interview guides.
All of the workers in this study had been employed in at 
least one of four machining enterprises: Bearing Company,
Remnant Company, Hightech Enterprises, Loyalty Company. The 
Bearing Company was a large machine shop that closed in the 
mid 1980s. The Remnant Company operates in the Bearing 
Company factory, however using the post-Fordist approach to 
production. Hightech Enterprises specializes in CNC 
production of large batches of precision machined goods. The
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Loyalty Company uses primarily manual machines for the 
production of small batches of machined goods. These 
companies are described in detail in Chapter 4.
Workers' ages ranged from 18-71 years, with an average 
age of 45 years. 79% of these machinists were born and raised 
in Machinists' Valley. 75% had fathers who had previously 
worked for one of the large machine shops in the Valley. Most 
of the machinists interviewed were currently married (79%) or 
divorced (8%), and most had children (88%). A high school 
diploma was generally the highest level of education attained 
by the sample of machinists (83%). However, two machinists 
(8%) reported failing to graduate and two machinists (8%) 
reported some college training beyond high school.
Methodological Concerns
Case Study Methods
This case study is not a community study of the classic 
approach such as the Lynd's (1929) study of Middletown (Lynd 
& Lynd 1929) or Warner's (1963) Yankee Citv. Rather, 
following the Rutmans' (1984) example, I view Machinist Valley 
as "a place in time" and my interests are examining the 
experiences of a particular group of workers in this place in 
time. Machinist Valley mirrors changes occurring at the 
national level, and experiences of workers in the Valley are 
likely to be similar workers experiences in many other
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communities undergoing similar changes.
The strength of case studies rest on their potentials for 
obtaining data rich in detail, and the opportunities they 
present to examine social relationships in the social contexts 
in which they occur (Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg 1991). This study 
method offers great potential for examining class relations 
between owners and workers in the small post-Fordist 
enterprises, as well as how class relations extend beyond 
factory walls into the community. Case studies have 
limitations, however, because of the potential "unigueness" of 
any particular case study site and the danger of generalizing 
findings under the assumption that all other cases are 
similar. This presents two concerns for this study.
First, is it appropriate to use the machinists and their 
experiences as exemplary of post-Fordism? There are other 
important changes in the opportunity structure of the United 
States that this study does not address, especially the work 
experiences in the expanding service sector of the economy. 
I strongly doubt that the findings presented in subseguent 
chapters could be (or should be) generalized to work 
experiences in the service sector and no single group of 
workers should be viewed as representative of all groups of 
workers.
Machinists' experiences should be used to make 
generalizations only concerning manufacturing workers in the 
primary labor market. And even with this caveat, these
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generalizations should be made tentatively, because machinists 
have historically retained much of the craft orientation to 
work even under Fordism. Experiences and patterns of response 
may vary by occupational group.
Second, is Machinist Valley a "unique case" that is 
different from other cases? This is an unavoidable 
shortcoming of the case study approach, which relies upon one 
location as being representative many other locations. I have 
shown above that Machinist Valley's employment changes mirror 
those occurring at the national level. This suggests that 
many other communities are experiencing similar changes as 
Machinist Valley, and that it is not a unique case. However, 
it is important to recognize that this potential exists.
Sampling
The sample size of this study is admittedly not large. 
In an ideal world, researchers have the resources to obtain 
very large sample sizes. This, of course, is always the case. 
I believe, however, that the sample size is adequate and 
provides valid data on work experience. In the final 
interview phase of this study, I was able to largely 
anticipate the types of responses interviewees would offer to 
my questions. At this point of "diminishing returns," in 
accordance with the grounded theory approach, I decided that 
this signified a reasonable juncture at which to return from 
the field and complete theory building (Glaser & Strauss
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1968). Although the numbers of subjects interviewed are not 
large, the data in this study are especially rich in detailed 
information.
Snowball sample technigues also have potential for 
producing non-representative samples. It is often likely that 
snowball samples produce a uniform group of subjects by virtue 
of social networks that may isolate one group of subjects from 
other groups. Also, subjects may be inclined to only refer 
the researcher to those people who will reiterate their views 
and experiences (Smith 1981). I tried to overcome this 
problem in my snowball sampling technique by asking workers to 
give the names of workers who had both good and bad 
experiences following the closure of the Bearing Company. In 
the initial stages of the snowballing, most workers were being 
interviewed in the Town of Liston. However, the final sample 
includes workers whose residences are dispersed throughout 
Machinist Valley. This leads me to believe that the snowball 
technique probably proved quite effective at producing a 
sample of interviewees who span across social networks and who 
have diverse experiences under post-Fordist production. 
Analysis in the proceeding chapters further substantiates this 
conclusion.
Summary
I use a two-pronged approach to examine how post-Fordism 
affects the control over work. I use Countv Business Patterns
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data to examine national changes in the organization and pay 
for machining work. I use interviews with workers, employers 
and community leaders in a case study community to examine how 
the control over work has been affected with the shift to 
post-Fordism. This community, "Machinist Valley" was selected 
because it reflects changes occurring at the national level 
signifying a restructuring of production to accommodate the 
post-Fordist approach. As skilled manufacturing work is 
likely to remain stable or increase in the United States, the 
study of machinists will provide data on the ways in which the 
new uses of organization and technology under post-Fordism 




OPPORTUNITY AND ECONOMIC REWARDS UNDER POST-FORDISM
This chapter examines how employment opportunities and 
economic compensation in the machining industry have changed 
under post-Fordism. Using Countv Business Patterns data, I 
first examine national level changes in work opportunities for 
machinists and how the changing organization of work has 
affected machinists' incomes. I then analyze the degree to 
which "fringe benefits," such as vacation pay, health 
insurance and retirement programs, have changed under the 
shift to post-Fordism. The data at the national level 
indicate that employment opportunities and economic rewards 
for machining work are declining as more machining work takes 
place in the smaller organizations. I also examine how 
indirect forms of economic compensation workers receive 
through company support of community infrastructure in 
Machinist Valley have been affected by the shift to post- 
Fordism.
Post-Fordist production is characterized by the 
increasing use of small organization sizes and the declining 
importance of large organizations advanced under the Fordist
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approach. Both national level data and interview data from 
Machinist Valley show that the shift to smaller organization 
sizes accompanied by reducing the economic rewards for 
machining work. Workers laboring in small enterprises earned 
lower wages and received fewer benefits than their 
counterparts laboring in larger enterprises. At the same 
time, support of community infrastructure is shifting from 
companies to workers. Individual workers' taxes have 
increased while company tax burdens stagnated and declined in 
Machinist Valley. In post-Fordist Machinist Valley there is 
a deterioration of community infrastructure as companies are 
reducing contributions to community and as workers are 
increasingly responsible (but less able) to absorb these 
financial costs.
National Changes in Opportunity and Pay for Machining Work
Structural Changes in Opportunity 1970-1990
Countv Business Patterns provide one indicator of the 
shift to post-Fordism with data concerning the changing 
organization of machining work, as measured by enterprise 
size. I discussed in Chapter 1 that Fordist organizations are 
characteristically very large and post-Fordist organizations 
tend to be smaller in size. Using large versus small 
organization size as approximation of Fordist versus post- 
Fordist approach, I am able to examine how the changing
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opportunity structure of machining work affects the pay 
workers receive for their labor.
Table 3.1 shows trends in opportunities for machinists by 
organization size. By 1990, there were 13,878 more machining 
enterprises in the United States than in 1970. This figure 
indicates that the shift to the post-Fordist approach to 
machining has increased the number of possible places of 
employment for American machinists compared to the opportunity 
structure under Fordism.
TABLE 3.1 NUMBER OF MACHINE INDUSTRY ESTABLISHMENTS* 
IN THE UNITED STATES 1970-1990.
ESTABLISHMENT SIZE NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS
Number of Employees 







20 - 49 5,883 7,743 8,108
50 - 99 2,334 3,104 3,310
100 - 249 1,649 2,242 2,214
250 - 499 737 911 734
500+ 703 869 528
Total # Firms 46,244 51,71737,839
Source - County Business Patterns, 1970, 1980, 1990
* Machinery except electrical, SIC code 35.
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In 1970 there were only 32,416 enterprises employing less 
than 50 people, by 1990 the number of small organizations grew 
to 44,931 establishments, a net increase of over 12,515 
enterprises. During this same period, large organizations 
employing 250+ employees declined from 1,440 establishments in 
1970 to 1,262 establishments in 1990, a net loss of 178 large 
establishments.
TABLE 3.2 EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR MACHINISTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT IN MACHINE
INDUSTRY* 1970-1990.
ESTABLISHMENT SIZE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
Number of Employees 1970 1980 1990










































Source - Countv Business Patterns (1970, 1980, 1990) 
* Machinery except electrical, SIC code 35.
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Figure 3.1








1-19 Employees \U\ 20-49 Employees □  50-99 Employees 
100-249 Employees Q  250-499 Employees [I] 500+ Employees
Source: County Business Patterns
Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1 show that the changing 
distributions of large and snail enterprises have had a 
significant impact on the nature of employment opportunities 
for machinists. While there were only 1,44 0 machining 
enterprises employing more than 250 workers in 1970, these 
firms accounted for 61% of the people employed in the 
machining industries. Thus, in terms of employment 
opportunities for machinists, the largest share of 
opportunities were in large Fordist type enterprises until the 
decade of the 1980s. The loss of 518 large establishments in 
the 1980s resulted in the loss of 594,726 jobs and by 1990, 
only 32% of workers were employed in Fordist-type enterprises. 
The growing number of small organizations (enterprises with 
less than 100 employees) only produced a net increase of 
196,968 jobs from 1970-1990. Thus, while there were 
increasing numbers of organizations employing machinists, 
during the decade of the 1980s, the overall number of job 
opportunities for machining work declined. In comparison to 
1980, in 1990 there were 581,603 fewer jobs available for 
people with skills in the machining industry.
One of the important reasons for the declining employment 
in the American machining industry is that Japanese industry 
in the 1970s and 1980s successfully gained control of markets 
previously dominated by American machine tool manufacturers 
(Holland 1989). While American industry continued to use 
outdated technologies and production techniques, Japan's
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Ministry of Industry and Trade, the MITI, supported Japanese 
machine tool manufacturers' competitive advantage by 
supporting corporate investments in tools and by restricting 
Japanese imports of American made machine tools (Holland 
1989). This gave Japan machine tool manufacturers an 
international competitive advantage over American 
manufacturers. Japan's success combined with declines in 
American military contracts resulted in widespread layoffs and 
factory closures in the American machine tool industry 
(Holland 1989).
National Trends in Income in the Machining Industry
While foreign competition may explain the overall decline 
in opportunities for workers with machining skills, it can not 
explain why opportunities are shifting to the smaller 
organization forms. Analysis of income by organization size, 
however, reveals one important factor: smaller organizations 
are more competitive because they enable owners to pay workers 
lower wages. In subsequent chapters I will address why these 
small organizations are successful at lowering workers' 
earnings. Here I restrict the analysis to document earnings 
differentials between large and small organizational forms.
Industry is shifting to a post-Fordist approach to 
production and this restructuring began in 1973 when American 
industry began to lose hegemonic power in the global economy. 
However, the shift to post-Fordism is gradual and older
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Fordist enterprises continue to operate during the transition 
to post-Fordism. Table 3.3 shows Countv Business Patterns 
data comparing average employee incomes in large enterprises 
with average employee incomes in small enterprises operating 
in 1990. The fifth column shows the average yearly income of 
employees in these enterprises adjusted to 1992 dollars.
TABLE 3.3 EMPLOYMENT, PAYROLL AND YEARLY INCOME 





















1 - 1 9 235,869 $ 6,066,118 $ 25,718 $ 27,518
20 - 49 247,871 $ 6,952,930 $ 28,050 $ 30,014
50 - 99 229,217 $ 6,532,660 $ 28,499 $ 30,494
100 - 249 341,697 $ 9,830,560 $ 28,769 $ 30,783
250 - 499 254,944 $ 7,519,649 $ 29,495 $ 31,559
500+ 612,561 $ 21,529,959 $ 35,147 $ 37,607
Total/Average 1,922,159 $ 58,431,876 $ 30,399 $ 32,527
Source: Countv Business Patterns (1990).
* SIC code 35 Industrial Machinery and Equipment.
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In 1990, the average employee working in the machining 
industries earned $32,527. There were considerable variations 
in pay according to the size of the enterprise, however. 
Those employees working in the largest organizations had 
considerably higher incomes than those laboring in the smaller 
organizations. Workers in the largest organizations (500+ 
employees) earned on average $37,607, in comparison to the 
smallest organizations where employees earned on average only 
$27,518. In other words, workers laboring in the large 
Fordist type enterprises in 1990 could expect to earn on 
average $10,089 more than their counterparts working in the 
smallest post-Fordist type enterprises.
Current patterns of pay for workers with skills in the 
machining industries indicate a two tier opportunity 
structure. At the top of this structure are the remaining 
large enterprises which pay high wages. At the bottom are 
small enterprises which pay significantly lower wages. These 
findings show the small organization sizes to be an important 
factor in producing low worker incomes.
While the 1990 data offer information on the current 
opportunity structure, it leaves unanalyzed the historical 
implications of the restructuring of opportunity from Fordism 
to post-Fordism. In Chapter 1 I showed how the Fordist 
approach was introduced by owners to increase their power in 
mass production to counteract the simple forms of control 
workers' developed under 19th century craft methods of
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production. Fordism therefore gave owners an initial
advantage in determining worker wages until workers adopted 
new forms of collective control suitable to the Fordist 
approach. Here I examine how average incomes in the machining 
industry have changed under the shift from large to small 
organizations over time.
TABLE 3.4 AVERAGE EMPLOYEE INCOME IN THE MACHINING INDUSTRIES 
1974-1990
ESTABLISHMENT 













1- 19 $ 31,081 $ 27,518 $ -3,563
20- 49 $ 31,158 $ 30,014 $ -1,144
50- 99 $ 31,609 $ 30,494 $ -1,114
100-249 $ 30,510 $ 30,783 $ 273
250-499 $ 30,858 $ 31,559 $ 701
500+ $ 35,442 $ 37,607 $ 2,165
Total $ 33,148 $ 32,527 $ -621
Source: County Business Patterns 1974, 1990, SIC code 35
Industrial Machinery and Equipment.
* 1992 Dollars.
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Table 3.4 compares changes in average employee income in 
the machining industries from 1974-1990 adjusted to 1992 
dollars.1 The bottom row of this table shows that there has 
been a modest decline in average employee income. Work in the 
machining industries pays on average $621 less in 1990 than it 
did in 1974. Examination of changing levels of pay from 1974- 
1990 by organization size, however, reveals important dynamics 
concerning the shift from large organizations to small 
organizations left unnoticed by this broadest measure of 
income change.
Whereas worker incomes in the largest enterprises 
continued to increase by $2,165 during the decades of the 
1970s and 1980s, incomes in the smallest organizations 
declined by $3,563. These findings illustrate the changing 
trajectory of workers' earnings. Under Fordism, workers' 
earnings consistently increased because of workers' collective 
abilities to disrupt production when dissatisfied with 
earnings or work conditions. Large organization size 
facilitated worker prosperity because it fostered collective 
methods of workers' control. It is not surprising that 
workers won increased wages in the large organizations during 
the 1970s and 1980s, as collective control continued to extend 
worker power in these enterprises. The increasing reliance 
upon smaller post-Fordist enterprises, however, disrupts this
^  use 1974 as the base year in these analyses because it is 
the first year in which Countv Business Patterns detail wages by 
organization size.
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trajectory by increasing owners' capabilities to reduce 
workers' earnings. Unlike the large Fordist enterprises, 
structuring work to snail enterprises has allowed owners in 
these companies to cut average workers' incomes by as much as 
$3,563 from 1974-1990. The ways in which small enterprises 
increase this power will be examined in Chapter 4. Here I 
show that national level data reveal that the transition to 
the post-Fordist approach to production provides workers with 
larger numbers of organizations where they can sell their 
labor. But these small organizations pay workers
significantly lower wages than in large organizations, 
suggesting that small organizations decrease workers' power to 
increase their earnings under post-Fordism.
Benefits
Annual income, of course, is not the only important 
measure of economic rewards received from work, and the shift 
in firm size affects workers' benefits as well. Work often 
provides fringe benefits that are not measured by annual 
payrolls in Countv Business Patterns data.
In a recent study of small versus large business, Brown, 
Hamilton and Medoff (1990) found that large firms employing 
500 or more employees offer considerably better fringe 
benefits than small firms employing fewer than 500 employees. 
Table 3.5, reproduced from the study by Brown et al., shows 
that large firms offer considerably more benefits to workers.
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For example, whereas 75% of large firms offer vacations, sick 
leave, health insurance, and pension programs, only 7% of 
small firms offer a similar combination of benefits to their 
employees.
TABLE 3.5 PERCENTAGE OF LARGE AND SMALL BUSINESSES OFFERING 
VARIOUS FRINGE BENEFITS 1986
FIRMS WITH MORE FIRMS WITH FEWER
FRINGE BENEFIT_______ THAN 500 EMPLOYEES THAN 500 EMPLOYEES
Vacation 95% 58%
Health 100% 55%
Sick Leave 91% 36%
Life Insurance 94% 29%
Pension or 401K 79% 16%
Bonus Plan 29% 11%
Short Term Disability 55% 10%
Long Term Disability 69% 9%
Savings Plan 29% 2%
Cafeteria Style Health 12% 1%
Vacation, Sick, Health, 75% 7%
Life, and Pension or
401K
Source: Brown, Charles, James Hamilton and James Medoff. 1990. 
Employers Large and Small. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Machinist Valley experienced the same structural changes 
in opportunities that were shown in the machining industry at 
the national level. From 1970-1990 the number of small 
enterprises (50 or fewer employees) increased from 13 to 39
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enterprises. Likewise, the 5 largest enterprises in the 
Valley in 1970, each employing over 500 people, all closed by 
1990. The change from Fordist to post-Fordist enterprises in 
the Valley were accompanied by significant declines in fringe 
benefits received by workers.
The reduction in fringe benefits occurred in two ways. 
First, during the period of factory closures, unions made 
concessions on benefits in order to forestall or prevent 
impending closures. Second, new post-Fordist companies opened 
with considerably lower initial benefit packages than 
previously offered in the Fordist companies. Thus changes in 
benefits in the Valley changed gradually during the decade of 
the 1980s.
In Machinist Valley, all of the Fordist enterprises 
offered similar benefits packages in the 1970s. Likewise, all 
of post-Fordist enterprises offer similar benefits packages in 
the 1990s. While there are very minor differences in benefits 
between companies of each type, comparing the Fordist Bearing 
Company with the post-Fordist Remnant Company illustrates the 
overall declines in benefits for machinists in the Valley.
The benefits package at the Bearing Company (one of the 
largest firms previously operating in the Valley) illustrates 
the high quality benefits Fordist workers received in 
Machinist Valley until the decade of closures in the 1980s. 
The unionized workers in the Bearing company received full 
health insurance benefits with a 100% Blue Cross/Blue Shield
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health insurance program. Bearing workers also had a generous 
pension program, which allowed many of them to retire as young 
as age 55, after working 25 years at the company. And when 
Bearing workers retired, they continued to receive the full 
health insurance benefits.
Bearing workers also had handsome vacation packages. 
After an initial 90 day screening period, Bearing workers were 
entitled to 10 vacation days per year. As workers gained 
seniority and accrued increasing vacation time, after 10 years 
of service they would eventually be eligible for five weeks of 
vacation time/pay per year (accruing 1.5 vacation days per 
year). Because workers received such good benefits and pay, 
the Bearing Company was universally seen by workers as a good 
place to work. Workers took advantage of good pay and long 
vacations by building vacation homes for activities such as 
hunting and fishing.
In the case of the Bearing Company, threats of an 
impending closure forced the union to give a number of 
concessions concerning both wages and benefits. Finally the 
company closed altogether and reopened under the new name of 
"The Remnant Company." In 1992 the Remnant Company employed 
60 non-unionized employees. While these employees are making 
similar products as were previously made in the Bearing 
Company, their benefit packages have been significantly 
reduced.
Whereas Bearing Company workers had full health insurance
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coverage, the Remnant Company only offers an 80:20 health 
Insurance plan, in which workers contribute 20 percent to 
health coverage with a high deductible. Their health 
insurance is also terminated upon retirement from the company. 
And unlike the Bearing Company, the Remnant Company offers no 
retirement program.
Vacation time was also considerably reduced from the 
Bearing to the Remnant Company. Remnant employees earn seven 
days of vacation only after completing one full year of 
employment, after which they accrue one further day of 
vacation time following each year of employment. And unlike 
Bearing workers, they are only eligible for a maximum of 3 
weeks vacation after 10 years of labor. Therefore, after 10 
years of work, the Remnant workers have 2 less weeks of 
hunting, fishing or family time per year in comparison to 
their counterparts in the Bearing Company. And because older 
Remnant Company workers feel the pressure of earning money to 
save for retirement, some choose to work through their 
vacations in order to "get ahead." Of course these workers 
are not "getting ahead" in comparison to their Bearing Company 
counterparts. They are struggling to maintain life standards 
set by their parents' generation who achieved high incomes 
working under the Fordist approach.
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Corporate and Worker Support of Community Infrastructure
I have thus far shown that pay and benefits have been 
significantly reduced during the period of restructuring 
production from large to small firms, at both the national and 
case study site. These findings offer strong evidence that 
workers' power in negotiating the terms upon which production 
takes place has been reduced. Before addressing why workers' 
power has been reduced during the transition to post-Fordism, 
I address one final aspect of economic livelihood that is 
affected by the restructuring of production: support of
community infrastructure. Support of community infrastructure 
affects worker life chances in indirect ways. For example, if 
workers receive modest paychecks, but are able to send their 
children to good schools, walk brightly lit streets in safety, 
and attend well funded civic events as a result of a company 
support of community infrastructure, they are compensated for 
work in ways not directly indicated by their pay.
During the twentieth century, workers received 
considerable indirect compensation as a result of corporate 
contributions to community. For example, the classic study 
Middletown showed the "X Family" providing support for 
churches, schools, and community events (Lynd & Lynd 1937). 
Therefore the presence of the X Family's glass company in 
Middletown benefitted workers in a number of ways outside of 
their personal compensation (see also Warner 1963). Thus 
workers in Fordist communities sometimes benefitted by having
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access to good schools, good roads, and good churches, all 
partially supported by the companies in their communities.
The practice of company support of community 
infrastructure has been exposed to extensive critical 
appraisal. For example, both Pope (1942) and Nash (1987) show 
that owners use these investments in community to maintain 
hegemonic control in the communities in which their companies 
operate. However, the fact remains that many communities, 
particularly in the Northeastern United States, prospered in 
comparison with communities in the 19th century and agrarian 
communities in the Southern United States. For example, while 
corporations used contributions to YMCA, baseball teams, and 
the United Way to increase their hegemonic power in 
communities, these contributions did have a positive impact 
upon many features of American community life. However, 
interviews in Machinist Valley indicate that the relationship 
between corporations and communities is shifting, and 
individual workers are now increasingly responsible for 
maintaining community infrastructure previously supported by 
corporations (see also Rubinstein 1990).
Taxation of community members and local manufacturing 
enterprises are the major sources of support for community 
infrastructure in Machinist Valley. In order to assess how 
the shift to post-Fordism affected the individual and 
corporate support of community, I interviewed the Tax Assessor 
in the Town of Liston, the largest community in Machinist
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Valley. According to the Liston Tax Assessor and City 
Manager, there have been no increases in the property taxes 
for manufacturing industries in the town of Liston from 1980- 
1992, largely because the town government is trying to 
encourage manufacturing enterprises to stay and locate in the 
Valley. However, for machinists and other community 
residents, the burden for community infrastructure has 
increased considerably through property taxes. Table 3.6 
shows that from 1980 to 1990, property taxes on a median 
priced home in Liston increased by $1170.00. The end result 
is that the economic burden for the support of community 
infrastructure is increasingly placed upon property owners in 
the Valley.
TABLE 3.6 PROPERTY TAXES ON A MEDIAN PRICED HOME IN THE TOWN 
OF LISTON 1970-1990, ADJUSTED AND UNADJUSTED 
DOLLARS




1970 $ 723 $ 2617
1975 $ 986 $ 2573
1980 $ 1133 $ 1926
1985 $ 1776 $ 2309
1990 $ 2893 $ 3096
Source: Town of Liston Tax Assessor
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Interviews with owners and supervisors of the local 
machine shops show that post-Fordist companies in Machinist 
Valley are making fewer substantial contributions to community 
infrastructure. One supervisor, who worked at both the 
Bearing Company and at the post-Fordist Remnant Company 
reported the Bearing Company used to give considerable support 
to the community through corporate donations. Even during its 
period of restructuring, the Bearing Company gave the school 
a $7,000 air compressor and science equipment no longer needed 
at the company. At the Remnant Company now, however, he 
reports:
I would say we give our $100-$200 donations to things, 
but as community minded I would put us mediocre to 
minimal [Shift Supervisor J7, Remnant Company].
Another owner of a local machine shop, when asked about what 
his company does for the community, responded simply:
We give people jobs and pay our taxes [Owner 01].
While company investment in community infrastructure is 
declining, community economic support of companies is 
increasing. Towns such as Liston are trying desperately to 
keep and attract employers in their communities. Town 
governments, such as in the Town of Liston, offer companies a 
variety of incentives to stay or locate in their community. 
For example, in the early 1970s the Bearing Company determined
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it was necessary to update their facilities and build a new 
plant and abandon the outdated plant located in the center of 
Liston. The move to a new plant constructed on the outskirts 
of town was made only after the Liston Town Government agreed 
not to tax the Bearing Company for nine years following the 
construction of this new plant. Otherwise, the Bearing 
Company indicated that it would consider moving to a Southern 
state where labor costs would be lower.
A more recent example is the case of a tool manufacturer 
which came to Liston in 1990 from another location in the 
Northeast. According to the personnel director at the tool 
company, the primary decision to move was the attraction of 
non-unionized Liston workers, who could be paid considerably 
lower wages than those offered at the unionized location 
operating at the time. When this plant started operations, 
Liston workers were working for $5.00 less per hour and 
without health insurance, vacations, or the pension programs 
previously offered in the old plant. The company's final 
decision to locate in Liston, however, was made only after the 
Town of Liston agreed to build an access road and install a 
sewer system at the taxpayers' expense.
As a result of declining company contributions to 
community infrastructure, and increasing burdens on the town 
to attract and keep employers, the infrastructure of the Town 
of Liston decayed during the 1980s. For workers, the most 
striking change in the Town of Liston is the deteriorating
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downtown section, which was previously the shopping hub of 
Machinist Valley. Once a "happening" and "bustling place," 
the downtown section is now more likely to be referred to as 
"bombed out" and "dead." Because of declining wages, retail 
sales are significantly down and currently one-third of the 
retail space stands unoccupied. For teachers, the biggest 
problem is a deteriorating public school that has lost its 
state accreditation because, among other things, it has an 
inadequate library, improper heating, lacks a science 
laboratory, and the building is literally crumbling.
Today, Liston has a reputation both inside and outside of 
the community as a "rough place" with a disproportionate share 
of social problems. Employers and community leaders complain 
about "bums" and "greebles" that hang out in the parks and 
next to closed stores, making the streets less safe at night. 
In 1985 alone, there were over 2000 serious crimes reported to 
police in Machinist Valley (Citv and Countv Data Book 1988). 
No one in Liston would question that the community atmosphere 
and its infrastructure has declined following the closure of 
the Bearing Company. Because the small post-Fordist 
enterprises are contributing less to the community, increasing 
economic burdens are being placed upon workers. As a result, 
workers expressed bitterness at contributing more to the 
community and getting less in return. While these data do not 
directly measure whether a "community ethos" exists in 
Machinist Valley, they do provide some indication that Piore
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and Sabel (1984) and Sable and Zeitlin (1985) over-emphasize 
the potential benefits experienced by workers under the 
"alternatives to mass production."
Conclusion
Opportunities for machining work are now increasingly 
concentrated in smaller organizations associated with the 
shift to post-Fordism. However overall opportunity has 
declined because these enterprises do not offer as many jobs 
as were available in the United States in the early 1970s.
Average worker pay in the machining industry declined 
moderately during the 1980s. But as industry continues to 
restructure pay will continue to decline because the small 
post-Fordist enterprises offer considerably lower pay than the 
larger Fordist enterprises. Likewise, benefits are lower in 
small post-Fordist enterprises, and workers are now less 
likely to have full health insurance coverage, pension 
programs, or long paid vacations.
Indirect forms of compensation have also decreased, as 
individuals are now increasingly responsible for maintaining 
community infrastructure that used to be largely supported 
through company taxes and charitable contributions. The study 
of Machinist Valley indicates that this industrial district is 
deteriorating and is a considerably worse place to live than 
when the Bearing Company was in operation. The shift from 
Fordism to post-Fordism is associated with this deterioration.
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CHAPTER 4
OWNER CONTROL IN POST-FORDIST PRODUCTION
In the previous chapters, I showed that the American 
machining industry has been shifting to the post-Fordist 
approach to production and that workers' pay and benefits are 
decreasing. If workers' compensation declined in all size 
classifications in the machining enterprises, declining pay 
could be argued to be purely a product of economic factors in 
the increasingly competitive global economy. However, by 
showing that changes in economic compensation are strongly 
related to organization size, I have provided compelling 
evidence that the post-Fordist approach has increased owners' 
power in the work place. The small enterprises associated 
with post-Fordist production have enabled owners to lower 
workers' wages and benefits, whereas the large enterprises 
associated with Fordism have enabled workers to increase their 
wages and retain good benefits during the period of 1970-1990. 
This chapter examines post-Fordism and owners' methods of 
control. I examine how the new methods of owners' control 
have increased their power to lower workers' wages and 
benefits, while simultaneously advancing their power to 
increase the pace of work.
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Prior to the 1970s, most machinists in Machinist Valley 
worked in 6 large machining enterprises. Each of these large 
companies employed more than 500 employees and used the 
Fordist approach to control workers, including the 
bureaucratic organization of work, the use of incentive pay 
systems, and pacing of work according to time study methods. 
During the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, 4 of these
enterprises closed and the remaining 2 downsized to medium 
sized operations. At the same time, Machinist Valley saw the 
rise of small post-Fordist enterprises which employ less than 
50 employees. In 1970 there were only 17 of these 
enterprises. But by 1990 Machinist Valley had 44 small 
machining enterprises.
In order to examine the changing methods of control, I 
examine the interviews of machinists, supervisors and owners 
in four enterprises in Machinist Valley. These companies 
include one Fordist enterprise, Bearing Company, a large 
manufacturing company that closed in the mid 1980s. I 
interviewed 3 supervisors and 12 employees from this company. 
The other 3 companies are post-Fordist enterprises: the
Remnant Company, Hightech Enterprises, and the Loyalty 
Company. In the Remnant Company, a small company that uses 
CNC equipment to make small batches of air compressors in what 
used to be Bearing factory, I interviewed 1 supervisor and 10 
employees. In Hightech Enterprises, a small sized plant that 
depends heavily on CNC technology to produce large batches of
108
close tolerance machine goods for government contracts, I 
interviewed 5 employees. Unfortunately, owners in Hightech 
Enterprises refused to be interviewed, but a worker had 
previously been employed as a supervisor in this company and 
provided extensive information on managerial practices. In 
the Loyalty Company, a small job shop that uses mostly manual 
machines to produce small batches of custom machine goods, I 
interviewed the owner and 5 workers.1
In each post-Fordist company there is strong evidence 
that owners are using organization and technology in ways 
significantly different from the Fordist approach. In part, 
the new uses of organization and technology are designed 
specifically to profit by capitalizing on changing markets for 
products. Organization and technology are also being used in 
new ways to extend the owners1 control over workers and the 
pace of production. By comparing the experiences of work in 
these post-Fordist enterprises with the experiences of work in 
the Fordist Bearing Company, I show how the post-Fordist 
approach influences power relations in the work place.
1 Some machinists previously had worked in more than one 
company. For example, some machinists had worked in the Bearing 
Company and then worked in the Remnant Company. Others were 
simultaneously working at both Hightech Enterprises and the 
Loyalty Company. These workers were interviewed for their 
experiences in both companies. Therefore individual workers are 
sometimes counted twice in the above tally.
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The Remnant Company
The Remnant Company operates in the factory and on 
equipment previously used by the Fordist Bearing Company to 
make industrial air compressors, mining equipment and road 
construction equipment. The Remnant Company has specialized 
in producing a more limited range of products, restricting 
production primarily to the manufacture of industrial air 
compressors. While the Remnant Company products are similar 
to those manufactured by the Bearing Company, there are many 
changes in the ways in which they are manufactured under post- 
Fordism. Below I first show how the Remnant Company's post- 
Fordist approach differs from the Bearing Company's Fordist 
approach to production. I then detail the new methods of 
control used by owners in the Remnant Company and how they 
differ from Fordist control as explained in Chapter 1.
Changes in the organization and use of technology in the 
post-Fordist Remnant Company have resulted from a new strategy 
to profit by exploiting economies of scope rather than scale. 
Chandler explains economies of scale as:
...those that result when the increased size of a 
single operating unit producing a single product 
reduces the unit cost of production or distribution" 
(Chandler 1990:17).
Economies of scale are aimed at mass production and profiting 
by manufacturing products in volume, thereby capturing large
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shares of the market for a particular commodity. The 
economies of scale were first made possible by changes in the 
infrastructure of the United States in the late 19th century, 
with the introduction of the railroad and telegraph (Chandler 
1990).
Like other Fordist companies, The Bearing Company was 
oriented to exploiting economies of scale. By using 
organization and technology to mass produce industrial air 
compressors, mining equipment, and road equipment in large 
volume, the Bearing Company was able to capture large 
proportions of the market for these product lines. As the
United States maintained hegemonic power in the global 
economy, the Bearing Company was able to maintain a profitable 
enterprise in Machinist Valley until the 1970s.
In the 1970s, with growing international competition, 
particularly from Germany and Japan, as well as newly 
industrialized countries (NICS) such as India, the Bearing 
Company's Fordist approach in Machinist Valley became a 
handicap to making high profits. Workers' wages in Machinist 
Valley far surpassed those offered in the NICs, in essence 
reducing Bearing Company's profits. The Fordist approach of 
the Bearing Company prevented the company from innovating and 
finding a niche in the more specialized markets opening in the 
1970s. As Chandler explains:
In machinery, the trade-off between the economies of
scale and those of scope was more clear-cut than in
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most industries. The extraordinary cost advantages of 
scale provided by the American system of manufacturing 
[Fordism] in the mass production of light machinery 
sharply reduced the opportunity for exploiting those 
of scope. Every part and accessory and every motion 
of every machine worker were designed specifically for 
the manufacture of a single product line. On the 
other hand, the construction of made-to-order machines 
for widely differing industries —  machines that could 
be produced from the same materials and many of the 
same types of metal working and shaping machinery —  
offered the potential for exploiting the economies of 
scope. In this type of production the German 
manufacturers excelled, but few American companies 
followed the German example (Chandler 1990:194).
Unable and/or unwilling to modify the Bearing Company's 
Fordist approach to production in the face of foreign 
competition and new market demands, the local paper reported 
the closure of the Bearing Company in 1986:
Plagued by debts, poor management, shoddy accounting 
and stiff foreign competition, the Bearing Company 
filed for protection from creditors under Chapter 11 
of the Federal Bankruptcy Act in November.
Later that same year, new owners restructured the company and 
reopened it as the post-Fordist Remnant Company. Unlike the 
Bearing Company, the owners of the Remnant Company have been 
attempting to maintain a profitable enterprise by exploiting 
economies of scope rather than scale. According to Chandler, 
economies of scope are one of the ways in which owners in 
developed countries maintain profitable enterprises in the 
contemporary global economy:
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The economies of joint production, or scope, also 
brought significant cost reduction. Here the cost 
advantage came from making a number of products in the 
same production unit from much the same raw and 
semifinished materials and by the same intermediate 
processes. The increase in the number of products 
made simultaneously in the same factory reduced the 
unit costs of each individual product (Chandler 
1990:24).
One of the features which separates the Fordist era from 
post-Fordist era is the increasing demands for specialized 
goods (Lash & Urry 1987, Piore & Sabel 1984). Rather than
mass producing air compressors, mining equipment, and road
equipment, the new owners of the Remnant Company sold off most 
of the mining and road equipment product lines and have
specialized in the production of industrial air compressors. 
Orienting production to small batches, producing only 60-80 
air compressors a month, the Remnant Company has been able to 
find a more specialized niche left untapped by the mass
production oriented Bearing Company. By producing air 
compressors to match the specifications desired by individual 
purchasers, the Remnant Company is now able to modify the 
production to suit customer needs.
The changing orientation from scale to scope has changed 
the Remnant Company in a number of related ways. Because the 
Bearing Company was mass producing its product lines in start 
to finish production, the company was very large. At its peak 
in the 1950s the Bearing Company employed over 1600 employees. 
Because of its large size, the Bearing company was also a 
highly bureaucratic organization. Of the 1600 employees, 400
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were employed in bureaucratic capacities such as time study 
men, payroll officers, secretaries, salespersons, and 
supervisors. In the Bearing Company 33% of the employees were 
employed in non-production oriented positions.
In 1992 the Remnant Company only employed 65 people, 60 
of whom were employed as production workers on the shop floor. 
The smaller size has allowed the owners of the Remnant Company 
to dispense with the bureaucratic organization that was 
previously necessary to keep the Bearing Company in operation. 
Whereas 3 3% of the Bearing Company employees were employed in 
non-production oriented positions, only 8% of Remnant Company 
employees were working in a bureaucratic capacity in 1992. 
More worker time is spent in productive capacities rather than 
in bureaucratic capacities in the Remnant Company, thereby 
increasing the potentials for profitability.
With its post-bureaucratic organization, the Remnant 
Company relies upon fewer formal rules to guide production. 
In the Bearing Company, legal rational authority was used to 
organize work through a formal rule book that standardized 
company procedures, including specific work tasks for its 
employees, time study methods, and incentive pay systems. 
When the unionized Bearing Company closed and reopened as the 
non-unionized Remnant Company, formal rules were dispensed 
with. Currently the Remnant Company does not use a formal 
rule book, nor does it use time study methods or incentive 
systems to pace production. The decreasing reliance upon
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formal rules has freed the owners and workers to work without 
the bureaucratic constraints that impede innovation and 
change, again facilitating flexibility in production and the 
ability of Remnant Company to capitalize on economies of 
scope.
The small Remnant Company is a flexibly specialized post- 
Fordist enterprise making a similar product to that 
manufactured in the large Fordist Bearing Company. It differs 
from the Bearing Company in size and post-bureaucratic 
organization, including its lack of incentive pay systems, 
lack of formal rules and abandonment of time study methods. 
Fordist methods of owners' control have been abandoned in the 
Remnant Company in favor of new post-Fordist methods of 
control.
Remnant Company owners use three distinct, but related, 
methods to control the pace and pay of work. First, by 
abandoning the Tayloristic agenda of removing control from the 
shop floor, owners have been able to tap into the positive 
potentials of machinists' craft ethic. Individual workers who 
adopt a craft ethic attain social status among their peers by 
producing high quality goods at a fast pace. By giving 
workers autonomy on job tasks, and by reintroducing variation 
in tasks, this craft ethic has reemerged. Unlike machine 
operators of Fordism, post-Fordist craftsmen work for 
intrinsic satisfaction, as well as for the extrinsic rewards 
attained from work.
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Second, this craft ethic is then organizationally 
harnessed to pace workers collectively through a new "pull" 
orientation to production. Work organized under the pull 
orientation demands that orders be completed quickly to fill 
individual contracts. This differs from the Fordist approach 
of mass production which "pushes" production from behind 
(Webster 1991). This new pull orientation imposes a pace of 
production that no longer requires time study methods and 
incentive pay systems.
Third, the post-Fordist approach to production allows 
owners to control individual workers and collectivities of 
workers by imposing job insecurity. With the absence of 
formal rules, owners have been able to dismiss individual 
workers who do not comply to company expectations concerning 
pace and quality of production under the pull orientation. 
Likewise, collective worker protests are diffused by owners' 
threats to close the company. And by not disclosing 
information on company profits to workers, workers have no 
foundation for questioning the fairness of the pace and pay of 
production.
Tapping the Craft Ethic
One of the ideologies which guided the Fordist approach 
was a taken-for-granted assumption of workers' tendency to 
restrict production, which Taylor termed "natural soldiering" 
(Taylor 1967). Because of this assumed "natural" worker
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trait, Taylor advocated the separation of thought (managers' 
responsibilities) from execution (workers' responsibilities) 
and decreasing managers reliance upon workers' craft knowledge 
(Braverman 1974). This ideology guided the organization of 
work in the Bearing Company, which relied primarily on the 
work of "machine operators" rather than "machinists" 
(craftsmen) in the mass production of goods. The post-Fordist 
Remnant Company relies extensively upon the craft knowledge 
and skills of the workers.
The shift supervisor reports that his workers are "hand 
picked" "all around machinists," capable of running all or 
most of the machines on the shop floor.
Everyone here does their own setups. And they can 
setup multiple machines, everything in the shop. They 
are right there. Machinists, per se, a guy tells you 
he is a machinist, you have to dig deeper. He will 
tell you he is a machinist. What do you run? "Well,
I run a turret lathe." Then you are a turret lathe 
operator, you are not a machinist, because a machinist 
does a lot of everything [Shift Supervisor J7, Remnant 
Company].
Machine operators, people capable of only operating a single 
type of machine, are no longer highly desired employees at the 
Remnant Company. To profit by flexible production, the owners 
seek workers who can shift from station to station and have 
the skills to change the machine tools to meet new 
specifications. Workers are expected to exercise craft skills 
with speed and precision.
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Everybody in here is a hyperactive person because they 
are all doing more than one persons job, literally. 
Guys that used to run one machine in the Bearing 
Company run four machines now. They are creating as 
good a part. But to stay active in the international 
economy, we just can not go back to running one 
machine to one guy. You have to run multiple machines 
and you have got to be able to hustle. Age has 
nothing to do with it. A guy with the knowledge can 
walk from machine to machine and get as much done as 
a guy with a little less knowledge who is running from 
machine to machine [Shift Supervisor J7, Remnant 
Company].
By relying on craftsmen, the Remnant Company owners are 
able to tap into a craft ethic that was left untapped by the 
Bearing Company under its Fordist approach. Bearing Company 
workers, laboring on deskilled tasks under the incentive pay 
system, reported sometimes having to hold back production in 
order to avoid having their guotas increased. Because these 
workers were compensated primarily by volume, not quality, 
workers learned tricks to pass bad parts by quality 
inspectors. Thus, paradoxically, while Taylor's time study 
method was implemented to maximize productivity, it had the 
unintended consequence of restricting production in a number 
of instances, and most notably it undermined the craft ethic 
that fosters pride in one's work.
In the Remnant Company there are no quality inspectors. 
Rather, inspection falls upon the last worker on the assembly 
line who starts the air compressor and trouble shoots any 
potential problems. Each worker, according to the shift 
supervisor, is treated as a "man," a term of respect reserved
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for craftsmen who show competence and dependability 
(Montgomery 1979). Workers in the Remnant Company, rather 
than operating under constant surveillance of foremen and 
managers (common in the Bearing Company) are under little 
direct supervision.
I have a hand picked crew. I can go in in the morning 
and say "This is what I need." I only check in on 
them twice a day. My thing is with them I don't need 
to yell and scream. We are all big boys here. You 
[the worker] know what I want and I'll come back later 
and see how you are doing [Shift Supervisor J7, 
Remnant Company].
Therefore, one of the ways in which the Remnant Company 
owners control work is by giving a great deal of autonomy back 
to individual workers. With workers monitoring their own 
work, the owners also have been able to dispense with the 
bureaucratic overhead of non-productive workers such as time 
study men and quality inspection departments, thereby 
increasing potentials for profitability. Working in part to 
maintain their status as a craftsmen among their peers, 
workers are guided by their craft ethic:
I try to do a good job. I buy something and I hope 
someone has put their best into it. We've had 
comments that now that it is just the few of us doing 
it the machines are coming out better than they were
a while back. We take some pride in our work I
would hate for someone to say that my work is shit 
[Machinist J5, Remnant Company].
Fordist workers laboring on deskilled tasks are less likely to
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be concerned with producing "shit," unless producing "scrap" 
undermines their abilities to "make-out" on the incentive 
system. A strong craft ethic is one of the primary 
differences that distinguishes Remnant workers from Bearing 
workers. While all of the retired Bearing workers reported 
taking personal pride in their own work, they also complained 
bitterly about the large number of "deadbeats" that worked in 
the factory. In part, they attributed the bankruptcy of the 
Bearing Company to the union's protection of "the deadwood." 
Remnant workers, on the other hand, uniformly report their co­
workers as "really knowing their stuff" and being a key source 
of satisfaction in their work experiences.
When workers adopt a craft ethic, informal groups enforce 
quality production, an aspect of work that used to be enforced 
by foremen and formal rules. Rather than first relying upon 
foremen or shift supervisors, craft workers instruct each 
other in production techniques and engage in quality control 
themselves.
If someone is doing something wrong and you have to 
fix it you shouldn't let him go on doing it wrong.
You just go and tell him. You let it slide a couple 
of times then you tell them. I would want someone to 
tell me [Machinist Jl, Remnant Company].
This attitude differs markedly from that fostered under 
Fordism because leaving their stations would undermine
120
workers' abilities to make out.2 In contrast, the post- 
Fordist Remnant Company encourages worker cooperation.
Oh yeah, if someone has a problem with something we 
can take a break and help them out. Give them a hand. 
Someone down at the other end of the shop might know 
that you know how to do something and he is stuck. 
You just take a walk down and show him. They [the 
owners] are pretty good about stuff like that 
[Machinist Jl, Remnant Company].
On one level, fostering a revitalization of craft skills 
and the craft ethic may appear to decrease owners' control 
over work tasks. This is true. But by structuring work to 
cultivate a strong craft ethic with craft labor, owners have 
also been able to structure the social context of the work 
place such that workers engage in the surveillance of each 
other. Interestingly, therefore, owners' power is apparently 
increased in the Remnant Company by giving task control back 
to workers. This is accomplished by coupling craft work with 
a "pull orientation" to production and the instilling a sense 
of job insecurity among the workers.
Pacing Work With The Pull Orientation
Fordist mass production in the Bearing Company was guided 
by a push orientation, which Webster explains as:
2 Roger Tulin's A Machinist's Semi-Automated Life (1984) 
provides an excellent account of how the Fordist approach 
discourages the sharing of knowledge between workers, undermining 
organizational efficiency.
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"the impetus for the movement of materials along the 
production line come from upstream, rather than them 
being 'pulled' through the plant by empty spaces 
downstream in the line" (Webster 1991:212).
In other words, pace of production was determined by the vast 
reserves of mass produced component parts, assembled at 
(ideally) the fastest pace possible. The Fordist approach 
uses time study methods to determine the optimum momentum of 
raw material to finished product, and incentive pay systems to 
compel workers to pace their work accordingly, pushing the 
production process from behind.
The post-Fordist Remnant Company seeks to exploit 
economies of scope with more flexibly specialized production 
methods and it has abandoned the Bearing Company's push 
orientation in favor of a "pull" orientation to production. 
According to Webster (1991:212), under the pull orientation 
the impetus for the movement of materials along the production 
line come from empty spaces downstream in the line. Unlike 
the push orientation, the pull orientation begins with the 
market for customized machined goods. Orders for products are 
obtained by Remnant Company salespersons, delivery dates are 
set, and then the production is thereby "pulled" from the need 
to fill these orders.
In the post-Fordist Remnant Company there are no time 
study men, nor are there incentive pay systems. All workers 
are paid a straight hourly pay, ranging from $7/hour to 
$11.50/hour (well below the pay in the Bearing Company, which
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was as high as $22.00/hour) . But according to the shift 
supervisor, as well as workers, per worker production has 
increased by 4 to 6 times over that in the Bearing Company.
By coupling the pull orientation with "Just In Time 
Production" (JIT), the owners are able to control the pace of 
production without time study methods. Under JIT, rather than 
producing vast reserves of parts for mass production, parts 
are produced for each batch of orders (Schonberger 1982) . 
This allows the company to modify products to suit individual 
customer's needs, as well as eliminate the cost of keeping 
large stocks of goods on the shelves in reserve. The JIT 
practice, however, also produces an organizational context 
that forces workers to produce at a faster pace than under 
Fordist time study methods.
Because each part is made to fill orders, any single 
worker who is unable to keep production flowing with quality 
parts is quickly identified to both managers and his co­
workers .
We are down to a skeleton crew. The assembly floor, 
at one time there were 60 guys down there doing almost 
the same amount of machines that we do right now with 
about 12 guys. But we have come a long way in 
learning about assembly lines. Before we were a 
really big operation, you would take six guys and put 
them onto a frame, it wasn't really an assembly line. 
Now workers work right there and get their 
parts....the small machines are physically moved by 
human bodies. One guy does what five guys used to do. 
It takes a little longer, instead of trying to get 10 
machines down the line in a day, we settle down for 
four or five. The quality is much better because you 
don't have a lot of hands in the pot. You've only got
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5 guys creating something that they know if this part 
is wrong it is going to immediately come back to them 
because they installed it and we know who does every 
part. And our quality has come up a lot and we used to 
have 10 inspectors but now we have only one inspector 
and he doesn't look at anything until it is completed 
[Shift Supervisor J7, Remnant Company].
With the "skeleton crew," the small post-Fordist Remnant 
Company eliminates the worker anonymity that was used to 
workers' advantage in the Bearing Company. If any one worker 
fails to perform his job adequately in the tightly coupled 
chain of reliance in the Remnant Company, he will hold up 
production of all workers further down the line, and his 
personal shortcomings will be quickly identified. For 
alienated workers who take little pride in their work, this 
would be of little personal consequence. However, for workers 
with a strong craft ethic, the inability to keep up is a 
reflection on their personal competencies and skills as 
craftsmen. Therefore workers "hustle" to keep up production 
and meet the pull of the orders.
Just In Time production also structures the workplace to 
produce frequent emergencies that require worker immediate 
attention. Whereas Bearing workers could build up "kitties" 
of parts, which allowed them to take frequent rests (sometimes 
as long as half of the work day) , Remnant workers can not make 
kitties of specialized parts. Upon finishing any particular 
part, they are then called to the next task that needs to be 
completed in order for production to meet the months orders.
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Neither the pull orientation, JIT, or the craft ethic 
alone, produces the rapid pace of production seen in the 
Remnant Company. Theoretically, the craft ethic gives 
autonomy back to workers, which increases their capabilities 
to slow the pace of production to their own comfort level. 
Likewise, workers could theoretically simply refuse to work at 
a fast pace, claiming inabilities to produce to the capacities 
demanded by the orders with the existing skeleton crew. 
However, when these two elements of control are coupled with 
job insecurity, owners are able to obtain a fast pace of work 
from machinists and submission to the owners' imposed pace of 
production.
Job Insecurity
The pervasive feeling among workers in the Remnant 
Company is one of insecurity. The owners are able to use job 
insecurity in two ways to generate a fast pace of production 
among workers. First, individual job insecurity is used to 
motivate workers to work at a fast pace in order to prevent 
being laid off or replaced. Second, collective job insecurity 
is fostered by cultivating an understanding of impending 
company closure if production is not highly efficient. This 
is made especially salient with Machinist Valley's history of 
plant closures and runaway companies.
All of the workers in the Remnant Company acknowledge 
that they are working at a faster pace and are producing more
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than when they worked in the Bearing Company. They are also 
given additional responsibilities, such as stocking their 
machines with castings, a job that used to be performed by the 
company internal truck driver. Workers are also expected to 
help co-workers when they are in need of assistance.
I build about 5 complete compressors a day. I usually 
have enough left to get started the next morning, have 
all my parts ready and stuff. There used to be two 
guys doing the job, now I try and do it the best I 
can, one person, to keep the line going. We've been 
doing pretty good. We've been on some good months 
were we've done close to a hundred in a month with a 
little overtime [Machinist Jl, Remnant Company].
This worker and others, however, feel vulnerable if they slow 
production or resist doing more tasks. The shift supervisor 
explains that in order to work at Remnant, each worker has to 
be "Mr. Hustle." In the constricting market for machinists in 
Machinist Valley threats of lay offs or firings carry great 
weight.
These guys, like I say, it's you put out or you get 
out. That is basically what they are telling you. 
They say to you, "you want to work here you do your 
day's work. Or you get out and we'll get someone 
else." They don't fire you, they lay you off 
[Machinist J4, Remnant Company].
In the Remnant Company, workers' job security rest on their 
willingness to conform to the pace determined by the pull of 
production, rather than the number of years they worked for
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the company. Workers who prove less productive than other 
workers, or who resist speed-ups, are usually laid off rather 
than fired directly. Once laid off, these workers are not 
recalled and are replaced by either more compliant workers or 
by workers who will expect lower wages for the work being 
performed.
If you wanted to work there [on the assembly line] you 
had to work harder. It was push-push-push-push for 
everything they were worth...Well, there is no way. 
If a guy worked at a slower pace they would say "Hey 
you can do better than that! We have ten machines you 
guys can go twelve. You guys didn't work a full ten 
hours or twelve hours." Stuff like that. Know what 
I mean. They would go out and hire young guys, pay 
them $6.50/hr and lay me off. That is the way they 
operated down there. They wanted people down there to 
bull. Just plain bull. Pick up tires, throw them on 
the compressor. Those kids, they are kids. Imagine 
all day taking tires like that, picking them up and 
putting them on axles way up there. But I had to do 
it because it was a job. [Machinist J4, Remnant 
Company]
They say you are only expected to make the old quota 
[on the CNC machines]. But in reality you are 
expected to make the old incentive production, without 
the incentive pay. People are hustling because they 
are afraid that they will not be called back after a 
layoff if they are not making that high rate of 
production. [Machinist J12, Remnant Company].
The responses of these two workers show that the shift to 
post-Fordism is affecting low-skilled and high-skilled workers 
in similar ways. Although the latter machinist has higher 
skills than the former assembly line worker, it is the same 
feeling of job insecurity that compels them both to produce at 
the fast pace mandated by the pull of production. The
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importance of this job insecurity is heightened by 
constricting opportunities for machinists in Machinist Valley, 
where there are roughly one-third of the machinist positions 
that there were in the early 1980s. But unlike the skilled 
machinist, the lesser-skilled assembly line worker feels 
considerably more pressure to produce because of the 
availability of younger lesser skilled workers that could (and 
did) replace him.
Job insecurity for workers' individual positions 
motivates individual workers to produce at a fast pace. By 
producing a collective sense of job insecurity, owners are 
able to instill further compliance to fast paced production. 
The decade of company closures in Machinist Valley showed 
workers that their jobs depend not upon union negotiated 
contracts, but rather on the viability of their individual 
companies to profit in Machinist Valley. This, in fact, is a 
new understanding in the Valley, as most workers thought that 
the Bearing Company was like "the Rock of Gibraltar" and that 
it would always be there.
Machine shops are very frustrating right now because 
there is no sense of security anymore. When I first 
went to work for Bearing, hey, everybody considers 
Bearing = Liston. If you go to work for Bearing you 
are going to work here, you are going to retire from 
there and blah, blah, blah. Well that didn't happen 
in my case. What everybody thought would never 
happen, happened. Bearing sold the company [Machinist 
J15, Remnant Company].
I always felt Bearing wouldn't leave. They were like 
the Rock of Gibraltar. Out here now I don't feel that
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way. Security does an awful number on you when you 
work for twenty years for something and you say to 
yourself I can take my pension and do this, do that, 
go here, go there. Then all of a sudden I know that 
its gone. I don't know what they are going to do. 
They can move out in three weeks, they can move out in 
10 years. I don't know. They don't seem to let you 
know [Machinist J5, Remnant Company].
In order to keep their companies in Machinist Valley, workers 
are exhorted by the owners to keep production high, so the 
company will not be forced to move to a new location. In 
company meetings workers are directly told that the company 
could move out of Machinist Valley with ease, and that staying 
depends upon maintaining a high profit. This leads workers to 
feel a sense of constant job insecurity.
[I think they will stay for the next five years] 
because they have a lease. They wouldn't break the 
lease unless someone offered them a place for nothing. 
They mentioned this at the meeting because there were 
rumors of them moving to Florida at one time and they 
gave us a special meeting to break the ice. And they 
said they would if they could get those special 
conditions, where they could get rent free, they would
move  [sarcastically] That makes you feel good.
"[They say] we are not leaving, but if something came 
up tomorrow we would go." You can't trust them. They 
are just a bunch of investors out to make a buck I 
guess [Machinist Jl, Remnant Company].
While workers are exhorted to produce at a fast pace in order 
to help the company prosper, they are given no information on 
the profitability of the enterprise. Almost all of the 
workers expressed disdain for the owners because they felt 
that the company must be making a profit, yet no one had
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received a raise since 1986. However, they have no foundation 
upon which to make a complaint because they lack hard data on 
company profits.
They say they don't make anything, but here we are 
with one-third of the crew we had but we are putting 
out just as much work. Its hard to believe, maybe its 
true, you know I don't know, I'm not an accountant or 
anything or keep track. But we see the machines go 
through here, and there has to be something somewhere. 
They want to keep us at a certain spot and that is
it.....  We had a meeting a month ago. [They say,]
"We made this much this month and this much last month 
but we can't give anything until next year. But by 
the end of the month we'll still be at this level. 
But you guys are doing good." [sarcastically] Thanks 
a lot. Why can't they just give a little now? You 
work hard you should get some reward. They could give 
us back even a little insurance that they made us give 
up. It isn't much, $15 bucks a week. Say "You guys 
are doing good, here we'll take this back." [Machinist 
Jl, Remnant Company]
In conclusion, post-Fordist production in the Remnant 
Company returns control to individual workers in the 
performance of their tasks. Workers exercise craft skills and 
report a great deal of autonomy in their work. However, 
owners have been able to set a social context that harnesses 
the potential benefits of employing workers with a strong 
craft ethic. The pace of production is now determined by a 
pull orientation, which compels workers to perform their tasks 
at a pace that will fill the monthly orders. And by 
instituting Just-In-Time production methods, the owners are 
able to compel workers to engage in more continuous 
production. However, the key factor that ultimately underpins
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owners power in determining the conditions of work is the 
ever-present threat of individual job loss and company 
closure.
Hightech Enterprises
Hightech Enterprises has a great deal in common with the 
Remnant Company. The company is a small non-unionized post- 
Fordist enterprise in Machinist Valley that only employs 30 
people. There is no formal rule book, no incentive pay 
system, and all production is done on CNC machine tools. 
Hightech Enterprises is flexibly specialized to make high 
precision machine parts for customer orders, primarily relying 
upon government contract work, and does not produce a finished 
product for the market. Their products include custom dies, 
components for industrial air conditioning units, and high 
precision parts for various industrial and military uses.
The case of Hightech Enterprises shows that post-Fordism 
does not necessarily signify an abandonment of mass 
production, but rather shows that there is a new post-Fordist 
approach to mass production, flexible mass production. Rather 
than engaging in start to finish mass production, as was the 
common practice under Fordism, Hightech Enterprises uses its 
CNC machine tools to produce large batches of custom machined 
goods. This allows the company to flexibly specialize in a 
restricted range of activities, adjusting the CNC machine
131
tools to meet new customer specifications. These same CNC 
machine tools also allow the company to produce small batches 
of customized products.
Hightech Enterprises' approach to mass production in 
conjunction with flexible specialization is a particularly 
important aspect of post-Fordist production that is often 
missed by craft control theories. As Hightech Enterprises 
demonstrates, because a firm is flexibly specialized, it does 
not necessarily mean that it has also abandoned methods of 
mass production. By limiting the range of its product lines, 
Hightech Enterprises has been able to work as an independent 
contractor, producing products specific to customer needs, as 
well as specialize in large batch production. The 
distinguishing feature of Hightech Enterprises' mass 
production, which separates it from Fordist mass production, 
is that Hightech Enterprises does not engage in start to 
finish production. Hightech Enterprises is one of the growing 
number companies to which second parties "outsource" 
production. This second party then assembles the component 
parts into the final products. The result is a fragmentation 
of the mass production process across small post-Fordist 
enterprises, rather than centralized mass production 
emblematic of Fordism. As I show below, this offers the 
owners of Hightech Enterprises (and the second party 
contractor) a distinct advantage in cutting worker wages 
because it undermines the workers' capabilities for forming
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viable unions.
Because Hightech Enterprises engages in both large batch 
and small batch production, the owners have divided work 
between two strata of workers. Low skilled operators are used 
primarily for large batch production, and higher skilled 
machinists are used for small batch production. Unlike the 
Remnant Company, the higher skilled machinists are not full 
craftsmen. Rather they occupy a position of semi-skilled 
craftsmen, skilled only in the operation of a particular type 
of machine tool. Therefore the types of workers working in 
Hightech Enterprises more closely match the types of low- 
skilled and partially-skilled workers desired by the Fordist 
Bearing Company.
By combining post-Fordist organizational size with 
deskilled and partially skilled work, owners in Hightech 
Enterprises have been able to exert considerable power in 
determining the terms of production, particularly increased 
because of the absence of a union. The lack of a union at 
Hightech Enterprises has increased the owner's power to use 
individual and collective job insecurity as a means of 
controlling workers. With a lack of formal rules protecting 
employee rights, owners are also able to manipulate workers 
with false promises and coercive tactics. Thus, in many ways, 
Hightech Enterprises represents the degraded work environment 
advanced by owners under Fordism in the context of the 
fragmented post-Fordist approach to "flexibly specialized mass
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production."
Low-Skilled Work in the Post-Fordist Enterprise
The assumption underpinning craft control theories is 
that the post-Fordist approach of flexible specialization 
extinguishes the need for deskilled work tasks. In order for 
companies to innovate and change products to suit the needs of 
customers, these companies need skilled workers. The case of 
Hightech Enterprises, however, shows that flexible 
specialization with advanced flexible technologies can still 
incorporate low-skilled workers in the production process. 
Rather than relying upon craft skills for large batch 
production, Hightech Enterprises has opted for the Fordist 
approach of programming machine tools off of the shop floor 
and limiting workers' acquisition of knowledge. By limiting 
the amount of craft knowledge operators obtain and use, owners 
are able to prevent these workers from gaining bargaining 
power over the terms upon which production will take place, as 
their positions are suited to easy replacement. In Hightech 
Enterprises, owners' control is made more effective than the 
Fordist approach because it constrains workers' power to 
engage in collective methods of control.
In Hightech Enterprises, machine operators have only 
rudimentary programming knowledge and do little more than 
place parts on the CNC machine tools and remove them once the 
machines have completed their cycle. In production of air
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conditioning units, for example, parts run in four minute 
cycles and operators work two machines at a time, thus 
changing parts on CNC machines every two minutes. The 
repetitive nature of tasks leads operators to characterize 
their jobs as "very boring." By restricting these workers to 
constant production, determined by the speed of the machine, 
these workers experience few opportunities for skill 
development.
An operator's position in the Hightech Enterprises is 
significantly worse than an operator's position in the Fordist 
Bearing Company. The starting wage for machine operators is 
only $4.50/hour, and after 5 years of work for Hightech 
Enterprises, the senior operator was earning only $7.00/hour. 
A comparable CNC operator in the Bearing Company would be 
earning as much as $18.00/hour in the early 1980s under the 
incentive pay system. Unlike Bearing operators, who increased 
their job security with each year of labor, the Hightech 
operators and machinists have no greater job security than on 
the day in which they entered the company.
One way in which owners keep operators laboring for low 
wages is with promises of skill development and company 
commitment to personal careers. These promises are especially 
effective on the operators, who are 18-24 years old and are 
the youngest and least jaded workers in the shop. According 
to older workers, these young operators are manipulated with 
promises that the owners never intend to fulfill.
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They have one guy that has been there four years. 
They promised him when he went there that they would 
put him through any school that he wanted to go, even 
if it wasn't machine shop. Anything that would better 
the community, that is what they led him to believe. 
He has been there four years. They are not going to 
do that. They just had another kid who has been there 
for six months. They told him that if he wanted to go 
to medical school, they would be glad to do that 
because it would better the community. This is what 
they do. They tell people what they will do and they 
treat you good while you believe, then eventually the 
worker finds out what it is all about. But by then 
they [the company] have had a good year or two years 
good production out of the guy because they had a guy 
with a good attitude believing they were going to do 
good for you. Then it all falls apart, as the guy 
finally realizes they are going to do nothing 
[Machinist H3, Hightech Enterprises].
Because these are informal agreements between the owners and 
the individual worker, operators have little recourse when 
promises go unfulfilled.
Hightech made some promises to me that they were going 
to send me on to college and technical school for 
continued experience on the technical end of 
computers. I'm still waiting [Operator HI, Hightech 
Enterprises].
Considerably more work is expected of Hightech operators 
in comparison to their Fordist counterparts. Bearing Company 
operators worked on only one machine and restricted their work 
tasks to that single job. Hightech operators, on the other 
hand, labor on two machines simultaneously and are also 
expected to do other unskilled tasks in the company as well, 
such as loading/unloading trucks and performing janitorial 
services. In this context, it is evident that by abandoning
136
bureaucratic organization, which rigidly determined job tasks, 
owners1 power is increased to pace work and keep machine 
operators laboring in a highly productive capacity.
In the Bearing Company, many operators were satisfied 
working with restricted tasks because the company provided job 
security and very high pay, thus making up for the 
intrinsically unrewarding work. In Hightech Enterprises, 
operators desire either to become more skilled machinists or 
to leave the company to find better paying work. But in 
Hightech Enterprises mobility is structurally blocked, as the 
owners prevent workers from acquiring new skills and 
knowledge. Hightech Company owners actively discourage the 
sharing of knowledge between workers on the shop floor.
[If I am away from my station] the foreman will run 
over to me and say "why are you here?" I say "look I 
am not a computer, I am not a robot, I can't stay at 
my machine for eight hours and just do that." He says 
"Well, are you having problems?" I say "no I am just 
chatting." I'm only standing 15 feet from my machine
and it is running. It all goes back to the general
manager who says his job is over there in the corner.
Usually I always feel like I am in one of the corners
of the building. [Operator H2, Hightech Enterprises]
When this operator talks with other machinists, he is not 
always simply "chatting." He is relying on more experienced 
machinists to teach him machining skills. However, by 
engaging in repetitive activities in an isolated corner of the 
shop, after four years of work he has only learned rudimentary 
program editing skills on a single type of machine tool. As
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a result, this operator has little more bargaining power than 
he did after a few weeks of work at the company. Having 
surveyed the options for other employment in the Valley, this 
operator has decided that his current job is "as good as any 
I can get around here."
In many ways, the Hightech Enterprises has incorporated 
Fordist practices in the post-Fordist approach to production. 
This includes the continued Taylorist practice of separating 
thought from execution. Rather than cultivating craft skills 
and craft knowledge, both machinists and operators are made to 
feel expendable.
They have capable people that just are not given the 
opportunity to work up to their abilities. They are
made to feel like they don't know nothing one of
the employees had a problem because of the foreman.
I think his exact words were "I think the best way 
to...” and the foreman cut him off and said "You are 
not supposed to think, that was his job.” That is 
their attitude and that affects their employees 
attitudes. We are not supposed to think [Machinist 
H4, Hightech Enterprises].
Creativity is not rewarded nor desired in the workers, 
and workers report a uniformly negative evaluation of their 
work experiences. While dissatisfied with work and 
compensation, machinists in Hightech feel they must continue 




The primary source of power for owners in both the 
Remnant Company and Hightech Enterprises is the enforcement of 
job insecurity. However, because most of the jobs in Hightech 
Enterprises require lower skill levels than in the Remnant 
Company, job insecurity is enforced to a much greater degree. 
In fact, the types of work performed in Hightech place the 
owners in a very advantageous position in Machinist Valley 
because the Valley has a large population of medium-skilled 
machinists available to replace dismissed workers. Workers 
understand that this is to the advantage of the employers, and 
as a result workers feel powerless in protesting working 
conditions and are "afraid of the thought" of losing their 
jobs:
[After the large shops closed] the market was flooded 
with machinists. So places like Hightech feel that 
(and I am sure they have probably a hundred applicants 
a week) there are people that are out of work and are 
desperate for anything. They don't have unemployment 
anymore and the employers have such a large labor 
force (available) that they don't even care about 
their own labor force. It is just that they feel that 
if they want to get rid of someone who has been with 
them for 5 or 6 years, those who know their way around 
the shop, know their work, know everyone that is 
there, they can let them go and hire someone off the 
street [Machinist H3, Hightech Enterprises].
Thus labor turnover in Hightech Enterprises is very high. 
Workers describe the company as "like it has a revolving 
door."
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When I went to work for them the first time, I was the 
37th employee (for seniority). Within two weeks I was 
the seventh employee for seniority [Machinist H4, 
Hightech Enterprises].
Whereas Remnant employees are laid off and not rehired, 
Hightech workers are more likely to be fired or be coercively 
persuaded to guit when they do not perform to the owners' 
expectations. Each of the workers interviewed reported a fear 
of being placed on the company "hitlist." According to 
workers and a former foreman in Hightech Enterprises, the 
hitlist is the owners' roster of employees who are to be 
either fired, forced to guit, or shown that they are now a 
unfavored employee.
[When I was a foreman] I was given what I consider to 
be a hitlist. I knew the people that were working for 
me and I knew the people who were doing good work for 
me and the people I didn't have to worry about. Once 
a month or so I was given a list of names of people 
they wanted to see canned. Sometimes it was the guy 
that wasn't giving me problems, but he had been there 
long enough so his paycheck was making top dollar. I 
had one guy that he was given a job to do and he said 
he wasn't going to do it so I told him to hit the
road....... [If a worker is on the hitlist] you just
can him. Find a reason and can him. It could be 
anything from being late too much or being late once. 
Make him quit. Make him quit before you ask him to 
leave. You give the guy who has 20 years machine 
experience and you make him sweep the floor and you 
put a part time kid working after high school running 
his machine. If you start doing that to
people...[Machinist H4, Hightech Enterprises].
Workers are subject to being placed on the hitlist when 
they give management or owners "trouble." Trouble includes
140
inciting labor activism, complaining about one's work, or 
trying to demand higher pay. For example, one CNC machinist, 
believes he is currently on the hitlist because of 
disagreement he had with management over rights to day shift 
work. Since going back on the day shift, he finds himself 
performing boring production work on a low quality manual 
machine at a section of the shop that has no window. 
Meanwhile, a younger worker was placed on a challenging CNC 
job that this machinist has done in the past.
As a result of the hitlist, the owners are able to keep 
wages low by keeping a steady turnover of employees. 
Collective employee tactics of control are undermined by 
dismissing individual activists, as well as by threatening to 
close down the plant. In one instance, workers did try to 
form a union, but according to one of the machinists, these 
efforts failed because of the pervasive feeling of individual 
and collective job insecurity.
Well they all know. Anybody who has been there long 
enough knows how they are being treated. Do you want 
to work here, work here for 15 years and be treated 
like shit, stay with this job or try to do something 
about it? People were all gung-ho until we actually 
had the union outside the shop one morning passing out 
pamphlets because the group that got fired got in 
touch with the local union president. They advised us 
how to do it. At that time they asked if we had 
enough people to make it worth their while. Of course 
they were gung-ho until then and then they got nervous 
because something was happening. Some people backed 
out. So it was a try but it didn't get anywhere 
because people were afraid.. .We couldn't get people to 
unionize because everyone was afraid for their jobs 
[Machinist H3, Hightech Enterprises].
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Because of their experience with overtly coercive employers 
and receipt of low wages, employees of Hightech Enterprises 
are very dissatisfied with their work experiences. Rather 
than finding post-Fordist work a source of intrinsic 
satisfaction, machinists describe their work as an extremely 
alienating experience.
I'll tell you I hate to go to work every day. I hate 
it. I get up and I don't feel good, I don't want to 
go. It is purely a paycheck [Machinist H3, Hightech 
Enterprises].
The case of Hightech Enterprises shows that flexibly 
specialized post-Fordist production can integrate low-skilled 
and medium-skilled work while capitalizing on a new form of 
mass production. Unlike the Fordist Bearing workers, however, 
post-Fordist workers receive significantly lower levels of pay 
and security. Some low skilled operators work in the hope 
that the company will fulfill promises of increasing their 
skill development. Because they are systematically blocked 
from advancing their skills and from using craft knowledge, 
low-skilled workers are especially vulnerable to replacement. 
In an local labor market saturated with medium-skilled 
workers, machinists in Hightech Enterprises are very 
vulnerable to being placed on a hitlist, and replaced by other 
workers in the Machinist Valley.
The experiences of machinists in Hightech Enterprises
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illustrates the ways in which owners are able to take 
advantage of workers in a local economy saturated with workers 
capable of engaging in low-skilled and medium-skilled work. 
Small organization size especially heightens the owners' 
power, as they are able to threaten to move the operation to 
new locations in the face of labor activism. While I 
emphasize the power relations within the factory, it is also 
important to recognize that owners' power is heightened due to 
economic incentives which favor the transplantation of 
companies from community to community, as well as from nation 
to nation (Barlett & Steele 1992). Small organization size 
facilitates this rapid transplantation of enterprises to a 
greater degree than the large organization size advanced under 
the Fordist approach.
The Loyalty Company
Rather than producing a finished product (Remnant 
Company), or engaging in large batch production (Hightech 
Enterprises), the Loyalty Company is strictly limited to small 
batch component production. All production in the Loyalty 
Company is aimed at customer orders and most contracts are for 
fewer than 10 pieces. Because of the constant changes in 
production, the Loyalty Company most closely represents the 
"flexibly specialized" enterprises which capitalize on the 
increasing demands for small batches of specialized products
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suited to individual customer needs.
The Loyalty Company was founded in 1986 by a Liston 
machinist with a $4,500 loan from a friend following the 
closure of the Bearing Company. Initial success in obtaining 
small contracts allowed the owner to quit his job at another 
local machine shop and work full time in his new company. 
Continued success in subcontracting for small batch production 
of replacement and prototype machine goods for a local 
electrical company allowed him to purchase a small two story 
building outside of Liston and to employ a few machinists. 
The company has continued to grow and gain higher profits and 
more lucrative contracts. Currently the Loyalty Company 
employs 12 machinists full time and 3 machinists part time. 
Although one machine is retro-fitted with CNC capabilities, 
most production is performed on manual machines in this 
shop.
The Loyalty Company currently produces small batches of 
custom machine parts for other companies in the Northeastern 
United States. All work is customized to the needs of 
contracting companies. Usually production is oriented to the 
manufacturing of replacement parts for automated machinery and 
prototype parts for new products. While the company still 
does custom work for local companies, it primarily relies on 
contracts from a large electrical company located outside of 
Machinist Valley. The Loyalty Company has no formal rule 
book, does not use incentive pay systems, and is non­
144
unionized.
All of the workers in the Loyalty Company are semi­
skilled machinists, highly skilled on one or two types of 
machine tools, but unskilled on other types of machine tools. 
Workers are able to work from blueprints and process parts to 
close tolerances on their individual machines before passing 
the part on to other workers skilled at operating other types 
of machine tools. The pay of these workers is comparable with 
the machinists working in the Remnant Company and Hightech 
Enterprises, $10.00-$l2.00/hour. However, unlike the workers 
in the other two companies, Loyalty workers have a very high 
level of job satisfaction. They report very positive feelings 
about the owner, their co-workers and their work tasks. In 
part, this is because they are able to exercise craft skills 
and have a strong craft ethic.
You want to do your best and you feel bad if you 
don't. If you have a bad day, it bothers you. You go 
home...it bothers me. Everybody has bad days. It 
bothers me. I'll come in the next day and give 150% 
and want to do it. I'll be thinking about it on my 
way into work. Hey, I am going to go in and make up 
for that bad day [Machinist H3, Loyalty Company].
By cultivating loyalty to the company and by disposing of 
formal bureaucratic methods of control, the owner's power to 
pace production is significantly increased over that obtained 
through Fordist methods. I first show how this owner's power 
is increased by methods of obscuring the class division 
between himself and workers. I then examine how the owner is
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able to motivate workers with an informal incentive program 
and the advantages of this system over the formal incentive 
programs advanced under Fordism.
Obscuring Class Divisions With Company Loyalty
Each employee in the Loyalty Company expressed admiration 
for the owner's efforts to start a new business in a harsh 
economic climate. The owner stresses to workers that in order 
for the company to survive, and for their jobs to survive, all 
of the workers have to work together as a team. While this 
idea is not incompatible with Fordism, it was not cultivated 
in companies like the Bearing Company because of the 
manifestly antagonistic worker-manager relationships generated 
by Taylorism. By building employee commitment to the company, 
the owner is able to obscure class divisions between worker 
and owner, reminiscent of 19th century craft approach to 
production. Workers need little supervision, and to some 
degree, extend control upon each other in maintaining high 
quality production.
Commitment to the Loyalty Company is cultivated through 
organized events and redefining benefits as gifts rather than 
rights. The owner of the Loyalty Company holds occasional 
company picnics and caters these events with lobsters, beer, 
and steaks. Each Loyalty Company worker sees this as evidence 
of the owner being a "good guy." The owner also offers 
employees one floating holiday, called "Loyalty Day" which
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they can take at any time during the year. Rather than adding 
on one more vacation day for all employees, Loyalty Day is 
defined as a special day only available to Loyalty employees, 
thereby increasing employee commitment to the company. The 
number of paid days off that the Loyalty Company offers are 
comparable with those offered in the other post-Fordist 
companies in this study, 7 paid holidays and 10 vacation days 
after one year of service.
With the expectation of worker commitment to the company, 
the owner is also obligated to display commitment to 
individual workers. Therefore, unlike Hightech Enterprises, 
there is no hitlist and workers are treated with respect and 
given special privileges in the plant. For example, I 
observed two workers using drilling machines to make a fence 
for their house. They had neither asked the owner for 
permission, nor did they try to hide this activity when the 
owner entered the shop. By giving workers special privileges 
not seen in other companies, such as flexible time schedules, 
the owner builds worker commitment to the enterprise rather 
than to their social class.
For the owner, worker commitment to the company is 
important because it saves him the trouble of training new 
workers and assessing new workers' capabilities. It also 
increases the positive potentials of employing workers who 
maintain a strong craft ethic. As discussed previously, 
workers with a strong craft ethic work hard because they like
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to work and take pride in their accomplishments. Because 
workers in the Loyalty Company believe in the company and in 
their work, they want to give their all to the job.
I am more busy at this job than any other job I have 
ever had. I go from 6:30 in the morning to 3:30 in 
the afternoon. Sometimes I forget to eat lunch. You 
look at the clock at 2:00 and say Jeeze I had better 
eat my sandwich! This is because you get into it and 
it is like anything else you do. You get into it 
and...[Machinist LI, Loyalty Company].
While the craft ethic is largely responsible for the fast high 
quality production in the Loyalty Company, it is not the only 
means by which the owner influences the pace of production. 
Below I examine the strengths of the informal incentive system 
used in the Loyalty Company. This system builds further 
commitment to the owner and the company, while further 
obscuring the class relations.
Informal Incentive System
Owners, under the Fordist approach to production, paced 
work on manual machines by introducing time study methods and 
formal incentive pay systems. In the Remnant Company and 
Hightech Enterprises, the pace of work is partially imposed by 
CNC machinery, thereby ending the need for incentive pay 
systems. Work in the Loyalty Company, however, is performed 
solely on manual machines. In order to pace production, the 
owner has developed an informal incentive system, which 
significantly increases his power to maintain a fast pace
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production in comparison to the formal incentive systems of 
Fordism.
The incentive for hard work in the Loyalty Company is job 
security and the year end bonus, which ranges from $100 to 
$750 per worker. These bonuses are based partially on company 
profits during the preceding year and are distributed among 
employees by their individual work behavior. According to the 
owner, "seniority has nothing to do with year-end bonuses." 
This differs sharply from compensation under Fordism, which 
tended to reward the most senior workers the highest. Unlike 
the Bearing Company's system that partially compensated 
workers for their seniority in the company, all workers in the 
Loyalty Company must work hard throughout their career to 
achieve good incentive pay.
This informal bonus incentive system offers distinct 
advantages over the formal incentive systems advanced under 
Fordism. Unlike Fordist incentive systems, an informal system 
can be changed and modified with ease. The owner of the 
Loyalty Company, a machinist with 30 years experience, knows 
his employees personally and believes he knows each worker's 
capabilities. He determines their capabilities during an 
initial trial period of employment, during which workers are 
expected to show him their maximum capabilities.
I would hire workers at a fair wage. Usually when 
they say "I have to have this much money." That is 
usually what I do. Being the nice guy that I am.
Then I say, okay, I'm paying you what you are asking
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me for, you are telling me what you can do, you look 
at the blueprint and the time, now buddy, now you have 
to show me what you can do.... Yes, if a guy comes in 
and he obviously can't do the job, I turn him over.
If the guy seems like he has the right attitude, but 
has a hard time doing the work and getting it done on 
time, I give him at least six months.... If he still 
doesn't work out, I turn him over [Owner L2, Loyalty 
Company].
Those workers who are not able to produce up to this owner's 
expectations are fired after a brief trial period. Once 
employees prove their worth, the owner then makes time 
estimates partially based upon his understanding of their 
individual capabilities. Therefore by not using a formal 
incentive system, the owner is able to maintain a sliding 
plateau of acceptable and unacceptable performances based upon 
individual worker's capabilities.
According to the owner, workers either "earn time" or 
"lose time" on each individual job by completing the job in 
less or more time than that estimated on the contract order. 
These times are recorded in a book placed behind the owners 
desk, and all employees have access to this book. At the 
year end, total individual employee time spent producing is 
subtracted from totaled estimated times for production. The 
owner then uses this as his guide to distribute employee year- 
end bonuses differentially. Thus workers perceive their bonus 
as reflective of their hard work during the preceding year, as 
well as reflective of the owner's generosity.
The owner informs workers that their bonus pay is also
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dependent upon company profits. In a highly profitable year 
bonuses will be large, in an unprofitable year bonuses will be 
small. By structuring the bonus system in this way, the owner 
is able to cultivate collective worker pressure upon co­
workers to maintain a fast pace of production. All employees 
understand that their individual bonuses are determined, in 
part, by the company's profitability during the preceding 
year. Individual workers who do not perform to capacity are 
subject to pressure by their co-workers on the shop floor to 
produce at a reasonable pace. This is directly contrary to 
the informal group pressure cultivated under Fordism, where 
employees pressured each other to restrict production so as to 
avoid having quotas increased.
While workers have access to the book that records their 
individual productivity, they do not have access to company 
records of profit and loss. Therefore, there is no formal 
system of distributing bonuses to employees based upon an 
absolute measure of the profitability of the company. Rather, 
the owner figures out "what he can afford to give" after he 
pays his taxes. In 1992, most of the workers believed that 
the owner was struggling to make ends meet, and felt "lucky" 
to receive any bonus at all. In fact, 1992 was the Loyalty 
Company's most profitable year, securing over $500,000 in 
contracts. Workers had the impression that the company was 
not making large profits and reported "knowing that the owner 
has gone home some weeks without a paycheck." However, the
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owner's income during this year was $83,000; $50,000 more than 
his highest paid machinist.
The informal bonus system also increases the owners power 
to control a wider range of worker behavior than the Fordist
incentive systems. Whereas some workers in the Bearing
Company could earn full incentive pay after only half a day of 
work, all Loyalty workers are expected to be constantly
working in order to be allotted a high bonus.
My idea of a model employee is perhaps different than 
somebody else's. Ideally I would like to have 
everybody come in to work in the morning. Don't stand 
around for 20 minutes shooting the shit drinking 
coffee on company time with 2-3 other guys. You come 
in, punch the clock, get your coffee, say good 
morning, have a few words, and in a few minutes you 
are at your machine and go to work. Occasionally, 
occasionally during the day it is okay to toss things 
off and talk to another guy for a few minutes. But 
10-15 minutes, three guys shooting the shit,
no When it comes time for bonuses, I look at
things like that [Owner L2, Loyalty Company].
Finally, one of the chief advantages of framing the incentive 
pay as an informal rather than a formal practice is that 
workers interpret the incentive pay as an indication of the 
owners' beneficence, not as one of their worker rights.
[The owner] takes good care of his people. He cares 
about his work force. I started working for him in 
November, and he gave me a $100 Christmas bonus. That 
makes a lot of difference too. I never expected to 
get a Christmas bonus, but I really didn't expect 
anything here. [The owner] really took me off guard 
with it [Machinist H3, Loyalty Company].
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By framing incentive pay as a "bonus" rather than a formal 
right, workers view the owner as "a good guy" and as "someone 
who takes care of his people." Therefore the informal 
incentive system used in the Loyalty Company offers a number 
of advantages over Fordist incentive systems, largely because 
it heightens worker commitment to the company and produces 
willing compliance to a fast pace of production.
Summary
In this chapter I showed that owners' methods of control 
under post-Fordist production are much more effective at 
producing a fast pace of work for lower wages than under the 
Fordist approach. While there are variations in owners' 
methods of control between different post-Fordist enterprises, 
there are also striking commonalities.
Underpinning owners' control are the abilities to impose 
job insecurity made possible by the post-Fordist approach. 
Insecurity affects individual workers responses, for fear of 
being put on hitlists or being laid off. Job insecurity also 
affects the collectivities of workers, who fear company 
closure. Job insecurity varies across firms. In Hightech 
Enterprises, individual worker's job insecurity is very high 
and is used by the owners to keep a constant overturn of 
medium-skilled machinists. In the Remnant Company, job 
insecurity is present to a lesser degree than in Hightech 
Enterprises, but extends considerable power to the owners who
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threaten to move the company to more profitable locations if 
workers do not produce at a very fast rate. And in the 
Loyalty Company, individual worker's job insecurity is low. 
Even in this company, however, workers feel that the company 
is marginally profitable and can be forced to close in a 
highly competitive industry.
By structuring the workplace such that it reguires 
workers to exercise craft skills, owners are able to harness 
the positive potentials of the craft ethic. Because 
craftsmen's status is related to the guality of their 
production, workers "naturally" labor consistently, rather 
than "naturally" soldier. Also, workers adopting a craft 
ethic control each other through informal group pressures. 
Again, this varies across firms. The craft ethic is highest 
in the Loyalty Company and the Remnant Company. In Hightech 
Enterprises, a strong craft ethic is neither cultivated nor 
rewarded in flexible mass production.
By disposing of formal rules and formalized incentive pay 
systems, owners' power is increased as well. Formal rules, 
when tied to legal rational authority, impose rigidity in the 
production process. This rigidity, as I showed in Chapter 1, 
can be used by workers to their own advantages. A work place 
that lacks formal rules makes obsolete one of workers' most 
powerful means of control developed under Fordism. In 
Hightech Enterprises, formal agreements are replaced with 
informal agreements between workers and owners, which enables
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owners' to manipulate younger, more naive workers. In the 
case of the Loyalty Company, the informal incentive system 
allows the owner to redefine incentive pay as a gift rather 
than a worker's right, thereby cultivating worker loyalty to 
their company rather than to their class. And in the Remnant 
Company, the lack of formal rules enables owners to demand 
constant production from their workers, who are expected to 
move constantly from task to task.
The differences between firms is important, because it 
shows that post-Fordist production has a variety of forms and 
produces a variety of experiences. While Piore and Sabel 
(1984) only emphasize the "flexibly specialized" enterprise as 
the dominant approach under post-Fordism, the degree to which 
firms are flexibly specialized varies, and the approach to 
flexible specialization can vary as well. Hightech 
Enterprises shows a dark side of post-Fordism, an extenuation 
of the deskilling-depowering process of Fordism that is 
especially resistant to workers' control. On the other hand, 
the Loyalty Company and the Remnant Company in many ways 
demonstrate the liberating potentials of post-Fordism, with 
the return of craft work and the craft ethic. Therefore, I 
suggest here that post-Fordism should not be viewed as 
producing a singular inevitable form of enterprise. Rather, 
post-Fordism is in an emerging state and can take on a variety 
of forms, either liberating or degrading. I will address this 
issue further in Chapter 6.
155
Post-Fordism is currently developing and the above 
analysis shows that it is extending owners' power in ways not 
possible under the Fordist approach. In the "top-down" 
analysis of power, therefore, the experiences of machinists in 
Machinists Vally conform more to the expectations of Lash and 
Urry's (1987) fragmentation theory than Piore and Sabel's 
(1984) craft control theory. In the next chapter, I examine 
"bottom-up" power, the efforts workers use to exert their 
individual and collective will in the work place. This 
analysis will further examine why workers' power is declining 




WORKER CONTROL IN POST-FORDIST PRODUCTION
Montgomery's (1979) history of Fordism shows that workers 
are not passive, rather they are agents who strive to gain or 
retain power in the work place. As I showed in Chapter 1, in 
the early 20th century, owners introduced organization and 
technology to increase their power to determine the pace and 
pay of production. Workers responded by shifting from 
individualistic responses, to craft union responses, and 
finally to class responses in industrial unions. In this 
chapter I examine the tactics workers use to exert control in 
the new post-Fordist work places, and analyze how these 
actions are influenced by their experiences under Fordism and 
post-Fordism.
To address the changing forms of workers' control, and 
their effectiveness at influencing the terms of production, I 
first examine workers' assessments of the desirability of 
union membership. As union membership is declining at the 
national level, the responses of machinists in Machinist 
Valley provide compelling evidence that old forms of union 
membership are neither desired by workers, nor would efforts
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to unionize these workers be likely to succeed. I then 
examine two other potential avenues for workers' control, 
extended through individualistic responses and political 
responses, and how workers respond to post-Fordist production 
through these two different avenues of action.
The following analysis examines the collective responses 
of workers in Machinist Valley. When there are variations in 
responses of workers among firms, I emphasize these 
differences and relate them to the practices of the employers 
in the Remnant Company, Hightech Enterprises, and the Loyalty 
Company. While Loyalty Company workers have the least pro­
union orientation and strongest individualistic orientation, 
workers in all companies had remarkably similar assessments 
and practices of control in the post-Fordist work places.
Industrial Union Membership
Post-Fordism and Organizational Discouragement of Unionization
In many ways, post-Fordist workers are in position 
similar to that of skilled craftsmen in the late 19th century 
because the organization of their work places is changing in 
ways that render old methods of control obsolete. Under 
craft methods of production, skilled workers understood their 
life chances to be tied to craft organizations which could 
maintain their exclusive rights to perform specific types of 
activities (Haydu 1988, Heckscher 1988). When these rights
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were challenged by owners, craftsmen engaged in simple forms 
of control by walking off the job (Edwards 1979) . By 
restricting membership to craft unions, and maintaining the 
exclusive right to perform labor defined as skilled, workers 
in the 19th century could maintain bargaining power over the 
terms of production:
...Craftsmen subscribed to a clear moral code - an 
implicit social contract, in Barrington Moore's terms 
- by which they evaluated new conditions at work and 
found them wanting. At the core of this code was a 
craft ethic, a shared commitment to the standards and 
dignity of the trade. Among machinists this ethic is 
overlaid with more populist rhetoric, in which the 
values of political liberty, equality, and 
participation are directed against the confinements, 
subordination, and despotism of the factory (Haydu 
1988:59).
Owners introduced Taylorized work tasks in order to 
reduce their reliance upon skilled workers and to undermine 
the effectiveness of the craft union response in the mass 
production oriented factories of the early 20th century. As 
a result, a primary focus of industrial union organizers was 
to change worker loyalties from craft to class, and to build 
alliances between skilled and unskilled workers (Haydu 1988). 
So long as craft workers failed to identify their life chances 
with those of less skilled workers, workers were quite 
powerless to influence the terms of production under Fordism.
Workers under post-Fordism face a similar dilemma that 
craft workers faced with the introduction of the Fordist
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approach. Under Fordism, the industrial union was the primary 
means by which workers advanced their individual and 
collective interests. Organized labor is currently in a state 
of crisis as union membership is declining and industrial 
unions are less effective in influencing the terms of 
production (Clark 1989, Heckscher 1988). Table 5.1 shows the 
decline in U.S. union membership, from a peak of 22,165,000 
members in 1974, to only 16,975,000 members in 1986.














The machining industry has experienced similar declines in 
union membership. In 1970, the International Association of 
Machinists (IAM) maintained 865,000 members. By 1991, 
membership had declined to 534,000 members (Statistical 
Abstracts of the United States 1970, 1993).
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TABLE 5.2 PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYEES AT DIFFERENT
SIZED COMPANIES AND LOCATIONS WHO ARE 
UNIONIZED, 1983_____________________




500 + Employees 30%
Source rB row r^^H am Tl to n ,  M"ec5ofr (1990:60)
Post-Fordist production is, in part, designed to 
undermine the ability of workers to organize collectively 
(Clark 1989). As Table 5.2 shows, small enterprise sizes are 
much less likely to be unionized than large enterprises. As 
I discussed in Chapter 4, small enterprise size enables owners 
to undermine unionization as it increases their capacity to 
instill a sense of collective job insecurity. The owners in 
Machinist Valley actively discourage unionization by 
threatening to close their enterprises if workers unionize, an 
action much easier to perform than dismantling and 
transplanting a large organization.
A guy mentioned it once. I don't think it was out of 
seriousness. It was just in a joking environment. 
The owner of the place got upset by it. He said, "As 
soon as you guys make any movement towards union, I'll 
sell the business. I lock the place up. People won't 
be telling me that if you are doing a poor job I have 
to give you a warning and not fire you. If you are 
doing a poor job, you are out of here. No one will 
tell me I have to give you three written warnings and 
have you rip me off for six months before I can get 
rid of you.” Other than that...none of the guys here 
have ever discussed or even considered being in a
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union [Machinist L6, Hightech Enterprises].
The people tried to start a union [in one company I 
worked for] and the owner of that company said that if 
they tried to start a union he would give them a 
months severance pay and close the doors....I know 
when I worked in one shop, we had a girl that wrote 
the personnel director a letter about a fox that was 
on the property. One of the supervisors threatened to 
shoot the darn thing and she got all wound up and 
wrote a letter to the personnel director that said, 
"we the people of [Company X]..." Well this guy had 
a fit and said, "what are you people trying to start 
a union up there? That doesn't happen in this 
company." We caught a lot of grief for that. This 
company is dead set against unions. You can see it in 
the way they operate. Maybe it is good in a way 
because they can keep the labor costs down. You can 
hire people at a cheaper rate, train them, and keep 
them there [Machinist LI, Loyalty Company (in 
reference to another company)].
Well, they all know. Anybody who has been there long 
enough knows how they are being treated. Do you want 
to work here, work here for 15 years and be treated 
like shit, stay with this job or try to do something 
about it? People were all gung-ho until we actually 
had the union outside the shop one morning passing out 
pamphlets because the group that got fired got in 
touch with the union president of the local 218. They 
advised us how to do it. At that time that asked if 
we had enough people to make it worth their while. Of 
course they were gung-ho until then and then they got 
nervous because something was happening. Some people 
backed out. So it was a try but it didn't get 
anywhere because people were afraid [Machinist H3, 
Hightech Enterprises].
Because of their experiences under the closure of the 
Bearing Company, workers believe that a union may be able to 
raise their pay, but it is incapable of retaining their place 
of employment in the Valley. Therefore workers believe it is 
better not to unionize, as a low paying job is better than 
having no job at all.
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For me personally, I wouldn't want one...[This 
company] is so small they might just pack up and take 
what little there is away. You know we've lost enough 
in Liston where they don't need to lose that. Even if 
I wasn't working there, I wouldn't want to see a union 
go in there because it would ruin what they have 
[Machinist Jl, Remnant Company].
The small organization size also increases owners' 
ability to observe individual workers and to screen out 
workers who are likely to engage in union activities, either 
by not hiring them in the first place, or by laying them off 
and not rehiring them. After the closure of the Bearing 
Company and during the opening of the Remnant Company, very 
few of the strong union members were rehired.
They went through the lists and got rid of all the 
people they wanted to get rid of and kept just the 
ones they wanted to keep. They called everyone into 
the office in groups and named off the ones they were 
gonna keep and the ones they didn't were out the door. 
They cut drastically. They cut people that were in 
there, and when they did hire they hired someone off 
the street when they were still laid off. We were 
still union workers. The union wasn't dead yet. That 
is when the union started fighting them. They cut 
these guys that were in there with seniority and 
brought guys in that didn't have seniority. In other 
words they cut the president, the vice president [of 
the union]. I was chairman of the grievance 
committee, they kept me. They kept a couple of other 
guys on the grievance committee. They didn't get rid 
of all the union officials, but they did get rid of 
the president and vice president. They kept the 
secretary and the treasurer and one other guy. They 
got rid of the rest of the other union officials... 
They were trying to destroy the union [Machinist J10, 
Remnant Company].
In Hightech Enterprises, workers engaging in union activity
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are at especially high risks of being placed on the hitlist or 
laid off.
One of the guys was laid off. You can't prove it, but 
there is a rumor going around that that is because he 
was in with union guys. Everyone would come in and 
there would be a poster up. They didn't like that too 
much... He was laid off and he did that afterwards. 
He was a real good worker. There was no reason to lay 
him off. They had to cut somewhere and he did things 
his own way. 90% of the time he was right but they 
didn't want to say that... No one who has been laid 
off has been hired back. [Operator HI, Hightech 
Enterprises].
Owners report not wanting strong union members in their 
shops, and deliberately avoid hiring people trained "in the 
union mentality." Owners prefer younger workers who can be 
trained to "my way of doing things" over the older workers who 
maintain the antagonistic attitudes toward owners developed 
under the Fordist approach.
[Bearing workers] have been trained into a union 
mentality. Here they expect the world owes them a 
living and are not willing to work for what they are 
doing... We tried some of these people here but they 
haven't worked out. At a place like this, everyone 
has to pull their own weight and be versatile. With 
the ones we tried, we found them to be resistant to 
the way things are run here... But when I look for a 
worker, I usually look for a younger worker who wants 
to learn. Also, they are not trained in the union 
mentality and I can train them from scratch [Owner 01 
of a machine shop in Machinist Valley].
Post-Fordist production enables owners to undermine 
unionization by creating organizational constraints which
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discourage the formation of collective forms of control 
advanced under Fordism. Small organization size increases 
owners' abilities to close and move enterprises when faced 
with union activity. Within this context, workers do not view 
unionization as an effective means to extend their control in 
the work place.
In the global production of goods, it would be hard to 
frame workers' assessments of union ineffectiveness as "false 
consciousness." Because unions are organized within the 
nation state, as opposed to across nations, they largely are 
unable to prevent the closure and transplantation of companies 
to areas in the global economy where workers are less 
organized and more easily exploited.
wprKer Dissatisfaction With Vnipns
Organizational constraint and declining union 
effectiveness are also accompanied with worker dissatisfaction 
with union practices. Despite the loss of wages and benefits 
under non-unionized post-Fordist production, machinists have 
very ambivalent feelings toward unions and union membership. 
While workers valued the security and high wages that union 
membership provided, they were also concerned about the 
negative effects unions have upon a company's profitability 
and the intrinsic experience of work.
According Heckscher's (1988) analysis of the history of 
union formation in the United States, labor relations under
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Fordism were formed in the framework of the Wagner Act of 
1935. This act, and subsequent legislation, advocated and 
supported industrial unionization as the best way to 
counteract owners' excessive abuses of power. The Wagner 
Act's preamble expresses this goal:
The denial by employers of the right of employees to 
organize and the refusal by employers to accept the 
procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and 
other forms of industrial strife and unrest... 
Experience has proven that the protection of the right 
of employees to organize and bargain collectively 
safeguards commerce from injury...by encouraging 
practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of 
industrial disputes...and by restoring equality of 
bargaining power between employers and employees 
(quoted in Heckscher 1988:42).
Unions were designed specifically to react to abuses of 
power by enabling workers to engage in collective disruption 
of production through the organized strike. But unlike the 
spontaneous strikes of craft production, bureaucratically 
organized industrial union strikes could not harness the 
"associational" forces that produce strong group solidarity 
(Heckscher 1988). Strikes, therefore, undermine workers' 
commitments to unions, as they feel "forced" to walk out 
rather than "compelled" to walk out. Machinists report not 
liking unions because of strike itself.
The bad part [about unions], I think, is strikes. I 
don't like strikes. I still have my sign. They got 
me in a labor dispute at the Remnant Company. It is 
difficult because you have to believe that the people 
negotiating for you are telling you the truth. You
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have to believe they are in there trying to hammer out 
a wage scale for you. It might be over some language 
problem. You might go on strike for some language 
problem. But I hate strikes. I think there is no 
winner in strikes. I don't think the company wins and 
I don't think the union wins. I don't feel like we 
got a fair shake out of the international union down 
here. I was very bitter towards the union for a while 
[Machinist J5, Remnant Company].
In effect, the industrial union's strongest method of 
advancing worker interests ultimately undermines worker 
commitment to the union rather than the company. The strike 
and unions are sometimes blamed for losses of jobs, not the 
owners who close companies.
Hopefully I never will be [in a union]. That is why 
my dad doesn't have his old job anymore... He worked 
for a big tire company. You can only ask for so much, 
you can't ask for everything under the sun. A lot of 
the guys were happy with what they had, but the union 
leader thought the company could give more. So they 
talked the guys into going on strike and asking for 
more. Well they all got more and they got a whole lot 
less six months later. They shut the plant down 
[Machinist L6, Loyalty Company].
In addition to the strike, the other primary way in which 
unions advanced worker control was through enforcing rigid job 
definitions, thereby using Fordist bureaucracy to protect 
workers from speedups and excessive task demands. While this 
proved effective at extending workers' control and preventing 
arbitrary treatment from employers under Fordism, workers 
expressed concerns of how the rigid job classifications 
restricted efficient production.
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When I was foreman [the union] was strong. They were 
opposed to anything that was management, even if it 
was for your own good. That I didn't like. I had a 
situation for example. A two man machine. They had 
two tables on a Rockford. It is a big miller, 50 feet 
long, and they have two tables on it. The object of 
two man was to have one guy setting up on one table 
and the other guy running the machine. It was all I 
could do to get them guys to do that. Normally they 
would both set up the machines and then both set on 
their ass and run it. It was quite a struggle to get 
them to do it. Eventually it got down to the point 
that they made it a one man machine again, for the 
simple reason that it started costing them so much 
money that they had to do something about it. But 
they were paying a man to do absolutely nothing. A 
whole night's pay. That was ridiculous. But you see 
a lot of that in union shops. That is one of the 
reasons I do not like it... If I have got money to 
have invested, and I am not making money, I have to 
pull the money out and put it in something where I 
can. Consequently that is one of the problems of why 
the economy has gone down because of that, in my 
opinion [Machinist J13, Bearing Company].
I think the union lost focus on what its purpose was, 
to take care of the people that needed to be taken 
care of. If they are singling somebody out for no 
reason, they could take care of that guy. But if you 
see a guy sitting there and doing a half hours work in 
an eight hour shift, they will have to take care of 
themself. That isn't what was happening with the 
union and that is why things ran out. That is what I 
think. It had to happen. I guess they had to have 
their eyes opened. But now in companies the unions 
have been weakened considerably. Well Hightech 
Enterprises has really taken advantage of that 
arrangement [Machinist H3, Hightech Enterprises].
The above quotes again show that the actions of unions are 
blamed for problems in the Valley, not the owner-imposed 
Fordist approach to production. The history of labor is one 
of workers reacting to owners' methods of control. Workers do 
not frame their understandings of unions in the historical
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context of the longue duree (Braudel 1958), they frame it in 
the contexts of their personal experiences in shorter 
historical spans, and frame their understandings accordingly. 
While industrial unions were designed to counteract the 
excessive power of owners in the early 20th century, workers 
now attribute many of the problems in production not to owners 
practices, but rather with the practices of unions themselves. 
These findings are consistent with national opinion polls 
concerning unions, which show that 60% of the public believe 
that "unions have become too powerful and should be restricted 
in their use of power by law" (Lipset & Schneider 1981).
Workers appreciated high wages, of course, but also felt 
that if the union had not been as effective in negotiating 
high wages, their jobs in the Bearing Company might have 
remained in the Valley.
They drove prices up. I'm not saying the company 
wouldn't have made as much money, but look today with 
what the automobile workers are making today, twenty 
bucks an hour. I imagine our next door neighbors are 
making five to six dollars an hour. Its got to stop 
somewhere... But I think [unions] overstepped their 
bounds [Machinist J8, Bearing Company].
But that is not the only reason that the shops went 
out of business. Some of it is poor management. Also 
the union always asks for more and the shop or company 
says, "Okay we will give you that." So they tack a 
little more on the price. What the hell, a few 
dollars more and the customer will still buy it. So 
next year they will negotiate the contract and the 
union says I want this and they say, "Give 'em that, 
what the hell." Then it got to the point where Joe 
Blow said I can build one of those cheaper than they 
can. So they started building it and you have 
competition and then you get right out of the market.
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The union demands a high wage, which is fine. 
Everybody wants more money, that is not the fault of 
the union. The company is the one that gave it to 
'em. [Machinist Jll, Bearing Company].
The unions can be bad too. They can be. I think they 
have their place. Sometimes they get out of hand, but 
it is the same way with companies. The company always 
says the union closed the shop. The union always says 
if the company went along with the plan they wouldn't 
have had to close. It gets men $15/hr. A man needs 
an adequate wage to sustain a living. Who is to be 
the judge? [Machinist J5, Remnant Company].
Unions were also appreciated for providing job security. But 
again, workers held contradictory assessments on union power 
in enforcing job security. While the union enabled good 
workers to keep stable employment, bad workers were also 
equally protected. Of all of the concerns workers had 
regarding unions, the primary complaint was how unions 
protected the "deadbeats".
[Unions] are just as good as they are bad. What I'm 
saying on that is they are good because they get 
something for the people if it is deserving. There 
are plenty of companies that make big profits and give 
their employees some of it. But having a union, as 
I'm sure other guys have told you, there is a time 
when a union is no good for the place because you do 
have deadbeats that are in the union that like to milk 
the system because they can get by on them because the 
union protects them. That is where I think the union 
is bad. If the guy is not doing his job, whether he 
is in the union or not, the company ought to have the 
right to fire him. And they don't in most places 
unless you really have a [serious cause]... What is 
serious enough to the union? Just about nothing 
[Machinist L3, Loyalty Company].
Unions like anything have their pros and cons. After 
working at Hightech, I have to say I like unions. But 
the unions did protect a lot of lazy people. That 
jacked the price of machines up, parts up. It 
affected too many of the wrong people [Machinist H3,
170
Hightech Enterprises].
I would have to say with the union what I praise the 
union mostly for is having the seniority/security. 
Not the fact that I [could] goof-off and have the 
union protect me. And they did and its certainly 
true. If I had a gripe against the union, it was that 
they always seemed to be protecting the ones they 
shouldn't be. The ones that are always missing their 
time or not doing their job properly or one thing or 
another. But that was their job and therefore they 
were doing what they had to do. But it is great to 
know that you have this job and your secure in your 
job. Nobody is secure anymore, in any level, 
management or out in the shop [Machinist J13, Bearing 
Company].
For the most part [unions] are good. The bad thing 
about the unions is they protect the deadbeats 
[Machinist J12, Remnant Company].
Taylorized work offered owners the strategic advantage in 
keeping wages low by enabling them to turnover employees and 
to thereby keep a ready supply of low-paid low-skilled 
workers. Industrial union response was to develop and enforce 
the seniority system of job security, operating on the basis 
of giving senior workers greater job security than younger 
workers. The logic of this system effectively subverts the 
owners' advantage of deskilling work tasks to lower wages. 
However, the seniority system does not recognize or reward 
individual efforts of the younger workers, who feel cheated 
when less capable senior workers are "unfairly'' protected.
For myself the union was fine because I had to be in 
it. Personally, I thought the union did more for the 
deadbeats than for the hard worker. And I still 
believe that way. While I'm starting to have my 
doubts, I always thought that if you did your job and
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people would probably take care of you. But I'm 
beginning to wonder about that. But I still wouldn't 
join the union unless it was mandatory. I feel we 
paid them a lot of money. Sure they kept your job. 
But then when layoffs start and then your on the 
layoff list and a guy with more seniority than you 
stays, but you know that he isn't worth the same as 
you. And here he is and has a good job and you are 
out on the street. That didn't seem right to me, but 
that is who they protected [Machinist Jl, Remnant 
Company].
In favor of seniority systems, workers prefer to have 
their jobs secured through evaluations of their personal 
accomplishments in regard to production and individual 
capabilities. This is consistent with strong held American 
values of individualism and personal responsibility for 
success and failure (Khleif 1992, Bellah et al. 1985, de 
Tocqueville 1966/1835). As post-Fordism operates with 
increasing reliance upon skilled workers and personal 
initiative, seniority systems are not desired by workers as it 
is no longer corresponds with the post-Fordist approach to 
work.
The extent to which unions are desired (or not desired) 
varies across firms. In Hightech Enterprises, because of the 
hitlist, three out of four workers desired a strong union 
presence to protect workers from arbitrary dismissal. The 
protection of deadbeat workers is viewed as an inevitable 
conseguence of providing protection of the majority.
Unions like anything have their pros and cons. After 
working at Hightech, I have to say I like unions. But 
the unions did protect a lot of lazy people. That
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jacked the price of machines up, parts up. It 
affected too many of the wrong people. But Hightech 
Enterprises needs a union terribly. We went two weeks 
without a paycheck once... We need a buffer in there 
to stand up as a group [Machinist HI, Hightech 
Enterprises].
In the Remnant Company, workers maintain similar feelings 
about unions. While they feel that reward and security should 
be based on merit, and wish it were, they also desire the 
increased job security previously offered in the unionized 
Bearing Company. In the Loyalty Company, however, none of the 
workers desired a union or a seniority system to secure their 
jobs. In this company, workers felt their personal merits 
were recognized as a basis of their job security and that 
union presence was not necessary to protect their jobs. In 
fact, they expressed concern that a union would undermine the 
positive relationship they have with the owner and the 
company's profitability.
I can remember talking to a fellow once, and it really 
kind of aggravated me because he took full advantage 
of the union and its function, won a grievance, and 
then threw it in their face and told them he didn't 
want the job. It tied up that machine and two people 
for over three months. Now I believe that fellow is 
retired. But when I heard that story I just couldn't 
believe that. I couldn't believe anyone could do 
that. I don't have the conscience for it. I have to 
make an honest living. Here [in the Loyalty Company], 
you can make an honest living [Machinist LI, Loyalty 
Company].
Well, I never worked in a union shop. Most of what I 
have heard didn't appeal to me. The pay scale was 
better, the benefits were better, but you were never 
an individual and that thought bothers me. That is
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one of the reasons I never went to a union shop. Two 
people are on identical machines, they earn the same 
wages regardless of ability [Machinist H4, Loyalty 
Company].
These responses of machinists in Machinist Valley are 
important because they show that post-Fordist workers do not 
desire the "old style" industrial union forwarded under the 
Wagner Act framework. While machinists think that industrial 
unions are beneficial to workers in securing stable jobs and 
high wages, the above responses show that they also see unions 
to be so effective at advancing worker interests that unions 
can undermine company interests. Workers believe that if 
unions were more sensitive to the interests of companies, 
rather than to the class interests of workers, possibly the 
Bearing Company would not have had to close down as quickly as 
it did. Given this belief, it is understandable that most 
workers have mixed feelings about unions.
Because industrial unions enforced an inflexible work 
place, they also were partially responsible for degrading the 
intrinsic experience of work. What workers desire is an agent 
that can act in their class interests, as well as allow for 
compensation based upon personal merit and recognize that 
worker interests are associated with company interests. In 
Chapter 6, I will offer some possibilities of how collective 
response can be reactivated in new forms suitable to post- 
Fordist production. Here I emphasize that post-Fordism is 
currently functioning to undermine collective worker response
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and that workers do not see industrial unions as being an 
effective force in counteracting the actions of owners. The 
Wagner Act framework, as Heckscher (1988) points out, is no 
longer a viable means of advancing worker interests.
Individualistic Responses
While workers are largely abandoning collective responses 
in the post-Fordist work places, they are also increasing 
their use of individualistic forms of response to extend their 
control over the terms of their employment. However, because 
their responses are fragmented, rather than collective, the 
effectiveness of these individualistic responses is minimal.
In many ways, the post-Fordist approach advances the 
individualistic ideologies underpinning individualistic worker 
response. As workers are given more autonomy in performing 
tasks, they feel more personally responsible for their 
successes and failures.
What do you mean by control? Nobody tells me what to 
do because the thing is there and they expect me to do 
it. Not unless I need some help [Operator H2, 
Hightech Enterprises],
Here you take care of the problems yourself... If you 
have a good job, it is no problem. If you have one 
that you are struggling with, and its one of those 
days, no matter what you do [it seems to come out 
wrong] [Machinist L3, Loyalty Company].
Oh yes, I have pretty much control. Because that is 
one of the things that makes it interesting, because 
I am the only guy there. I can deal with things any 
way I want. I can approach it any way I want 
[Machinist Jll, Remnant Company].
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The personal autonomy of individual workers is placed in 
a context where workers are pitted against one another for 
scarce jobs in the Valley. In order to compete against other 
workers for the limited numbers of jobs, post-Fordist workers 
try to develop their craft skills to give them a competitive 
edge over other workers. This involves trying new jobs when 
given the opportunity, as well as taking courses outside of 
the work place in order to advance their craft skills. As 
this worker explains, his security rests not on the number of 
years working for the company, but rather on the skills he 
brings to the company.
I know that there are a couple of people that would go 
before me. He [the owner] would have to get in pretty 
bad shape before I would have to go. There are three 
guys that run the lathes, me, Joe, and Sam. Of the 
three of us, Sam is the least knowledgeable. He would 
be the first to go [Machinist L6, Loyalty Company].
Another worker expressed a similar sentiment, placing emphasis 
on the skills he needs in order to obtain a job in a tight job 
market.
They [the owners of the Remnant Company] take who has 
the most knowledge of running the machine itself...
They usually take whoever is best. Prices are down 
and they have to get it out quicker [Machinist L3, 
Loyalty Company].
In Chapter 4, I showed that a great deal of owners' power 
is exercised through enforcing job insecurity. As a result,
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workers in the Remnant Company and Hightech Enterprises feel 
work relationships do not entail a lasting commitment between 
owners and workers. Because owners feel little commitment to 
workers, workers feel little attachment to owners.
People don't have any [loyalty]. The workers around 
here don't have any loyalty anymore. The employers 
don't have any loyalty. I think everyone needs an 
attitude adjustment [Machinist J6, Remnant Company].
Because machinists in the Remnant Company and Hightech 
Enterprises feel companies have no commitment to workers, they 
in turn feel little commitment to their companies. As a 
result, workers actively seek new jobs which may offer higher 
wages or better working conditions. Therefore the common 
responses of workers to unfavorable conditions in their 
current work places were to quit or plan to quit the job at 
the first available opportunity in order to get a better job.
I went in and did my days work. Even though they cut 
my pay I still went in and I had no place else to go. 
No place was hiring. Most shops around here were 
folding. I went in and did my days work. I didn't 
like it, but I did it. I was still being paid to do 
the job, so I did the job. I wasn't the only one who 
took the cut, everyone took the cut. When the chance 
came I said goodbye [Machinist J9, Remnant Company].
We have had a few guys come in and they have quit, get 
laid off, one guy got fired for various reasons. Some 
of the guys don't like their wages, some don't like 
the work [Operator HI, Hightech Enterprises].
I didn't want to tell these guys until I was sure I 
had another job. [Before that] I couldn't afford to 
quit [Machinist J5, Remnant Company].
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They [co-workers] are quitting. One guy quit after 
two days. They are quitting over pay and the way they 
are being treated. For me to go back there [to 
Hightech], I needed a job where I could get a lot of 
overtime and make as much money as I could as quick as 
possible. That is why I went back there [Machinist 
H3, Hightech Enterprises].
I was over in the corner. This is a punishment. They 
didn't want me to go back on days and I believe that 
what they think may happen is that I'll get sick of 
the shit on days and go back on nights. It won't 
happen. I'll quit first [Machinist H4, Hightech 
Enterprises].
What goes around comes around. No faith. But what is 
going to happen is that it is going to hurt the ones 
who don't want to leave. They are the ones who are 
going to suffer. Myself, I'll go and work someplace 
else. I could work at a job for a little less money, 
it would be a little tougher, but I could do it to 
survive [Machinist H3, Hightech Enterprises].
Craft control theory emphasizes the power that individual 
worker responses have, as owners are in need of skilled 
workers and can not replace them as easily as the lower 
skilled Fordist workers. Craft control theory, however, 
ignores the economic and social constraints that tie workers 
to communities, but do not tie companies to communities. 
Under post-Fordism, small companies can move with relative 
ease. For workers to move to new locations, however, entails 
major social and economic costs. They have to worry about 
selling their homes, moving their children to new schools, 
absorbing moving costs, etc. Beyond these concerns, breaking 
ties with family and friends entails the loss of considerable
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amounts of social capital.1 79% of the machinists in this 
study were born and raised in Machinists' Valley. 75% had 
fathers who had previously worked for one of the large machine 
shops in the Valley. While most reported formally applying 
for jobs in the machine shops, many acknowledge the importance 
of family and friends in obtaining their jobs. To move from 
Machinist Valley, therefore, is to lose these social 
connections which help workers obtain jobs in a constricting 
market of opportunity.
When workers guit or lose jobs, they search for new 
employment in their immediate social environment. They 
compare one firm with another, and try to get a job in the 
company that offers the highest wages and best benefits. The 
firms in Machinist Valley, however, are not in high 
competition with one another for workers.
The attitude among the owners is machine operators are 
a dime a dozen. Anyone can be replaced and the owners 
feel that anyone can run a machine. The companies 
have zero loyalty to workers. They are a bunch of 
bastards [Machinist J12, Remnant Company].
With a saturated labor market, owners are not competing 
against one another for workers and are not inclined to
1 Pierre Bourdieu defines social capital as, "the aggregate 
of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition - or in 
other words, to membership in a group —  which provides each of 
its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a 
"credential" which entitles them to credit, in the various senses 
of the word." (Bourdieu 1986:248)
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bargain over wages.
I don't do that [bargain with workers]. For example, 
I had a worker who was offered a dollar more an hour 
to work at another machine shop. I don't play that 
game. I let him go because if they want to work 
somewhere else then that is fine, I'm not going to 
bargain on wages [Owner 01 of another machine shop in 
Machinist Valley].
In fact, both workers and owners suggested that the 
prevailing wage and benefits are not based upon profitability 
of enterprises or through negotiations with workers. Rather, 
wages and benefits are informally negotiated among the owners 
in the Valley, setting standards that all follow.
They want to keep us at a certain spot and that is it. 
A lot of the places around here, they see one company 
do this and it's like a chain reaction. From what 
I've noticed around here, one company cuts back and 
cuts the insurance back, and now this one's doing it. 
Its like a chain reaction. I don't know about other 
cities, but in this area it is really sad. You once 
thought you had it all, but it's not that way anymore. 
It makes you wonder what the future is going to be 
[Machinist Jl, Remnant Company].
I pay as good as any other machine shop [Owner L2, 
Loyalty Company].
By observing the wages and benefits that other owners are 
offering in the Valley, owners are able to maintain leverage 
in bargaining power over worker demands for increased pay. 
Workers are simply told to go elsewhere if they think they can 
do better.
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I can give you another little example that happened to 
me that led me to quit there. I went two and one-half 
years without a raise. And times were not like they 
are now. The way things are now, I wouldn't even 
hesitate or even wonder about it. Now things are bad. 
Back then they weren't, not like they are now. Then 
I got a $.15 raise, which is like a slap in the face. 
I went in to talk to the owner, the main guy. He 
really didn't say anything, and I was pretty upset. 
I wasn't really thinking about what he said when he 
said it. He said I was in the right place to keep 
doing the thing I was doing. I got to thinking about 
it and a couple of weeks later I told the foreman I 
would like it explained a little bit further what we 
were talking about. He said, "Okay I'll go in and 
talk with him and give you a sign to go in." Well he 
went in there and was in there for about 45 minutes. 
He came back out and said, "Okay, he will see you 
now." I opened his office door and he was behind his 
desk and he was glaring. He wasn't happy. He leaned 
over his desk and he said, "If you can do better 
elsewhere, you had better leave." That is just what 
happened. I said at this point there is no point in 
talking to you so I gave him my notice. I quit. 
[Machinist H3, Hightech Enterprises].
Later that same year this worker came back to Hightech 
Enterprises, asking for his old job back. Unable to find 
better paying work and facing mounting mortgage payments, he 
returned to his old job at the same pay.
While craft control theories recognize that workers can 
spontaneously withdraw from individual enterprises, they fail 
to acknowledge the class actions of owners which restrict the 
opportunities of workers to find better paying work. While 
these actions of the owners are not formally organized, they 
work together with an implicit understanding of what a 
machinist is worth in the Valley. Workers withdrawing from 
one enterprise find themselves working in other enterprises 
for similar levels of pay and benefits. This keeps many
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workers laboring in jobs at which they are dissatisfied. For 
other workers, searching for better work from company to 
company, prevents them from forming strong co-worker alliances 
which could advance collective worker responses.
The marginal exceptions to this analysis are the 
experiences of workers in the Loyalty Company, where 
individualistic responses hold some degree of power. The 
Loyalty Company operates largely by cultivating a commitment 
between workers and the owner, which Edwards (1979) terms 
"entrepreneurial control." Entrepreneurial control enables 
the owner to control workers through a form of charismatic 
authority (Gerth and Mills 1946). This also increases the 
capabilities of workers to extend their control in the work 
place because attaining good work behaviors relies upon the 
owner maintaining a positive working relationship with 
workers. This enables workers in the Loyalty Company to take 
liberties not extended to workers in the other two companies. 
For example, during an interview I observed two workers using 
a company drill to drill boards for a personal project. The 
owner was not asked for permission to use the tools for this 
purpose, and seemed unfazed when he found the shop filled with 
wood smoke.
However, the Loyalty Company operates in the same labor 
market as the other post-Fordist companies and the owner is 
able to justify the wages he offers because "they are as good 
as any other machine shop." While individuals in the Loyalty
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Company have increased capabilities to exercise 
individualistic methods of control, this control comes after 
they have shown the owner their full capabilities.
You talk with a guy for five minutes, a lot of times 
you say, "I don't want this guy." If someone were to 
walk through my door and say they do this or do that, 
I call up where they had worked before, and they say 
he is a good man, I hire him. I would hire him at a 
fair wage. Usually when they say, "I have to have 
this much money.” That is usually what I do. Being 
the nice guy that I am. Then I say, "Okay, I'm paying 
you what you are asking me for, you are telling me 
what you can do, you look at the blueprint and the 
time, now buddy, now you have to show me what you can 
do" [Owner L2, Loyalty Company].
Loyalty Company workers feel insecure in the first few months 
of employment, and therefore work as hard as they can to prove 
their worth.
As time goes on I am feeling more and more secure. 
There was a time when I was very nervous because I 
knew I was having a problem getting things going and 
making parts [Machinist LI, Loyalty Company].
Once workers have proved their capabilities, their control in 
slowing the pace of work is less tenable. Therefore, while 
Loyalty Company workers have greater capabilities of 
exercising individualistic forms of control, this control must 
be exercised in areas outside of issues of pace and pay, as 
these are effectively determined by the owner of the company. 
For example, they have been able to structure their hours to 
allow for four-day work weeks, as well as beginning the work
183
day at 7am, rather than 8am, to free afternoons for 
recreation. Work in this company is therefore evaluated very 
favorably by machinists. However, individualistic methods of 
control have had no effect on influencing the pay in the 
Loyalty Company, which is on par with the other machine shops 
in the Valley.
workers' Political Responses
Workers1 experiences in the work place are one of the 
primary factors which shape their political responses. Under 
Fordism one primary reason why workers were not inclined 
toward radical political change during the 20th century was 
their experience of economic advancement (Lipset 1985, Gramsci 
1971, Sombart 1976). Beyond economic experience, Fordist 
production was especially adept at maintaining a politically 
tranquil work force because it allowed for the effective 
dissemination of hegemonic ideologies which linked the 
interests of big business with nationalism (Gramsci 1971). 
Because many workers accepted ideologies which asserted anti- 
Ford (ism) as tantamount to being anti-American, political 
responses against the Fordist approach were minimal.
While Gramsci was primarily interested in examining 
worker political inactivity at the national level to explain 
"American exceptionalism," Nash (1989) drew upon Gramscian 
theory to analyze how employer practices quell political 
activity at the community level. In a case study of the
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Pittsfield General Electric plant, Nash (1989) detailed the 
numerous practices of upper management to cultivate worker 
acceptance of ideologies of individualism and consumerism. 
The ideologies served to entrench corporate hegemony and 
suppress political inquiry into General Electric's employment 
and environmental practices.
Nash (1987) also argued that corporate hegemony is 
weakening as a result of the deindustrialization wave of the 
1970s-1980s. With the growing problem of "run-away" plants 
(Bluestone & Harrison 1982), a potential result is an increase 
in political dissent or political response, as the ideologies 
underpinning corporate hegemony become more transparent. In 
Machinist Valley, however, workers were not strongly inclined 
to engage in political action, despite declining incomes and 
their experiences during the closure of the Bearing Company. 
Only 17% post-Fordist workers described themselves as 
politically active, none held political office, and those who 
described themselves as politically active described their 
political actions simply as "I vote." Nor were workers 
disposed toward radical change. 62% of the workers 
interviewed described themselves as conservative and 38% as 
liberal in their political orientation. No one described 
their political orientation as "radical."
These findings are not surprising because they conform to 
other recent studies which demonstrate a lowering commitment 
of workers to engage in political action (Halle 1984, Edsall
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1984). One indicator of declining political commitment is 
voter participation, which declined among blue-collar machine 
and transport equipment operators from 59% in 1968 to 45% in 
1980 (Edsall 1984).
Workers' orientation to voting in Machinist Valley was 
not strongly aimed toward supporting political parties. 35% 
of workers interviewed classified themselves as Democrat, 12% 
as Republican, and 53% as independent. Because political 
problems are viewed as the fault of individual politicians who 
do not care about the working class, workers respond by voting 
for politicians they hope they can trust.
I vote for the man, not the party [Machinist Jll, 
Remnant Company].
Party voting in the United States may not be an extremely 
effective means of workers advancing their class interests, as 
the Democratic Party and the Republican Party increasingly 
appear to be forwarding very similar platforms (Vanneman and 
Cannon 1987). However, party differences do exist and the 
Democratic Party favors the interests of the working class to 
a greater degree than the Republican Party. For example, the 
Democratic party platform of implementing a national health 
care program strongly favors the interests of the working 
class, who are much less likely to have health insurance than 
the upper class. Because of declining voter participation 
among the working class, however, the strength of the
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Democratic Party has been considerably weakened (Edsall 1984) .
Why are workers not inclined to engage in political 
response to their economically degraded conditions? Halle 
(1984) offers an important insight:
Most workers believe that the American political 
theory confers both democracy and freedom, but in 
practice delivers only freedom...There is a belief 
that venal politicians, not the system are to blame 
for what is wrong. There is the belief that some of 
the main alternative systems, especially socialism and 
communism, represent the loss of freedom as well as 
the absence of democracy (Halle 1984:201).
Workers in Machinist Valley maintain strong nationalistic 
commitments, and 100% of the workers in this study reporting 
that they were patriotic. Because of this strong patriotic 
orientation, many of the problems confronting workers in 
Machinist Valley are attributed primarily to increasing 
foreign competition.
I think things are getting worse. Years ago, 
even when I was young, people worked in the woolen 
mills, in the shoe factories, some of them were making 
good money. But then before you knew it 
woolen mills were going out to foreign countries. 
People didn't say much because it wasn't bothering 
them. Then the shoe industry. Then it started 
snowballing [Machinist J4, Remnant Company].
Between Canada, Mexico and the free trade agreement 
that Bush is signing. All these companies are moving 
to Mexico and I think this is what is bad. I think 
they should charge enough money to get the product 
back in so that the American product is as cheap as 
the Mexican [Machinist J3, Remnant Company].
Because of the Japanese, the Swedish, and the German
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manufacturers in particular, we were forced to look at 
our prices and determined that we have to make them 
cheaper and to make them as good or better [Time Study 
Man J9, Remnant Company].
But foreign competition is really the problem, there 
is no question about that. My youngest son is in the 
Air Force. He was in Korea recently and the 
competition from that one little country is unreal. 
Twenty years ago you didn't have that. You don't have 
textile and paper industries now. It has all moved 
overseas. These little countries that have nothing 
are growing and we're going down. And you want to buy 
things made in this country and you can't. It's not 
there and you buy what is there. It's tough, it's a 
world market now. He had a good standard of living 
compared to us. But now it is true, they're actually 
rising above us. Not the way we were 10 years ago, 
they are not that high yet, but they are coming up 
where we are going down [Machinist J13, Remnant 
Company].
Competition in the machining industry is intense. But the 
understanding of foreign competition as the reason for 
increasing pace and declining pay in production also serves a 
hegemonic function that increases owners' power. In the 
global economy of the late 20th century, with the growing 
dominance of multi-national corporations, the "American 
Company" is becoming a rarity (Reich 1992). The ideology of 
foreign competition serves as a constructed myth to advance 
the interests of owners, because the "foreign competition" are 
often workers employed by American capitalists (Barnet and 
Muller 1974). So long as workers believe the foreign 
competition ideology, they will view their economic position 
in this country (and in the global economy) as resulting from 
the practices of other workers, rather than owners, and orient
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their responses accordingly.
Now I'll tell you myself that there are people in this 
country who needed to get off their rear ends and 
start working and do better quality stuff. It isn't 
today anymore, "it is good enough." It is not good 
enough anymore... [Machinist L3, Loyalty Company].
Workers desire some action on the part of government to stem 
the degree to which owners are transplanting companies to 
foreign countries. At the same time, workers believe that 
government primarily operates in the interests of owners 
rather than workers, and this deters them from engaging in 
strong political response.
In this area and in the whole country is in the same 
boat. There is nothing else to do. We have too many 
4-5 and 6 dollar an hour jobs in this country. You 
can thank Mr. Reagan for that one. He really chopped 
it up... He took down the unions and made it all for 
the companies [Machinist L3, Loyalty Company].
It's tough. It's tough when you can almost lose your 
house or you can almost lose your car or you can 
almost lose everything. When companies don't care, 
when the government doesn't care about the people. 
Then around election day they say they are going to 
give you the world, but they won't, let's be honest 
[Machinist J5, Remnant Company].
Workers in Machinist Valley believe that government is 
primarily concerned with the interests of big business, rather 
than with the interests of workers (see also Halle 1984) . 
They question the effectiveness of political action as a means 
of changing employment conditions, as government is not
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concerned with workers to the degree that it is concerned with 
owners. In favor of political response, workers orient their 
actions individualistically rather than politically, such as 
"buying American" as a way to protect their jobs.
You look back at what Reagan did. He really didn't do 
nothing. He let it all become a cutthroat place. Go 
rip off whoever you can rip off. Make your money. 
Steal. Then he crushed everything and moved 
everything down to Mexico. I don't want none of that 
junk. But you try to buy something American. That is 
what I do. For example, Makita, they make good tools, 
but they are Japanese and I don't want to support 
them. You have to work over here and we should take 
care of our people in this country first before you go 
take care of anyone else. You have people over here 
who are starving, don't have a place to work but want 
to work...They tell you to vote but it don't mean 
anything [Machinist L3, Loyalty Company]
I've always tried to buy American. All my automobiles 
are American made [Machinist J3, Remnant Company].
In summation workers' political responses are not strong. 
They tend to be fragmented, thus not providing strong support 
for political parties which may potentially advance class 
interests. Rather than a commitment to political process and 
political change, workers are resigned to a belief that 
government operates primarily in the interests of business and 
believe that politic change should address the problem of 
foreign competition rather than class.
Summary
Post-Fordism is marked by an increasingly individualistic
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orientation to control in the work place. In part, this is 
the result of an organizational structure which effectively 
prevents workers from unionizing. Because workers hold 
industrial unions partially responsible for the closure of the 
Bearing Company, and because unions under the Wagner Act 
framework fail to recognize individual workers' contributions 
to companies, workers are less inclined to form or join 
unions.
While individualistic responses are the dominant tactic 
of workers to advance their interests, it is not as effective 
a means of advancing worker power as craft control theories 
assert. Even in the company that most closely conforms to the 
ideal of the flexibly specialized craft enterprise, the 
Loyalty Company, individualistic methods of control have been 
only able to affect issues such as time schedules, and not the 
pace and pay of work. Workers' political response in
Machinist Valley is minimal, largely because of skepticism of 




In this chapter I discuss how owners’ and workers’ power 
have been affected by the restructuring of production to the 
post-Fordist approach. Rather than simply restate the 
findings of the previous chapters, my goal here is to 
integrate the history of Fordism with post-Fordism concerning 
power in the work place. I conclude with a discussion of 
further research that can increase the sociological 
understanding of how post-Fordism and global production affect 
work and power.
Conclusion: Work and Power in Post-Fordist Production
There are junctures in history where the experiences of 
a generation of people are set apart from the experiences of 
the preceding generation. In this dissertation, I have 
examined two of these junctures concerning work experience. 
The development of the Fordist era in the early 20th century 
resulted in a degradation of the intrinsic experience of work. 
However, because workers developed new forms of control under 
Fordism, the extrinsic rewards from work increased. At the
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end of the 20th century a post-Fordist era is emerging. This 
study indicates that post-Fordist era is reversing the 
historical trajectory of Fordism, as extrinsic rewards are 
declining while intrinsic rewards are generally increasing.
I have not argued that was Fordism introduced solely to 
depower workers. It was introduced to capitalize on new 
economies of scale made possible by the infrastructure of the 
United States which made mass production more profitable than 
small batch production (Chandler 1990). Nor have I argued 
that post-Fordism is emerging merely as a tactic of owners to 
depower workers, although this is an important reason why 
post-Fordism is taking the shape it is. Rather, both 
approaches to production were introduced to capitalize on new 
markets, each appropriate to the United State's position in 
the global economy. Nonetheless, under both approaches to 
production, a primary goal of owners has been to restructure 
the work place to increase profits by decreasing the power of 
workers to control the pace of work and demand high wages and 
good benefits.
Owners are in an initial position of power in the work 
place because they are able to structure work in ways that 
heighten their power to control the pace and pay of 
production. Taylorism replaced the craft approach to 
production in the 19th century largely because owners believed 
that scientific management could subvert the power workers 
maintained through membership in craft unions. There is no
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reason why craft methods of production could not have been 
incorporated into mass production, it is simply that craft 
oriented work gave workers too much initial power to negotiate 
high wages and to control the pace of production (see Sabel & 
Zeitlin 1985).
Braverman's (1974) socio-historical analysis of work 
revealed Fordism to be a history of "the degradation of work 
in the twentieth century." Following Montgomery (1979), I 
have argued that while Fordism was largely responsible for 
lowering the value of skills in the work place, it did not 
depower workers. In fact, Fordism enabled workers to expand 
their power in the work place because it provided an 
organizational and technological context that encouraged 
unionization and collective forms of worker control. Wages 
and benefits increased while work tasks became more monotonous 
and "degraded."
Once workers abandoned the types of control exercised 
under craft production, they were able to respond to the new 
Fordist work place and use it to their advantage. Therefore, 
workers should not be viewed as passive victims of capitalism, 
as Braverman (1974) implied. New approaches to production, 
however, require workers to test of new methods of control in 
efforts to exert their individual and collective wills in the 
work place. In the early phases of Fordism, workers tried to 
exert control by relying upon the old craft methods of control 
learned during the 19th century (Haydu 1988). These were
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methods later abandoned in favor of industrial union 
membership, which proved very powerful at extending the class 
interests of workers.
Analysis of the experiences of machinists in Machinist 
Valley indicate that contemporary post-Fordist workers are in 
a position similar to that of their early Fordist 
counterparts. They are finding their old methods of control, 
learned under Fordism, to be of little use in negotiating the 
pace and pay of work under post-Fordism. The industrial union 
offers as little power in the late 20th century as the craft 
union offered in the early 20th century because small 
companies can move operations when workers start to organize 
collectively. Therefore worker commitment to industrial 
unions is declining and workers are trying to increase their 
power in the work place primarily through individualistic 
responses.
Skilled workers are bargaining with employers and are 
quitting when dissatisfied with work conditions, the types of 
behaviors that craft control theory alleges enhance workers' 
power under post-Fordism. The experiences of machinists in 
Machinist Valley, however show these actions are not very 
powerful extending workers' control over the pace and pay of 
work. Because wages, benefits and job security are declining, 
while at the same time the pace of work is increasing in 
Machinist Valley, this study suggests that fragmentation 
theory more accurately predicts the future of power in the
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work place than craft control theory.
It is also important to note, however, that the 
experiences of workers in the Loyalty Company and the Remnant 
Company reveal some of the liberating aspects of the post- 
Fordist approach to production. As workers exercise more 
craft skills, the intrinsic rewards they receive from work 
increase. At the Loyalty Company, these intrinsic rewards 
were so high that they counterbalanced declining extrinsic 
rewards, resulting in favorable evaluations of post-Fordist 
work. At the Remnant Company, workers felt that the work pace 
was very demanding, they faced a constant threat of job loss, 
and experienced declining wages. But workers in this company 
also evaluated their work tasks very favorably in comparison 
to work in the Bearing Company, where work tended to be more 
boring and repetitious. Only in Hightech Enterprises did 
workers maintain an unqualified negative appraisal of their 
work experiences, pointing to both declining extrinsic rewards 
and a degrading work environment. This is because Hightech 
Enterprises has incorporated the alienating practices of 
Fordism while exploiting new markets for mass produced 
component parts.
The primary factor contributing to the disempowerment of 
workers in Machinist Valley is job insecurity. As workers 
fear the loss of their individual jobs, as well as collective 
losses of jobs resulting from the closure or transplantation 
of their companies, they are less likely to engage in the
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simple forms of control which empowered craft workers in the 
19th century.
Less apparent changes, from the workers' perspective, 
reduce worker power in Machinist Valley as well. The 
relationships between big business and workers are 
increasingly obscured as companies rely upon the outsourcing 
of production to small enterprises. This outsourcing 
fragments and locates conflict in small enterprises, thereby 
increasing the social distance between workers and owners of 
these larger enterprises. Workers' concerns remain located 
within the organizations in which they labor, not with the 
relationships between these companies and larger 
organizations.
The work place shapes the ways in which conflict occurs 
and focusses conflict in specific directions, as Piven and 
Cloward (1977) explain:
People experience deprivation and oppression within a 
concrete setting, not as the end product of large and 
abstract processes and it is the concrete experience 
that molds their discontent into specific grievances 
against specific targets. Workers experience the 
factory, the speeding rhythm of the assembly line, the 
foreman, the spies and the guards, the owner and the 
paycheck. They do not experience monopoly
capitalism...institutional patterns shape mass 
movements by shaping the collectivity out of which 
protest can arise. (Piven & Cloward 1977:20-21).
Post-Fordist production shapes the collectivities of 
workers into controllable groups and fragments their alliances 
within firms and within nationalities. In reality, production
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is occurring across organizations and across nationalities. 
Post-Fordism is much more resistant to worker response than 
Fordist production ever was because it separates workers and 
their responses into small self contained units. As the 
experiences of machinists in Machinist Valley show, the post- 
Fordist approach to production can liberate workers from the 
degrading tasks of Fordism. But by fragmenting workers' 
responses and diluting their class power, post-Fordism may 
very well facilitate a new degradation of work in the 21st 
century.
Directions for Future Research
By studying the practices of workers and owners in single 
case study site, I have been able to highlight some of the 
ways in which power has been affected during the shift to 
post-Fordism. However, it is inadvisable for any single case 
study to be viewed as the end of research. Rather, the 
findings should be used to inform researchers in how to 
conduct further research, adding to the understanding of the 
relationships between work, class and power.
Sociologists in the 1970s and 1980s were interested in 
examining the immediate effects of the closures of large 
companies (i.e., Bensman & Lynch 1987, Bluestone & Harrison 
1982, Buss & Redburn 1982, Lynd 1982). I have suggested a 
reorienting the study of "deindustrialization" to the study of
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the restructuring of production. Therefore, a useful set of 
studies would present re-analyses of the communities 
previously studied to examine the types of jobs being 
introduced in the decades following the closures of large 
factories. This will also provide further data to assess the 
degree to which Machinist Valley is a common or unique case.
Because I focussed this study on the experiences of 
employed machinists, the experiences of displaced machinists 
are left unexamined. Another useful set of studies would 
examine the experiences of displaced workers and compare their 
experiences as they try to adjust to the new markets of 
opportunity in the restructured economy. Of particular 
interest would be the experiences of workers previously 
employed in the manufacturing sector who are endeavoring to 
adjust to an increasingly service oriented economy, which 
requires distinctly new types of skills.
I have argued that machinists are important to study 
because they constitute a group of skilled workers that will 
be of importance in the United States in the 21st century. 
For this same reason, it is important to study other groups of 
workers being affected by recent changes in the opportunity 
structure of the United States. Machinists have predominately 
worked in the primary labor market, which offers better wages, 
better benefits, higher job security and greater opportunities 
for skill development and advancement than the secondary labor 
market (Edwards et al. 1973). Many of the lower educated
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workers, who would have previously been employed in the low- 
skilled manufacturing jobs, are now working in pink-collar 
jobs in the secondary labor market in the expanding service 
sector of the economy. These secondary labor market jobs have 
been structured to operate with a low-skilled tasks, similar 
to those jobs in the secondary labor market manufacturing 
industries under Fordism. Future research could examine 
whether the post-Fordist approach is being extended into these 
service sector jobs, and if it is, how it affects jobs and 
class power in these work places.
Finally, sociological inquiry is not guided by a drive to 
prove a perspective. Rather, good sociology is driven by a 
desire to understand social relationships, how these 
relationships affect individuals and how individuals in turn 
attempt to shape and give meaning to their experiences. I 
have endeavored to highlight how the post-Fordist approach to 
production affects manufacturing workers in the global economy 
of the late 20th century and how workers are shaping their 
responses. Any weaknesses in this study should be viewed as 
an invitation to further inquire into the issues I attempted 
to address. New studies will certainly enrich the 
understanding of the complex relationships between work and 
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First I need to get just a little background information on you.
al. What is your age _______________________
a2. In what state were you born _______________________
a3. How many years have you lived
in the Machinist Valley Area_______ _______________________
a4. Where do you currently live _______________________





a6. Do you rent or own this place
1. Rent
2. Own






a8. What age were you when you married?________________
a9. What was your wife's age when you
got married? ________________
alO. How many adults, over age 18, live in your house?
all. How many children under age 18 live in your house?
al3. What is your occupation?____________________________
al4. What company do you work for? ________________
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PARENT'S HISTORY
Before we talk about your job, it would help me to learn a little 
bit about your family background.
bl. What part of the world did your ancestors come from?
Mother's Ancestors __________________________
Father's Ancestors __________________________
b2. About when did they come to the United States?
Mother1s Ancestors _________________
Father's Ancestors_______ _________________
b3. Did your parents live in the Machinist Valley area?
1. No
2. Yes
b4. If not, where did they live _________________
b5. What was your father's main occupation? ____________
b6. Where was he mostly employed
when you were growing up? _________________
b7. About how many years did he work
work there? _________________
bl6. What was your mother's main occupation?
bl7. Where was she mostly employed
when you were growing up?__________ ____
bl8. About how many years did she work 
work there?
bl9. Was her work usually part-time or full-time?
1. Part-time
2. Full-time
b20. About how many hours a week did she work? _
b31. How far did your father go in school?




5. Associates Degree or 2 yr Vocational













What was the highest grade your mother completed in school?




5. Associates Degree or 2 yr Vocational
6. College Grad (4 yr)
7. Above
How far in school do you think they expected you to go?




5. Associates Degree or 2 yr Vocational
6. College Grad (4 yr)
7. Above
How far did you go in school?




5. Associates Degree or 2 yr Vocational
6. College Grad (4 yr)
7. Above
What do you think your father's attitude was towards formal
schooling like high school? What about college?
Can you think of a particular instance which makes you 
believe this?
WORK HISTORY
Now I would like to ask you about your work history.
Did you work when you were in high school?
1. No
2. Yes
What did you do?
How old were you when you got your first full time job?
What was your job title? 
Where was your job? ____
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c6. How did you get that job?
cl. Could you tell me about the other jobs that you have had
since you have left school? Start with the first job you
had and work your way up to the present.
c8. Which of these jobs did you like best? Why?
c9. Which of these jobs did you like the least? Why?
IF SUBJECT HAD WORKED AT Bearing Company-
zl. Tell me about the jobs you did at Bearing Company.
z2. What did you like best about working there?
z3. What did you like least about working there?
z4. What was your personal income before taxes in your best
year of working at Bearing Company?
z6. How long did it take you to find work again after you
left Bearing Company?
z7. Do you remember why Bearing Company closed its shop?
z8. Can you tell me about what happened to some of your
coworkers? What are they doing now?
z9. Would you say that your current job pays much better,







zlO. Would you say that working conditions on your current
job much better, better, worse, or much worse than when 


















zll. How would you say skill levels compare between the two 
jobs? Would you say that your current job requires much 
more skill, a little more skill, the same skill, less 
skill, or much less skill?
1. Much More





I want to learn as much as I can about your current job.
Where do you currently work? _______________________________
What is your job title? _____________________________________
How did you get this job? _______________________________
How long have you had this job? __________________________
Have you done other work for this company or were you hired 
directly into this position?
1. Did not do other jobs
2. Did other jobs
How many hours do you usually work in a week? ______________
JOB ASSESSMENTS
Could you now describe a typical work-day for me? Start with 
when you come into work and describe in as much as you can 
the different things that you do during your day. (PRESS FOR 
DETAILS)
Would you say that on the whole you strongly like, like, 





What parts of the job do you like the most?
What parts of the job do you dislike the most?
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dl2. If something goes wrong on the job, maybe you can think of a 
recent situation, how do you deal with it?
(if no response, try to coax one by suggesting probable 
situations)
dl3. Do things like this problem situation happen often?
dl4. Would you say that on the whole your job is very






dl5. Tell me about the most interesting part of the job.
dl6. Tell me about the most boring part of the job.
dl7. Would you describe your job as very easy, easy, moderate, 






dl8. What is the most difficult task in your job and what makes 
it hard?
dl9. Would you say that your job requires a lot of skill, medium 
amounts of skill, small amounts of skill, or practically no 
skill at all?




d20. Tell me about the part of the job it would take a person the 
longest to learn to do well.
d21. To do your job well, would it take a lot of concentration, 







d22. Do you feel you have a great deal of control, moderate
control, a little control, or no control over the way you 





d23. Can you tell me about why you would say this. Maybe you 
have an example (probe).
d24. Which better fits your job description, it is usually the 
same, a little different, moderately different, or very 
different each day.
1. Same
2. A little different
3. Moderately different
4. Very different
d25. Would you say that on the whole you are very satisfied with
your job, reasonably satisfied with your job, dissatisfied
with your job, very dissatisfied, or don't really have any 






d26. What aspects of the job are you most dissatisfied with?
d27. Would you describe you work as very fast paced, high paced,
medium paced, slow paced or very slow paced.




5. Very slow paced
d28. On the whole would you say you are very proud, proud, or not 




d29. Could you tell me what makes you feel either very proud or 










Did it take a lot of training, medium training, little 
training or almost no training to learn to do the work you 
do?
1. A lot of training
2. Medium training
3. Little training
4. Almost no training





Did you have prior training or related job experience before
you got this job?
1. No
2. Yes
Please tell me about that training and how useful you feel 
it was to your later work experiences.







What level of education do you think someone needs to do a 
job like yours?




5. Associates Degree or 2 yr Vocational
6. College Grad (4 yr)
7. Above



















el2. Do you know how to use a computer?
1. No
2. Yes
el3. Do you think a person would need computer experience before 
they worked at your job?
el4. What other types of skills or training would a person need 
before they started working in your job?
el5. What level of education do you think a person needs to do a 
job like yours?




5. Associates Degree or 2 yr Vocational
6. College Grad (4 yr)
7. Above
RELATIONS WITH COWORKERS
fl. Does your job put you in a lot of contact, some contact, a 
little contact or practically no contact with other people 
as you work?
1. A lot of contact
2. Some contact
3. Little contact
4. Almost no contact
f2. When you are working, can you sometimes take a break and 




f4 . What happens when you do this? Can you give me an example
or tell me a little bit more about things that happen on the 
job that are not necessarily "work”?
f4. How many people that you work with would you call "friends"?
f5. Do your friendships on the job carry on outside of the
workplace? For example do coworkers and you get together 
often outside of work? What do you do?
f6. If you have a problem with a coworker, how do you usually
deal with it? Maybe you can give me an example.
SUPERVISORS
gl. How many direct supervisors do you have? __________________
g2. Could you tell me what you think of them?
g3. How would you say most of your co-workers feel towards the
supervisors?
g4. If you or one of your coworkers has a problem with one of
the supervisors, how do you deal with it? Maybe you can 
give me an example.










g7. Is it very effective, effective, not usually effective, or 
not at all effective?
1. Very Effective
2. Effective
3. Not Usually Effective
4. Not at all Effective
g8. Maybe you can give me an example.
g9. Have you ever seen or met the owner of the company? What do 
you think of them?
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glO. How would you say most of your co-workers feel towards the 
owner?
UNIONS
hi. Are you in a union?
h2. Have you ever been in a union?




3. Don't Know 
h4. What happened?
h5. What do you think of unions? Are they usually good for 
workers or bad for workers?
1. Good for Workers
2. Bad for Workers
h6. Are they usually good for companies or bad for companies?
1. Good For Companies
2. Bad for Companies
h7. Can you tell me a little more about why you feel this way?
h8. Would you say that for most Americans their opportunities 
are getting better or worse?
1. Better
2. Worse
h9. Is this the same for all groups of Americans? (If no, who 
is doing better and who is doing worse?)
h9. (If Worse) What do you think is the primary thing needed to 
turn things around?
FUTURE PLANS
11. How long do you anticipate staying in this job? __________
12. How long do you anticipate working for this company?________
13. Would you like to be promoted up in this company?
1. No
2. Yes
14. What position would you like? ______________________  why?
2 2 6







16. Ideally, in five or ten years, what do you hope to be doing? 
UNEMPLOYMENT
jl. Have you ever been temporarily laid-off from your current 
job or previous jobs?
1. No
2. Yes
j 4. How long did these periods last? _______________
j5. During these times did you collect unemployment?
1. No
2. Yes
J6. For how long did you collect unemployment? ________________
j10. How did you make ends meet during this time?
jll. Can you tell me a little about what you felt like during 
this time?
j12. How much financial support would you say friends gave you 
during this period?
1. A lot of support
2. Some support
3. A little support
4. No support
j13. How much financial support would you say your family gave 
you during this period?
1. A lot of support
2. Some support
3. A little support
4. No support
j14. Could you give me an example of how family and friends 


















Are you paid hourly or salary?
1. Hourly
2. Salary
What was your starting pay? _______________________________
What is your current pay? _______________________________
What was your families income before taxes in your best year 
working at any job? ______________________________________
What was your families income before taxes last year
Does your family currently have health insurance?
1. No
2. Yes











3. Deserve A Lot More




If you lost this job for some reason, what types of work 
would you immediately look for?
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k8. What types of jobs or companies in the community would you 
not want to work at? why?
WIFE'S WORK HISTORY (IF MARRIED)
11. Does your wife work?
1. No
2. Yes
12. What is her occupation? ____________________________________
13. Where does she work? __________________________________




15. About how many hours a week does she work? ______________
16. Is she paid hourly or salary?
1. Hourly
2. Salary
17. What is her current rate of pay?
19. Ideally, would you like her to continue to work, or would it 
be better for you if she stayed at home and just took care 
of things around the house?
111. Does either her work or your work sometimes cause problems 
at home? Can you tell me a little bit about it?
THANK YOU. WE ARE NOW ALMOST THROUGH WITH THE INTERVIEW. I JUST
HAVE A FEW MORE QUESTIONS TO ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR LIFE OUTSIDE WORK
EDUCATION
nl. Do you remember strongly liking, liking, disliking or 





n4. Looking back, are you happy with the choices that you've 
made concerning when to stop schooling?
n5. Are you happy with the choices that you made concerning your 
career?












Would you say that your pay is enough to make ends meet?
1. No
2. Yes
(If no) What strategies does your family have for stretching 
a dollar?
Do you or your wife do extra things to earn a little extra 
money outside of what you both do at work? What?
1. No
2. Yes
What is the main thing that makes your life different from 
your father's?
How do you think your families financial situation compares 
with your parents during a similar time in their lives? Do 




Can you tell me why you say this?
How do you think your job compares to your fathers? Do you 







On the whole, would you say members of your generation are 





How much income would you say a family of four needs to make 
in a year in order to be "making it" here?
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CHANGES IN Machinist Valley
ql. Would you say that Machinist Valley is a better place, the




q2. In what ways has it gotten better and in what ways has it 
gotten worse?
POLITICS
si. Would you describe yourself as politically active?
s2. To you generally think of yourself as:
1. Strong Democrat
2. Not very strong Democrat
3. Strong Republican
4. Not very strong Republican
5. An independent
s3. In politics would you describe yourself as
1. A strong conservative
2. Conservative
3. Middle of the road
4. Liberal
5. Radical
Thank you very much for your time. Is there anything else that 
you can think of that might be important to include in this study 




Explain project. Purpose of this interview is to learn as 
much about the company as possible and what life is like for 
workers on their jobs.
al. How long have you worked here __________________________
a2. What is your position _________________________________
a3. It helps me to know a little bit about the background of a 
person in an interview. Could you tell me a little about 
your job history and how you eventually came to be working 
for this company?
a4. Could you now tell me more about the company and the 
products it makes?
a5. Where company is based _________________________________
a6. When company came to Liston _________________________
a7. What products does the company make?
a6. Number of employees _____________________
a7. Could you tell me about the categories of workers you have 
here? Both in management and in production work?
a7. Number of managers _____________________
a8. Number of workers ______________________
a9. Number of men _____________________
alO. Number of women _________________________
all. How many full time workers do you employ?
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al2. How many part time workers do you employ?
al3. Types of benefits workers get _______________________________
al4. Has the number of employees increased or decreased? By how
much? __________________________________________
Why?
al5. How difficult is it to get good workers? ___________________
al6. Do you have a lot of applications on file?__________________
al7. How do you usually get employees? ___________________________
al8. For someone starting, what educational level do you look 
for? _____________________________________
al9. What kind of training are workers given? ___________________
a20. What is the starting pay for a floor worker? _______________
a2l. What is the highest pay for a floor worker? ________________
a22. Where did the managers and supervisors come from? Did they 
work their way up or were they hired directly managers?
a23. Can you tell me about some of the things the company does 
for the community?
a24. Could you tell me what is the best part of your job?
a25. Could you tell me what is the part of your job you like the 
least?





The following methodology is used for calculating 1992 
adjusted wages.
Example:
If a worker made $25,000 in 1970, and we are to convert that 
to 1992 dollars the following methods are used.
1. Figure the inflation rate using the CPI adjuster.
(140.3 - 38.8) / 38.8 * 100 = X
= 262%
Note-
[140.3 is the 1990 CPI]
[38.8 is the 1970 CPI]
2. Figure the inflation rate adjustment.
$25,000 * 2.62 = X
= $ 65,399
3. Add the base year income to the inflation rate 
adjustment.
$25,000 + $65,399 « $90,399
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1992 INFLATION RATE ADJUSTMENT




1967 33.4 140.3 33.40 3.20
1968 34.8 140.3 34.80 3 . 03
1969 36.7 140.3 36.70 2 . 82
1970 38.8 140.3 38.80 2. 62
1971 40.5 140.3 40.50 2.46
1972 41.8 140.3 41.80 2 . 36
1973 44.4 140.3 44.40 2.16
1974 49.3 140.3 49.30 1.85
1975 53.8 140.3 53.80 1.61
1976 56.9 140.3 56.90 1.47
1977 60.6 140.3 60.60 1. 32
1978 65.2 140.3 65.20 1.15
1979 72.6 140.3 72.60 0.93
1980 82.4 140.3 82.40 0.70
1981 90.9 140.3 90.90 0.54
1982 96.5 140.3 96.50 0.45
1983 99.6 140.3 99.60 0.41
1984 103.9 140.3 103.90 0.35
1985 107.6 140.3 107.60 0. 30
1986 109.6 140.3 109.60 0.28
1987 113.6 140.3 113.60 0.24
1988 118.3 140.3 118.30 0.19
1989 124.0 140.3 124.00 0.13
1990 130.7 140.3 130.70 0.07
1991 136.2 140. 3 136.20 0.03
1992 140.3 140.3 140.30 0. 00
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